Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 32

Minutes of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, May 7, 1945, 6:18 p.m.

San Francisco, May 7, 1945, 6:18 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (31) present at meeting.]

The Secretary opened the meeting at 6:18 p.m. and announced that the regular meeting of the Delegation each day would take place at 6:15 p.m. …

Statement by Senator Vandenberg

Senator Vandenberg remarked that Mr. Molotov had held a press conference that day and that he had a transcript of this conference before him.²⁸ He noted that Mr. Molotov had adroitly tried to leave the inference that in omitting the reference to “treaties”, we were attempting to provide a means by which the enemy could get out from under repressive measures. Of course this was not the reason, but Mr. Molotov’s interpretation made a hot story.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that he had met with press representatives that afternoon and reread to them the statement made by Senator Vandenberg in the press conference Saturday morning.²⁹ He had pointed out that the phrase “regardless of origin was in fact broader than the term “treaties”. Mr. Pasvolsky said he had defended Senator Vandenberg and said that he thought that Senator Vandenberg’s own press statement would help to straighten out the situation.

The Secretary announced that he would have to reach a quick decision on the matter raised at the morning meeting. (1) He would need to have the instructions of the Delegation as to what he would say to Mr. Molotov before he left. (2) It was important for two or three members of the Delegation and for Mr. Rockefeller and himself to meet with a half dozen of the Latin American ambassadors in order to thoroughly understand their position. Furthermore, he needed time to take the whole question up with the President after the Delegation reached a position. Representative Bloom suggested that the Delegation hear the report of the subcommittee appointed at the meeting of the morning.³⁰ Mr. Dunn stated that an attempt had been made to draft alternatives in the form of a protocol and in the form of an amendment to paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII. Mr. Dunn then read the following two proposals:

(1) “It is the understanding of the undersigned that the provision of Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2, with respect to authorization of enforcement action by the Security Council will not apply to the repression of aggression under a regional arrangement, such as contemplated by the Act of Chapultepec, which will define in advance the conditions under which said repression may occur.”

(2) “The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of measures against enemy States in this war provided for pursuant to Chapter 12, paragraph 2, or pursuant to regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of such States, and with the exception of measures to repress aggression under a regional arrangement, such as contemplated by the Act of Chapultepec, which will define in advance the conditions under which such repression may occur, such exceptions in all cases to expire when the Organization by consent of the Governments concerned may be charged with the responsibility for preventing the aggression so exceptionally dealt with.”

Representative Bloom asked whether Mr. Dunn thought that the protocol proposition would take care of the problem. Mr. Dunn expressed the view that if any proposal along the lines he had read was raised, it would be difficult to avoid opening up the old question of the exclusion of all regional arrangements from the jurisdiction of the Organization.

Senator Vandenberg said he realized that if we now opened up this question Mr. Molotov would put an unfriendly interpretation on our action.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Harriman would make a statement to the Delegation. Ambassador Harriman commented that he and Mr. Bohlen were shortly going to talk to Mr. Molotov. He added that while he would not talk on the substance of the question, he did have the following advice to give: (1) he thought we should not approach Mr. Molotov alone, but should rather meet him with the four powers together; (2) he hoped that when we talked to Mr. Molotov we would be clear as to our objective so as not to leave the matter in a vague state and so possibly arouse unnecessary fears on the part of Mr. Molotov; (3) we should guard against any possibility of giving the impression that we were bowing out of regional organizations in Europe. Ambassador Harriman explained that the Soviet Union believes that Continental Europe is properly the field of action for continental countries only. We should be sure not to fall in with this assumption.

The Secretary asked Ambassador Harriman if he wanted to define his stand more fully. Ambassador Harriman remarked that he did not know where the discussion stood in its substantive aspects, but that he felt very definitely that all five powers should meet together and that we should not manage things in such a way that the South American countries became our “stalking horses”. In any event he said the Soviet Union would assume that we stirred up the problem. Moreover, he felt we should be clear that we are not backing out of Europe.

Senator Vandenberg thought we could approach Mr. Molotov by stating that we were not proposing to debate what had already been given him in the modifications of Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. We could point out that in order to achieve these ends, we had found it necessary to clarify the situation regarding the Act of Chapultepec. We could explain that we contemplated that, in the first instance, the Pan American authority would be the enforcement authority, subject to the ultimate action of the peace league if the regional action was not successful.

Ambassador Harriman remarked that he had no comment to make on the substance of the discussion, but he felt constrained to point out that the Soviet Union would use whatever excuse it could find to minimize our interest in Europe and might welcome our approach as a reason to get us out of Europe.

Dean Gildersleeve recalled that on Friday night Mr. Molotov had said he had to think our amendment over, and that at this time the Secretary had urged that all amendments must be in by midnight Friday night. She felt that the Secretary would be in a very difficult position if modifications of our amendment were now urged.

Mr. Rockefeller indicated his agreement with Ambassador Harriman that the Soviet representatives should be approached quite directly and with simple frankness.

Mr. Stassen indicated that if any effort was made to put into the basic document an exception for the western hemisphere, it would be a basic and tragic mistake. Mr. Stassen stated that the draft read by Mr. Dunn went too far and went further than the speech made by Senator Vandenberg on January 10,³¹ which, having received general approval, represented in his view the basic policy of the United States. To go as far as Mr. Dunn suggested would weaken our influence in the world and undermine the charter, which the world now looked to us to conclude. Mr. Stassen proposed a more limited protocol under which the Western Hemisphere would be given permission to take enforcement action in the event of aggression in an emergency situation until the Security Council took over. He said he would agree to a revision of our position to that extent only, and that he would strongly oppose any move that would open up the rest of the world situation. Senator Vandenberg said he had no objection to this proposal. The Secretary agreed that this represented exactly his position. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that even this went too far.

Senator Connally felt that whatever was done, the Secretary would have to see Mr. Molotov before he left and tell him the situation.

Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he would like to say a few words. He stated that the Act of Chapultepec does not provide for prior authorization of regional organizations by the general organization in taking enforcement action. The Act of Chapultepec says that whatever action is taken during the war must be in conformity with the world organization. At the time that the Act of Chapultepec was drafted it was our general understanding that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were not subject to change and we negotiated under instructions to use Section C, Chapter VIII as a basis. Therefore, the only interpretation that we can justifiably make of the Act of Chapultepec is to interpret it as being consistent with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. It is another story if we now propose to make a change.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that on Saturday in a three-hour talk which he had with Latin American representatives he emphasized that the United States did not and could not make commitments which went beyond paragraph 2 of Section C, Chapter VIII. Therefore, the Latin Americans would be aware of the fact that there is no commitment in the Act of Chapultepec beyond the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, nor are there any private commitments that go beyond the Proposals.

Mr. Pasvolsky said the basic situation we confront is to decide whether we wish to take the regional systems out of a world system of security. So far we have considered the Russians’ proposal as applying only to special states in a special situation. In the course of our negotiations the one point we were not sure of was whether the Russians meant to go beyond this limited exception. On Friday afternoon we proposed a change in the Russian proposal limiting it to enemy states. The Russians accepted this, while a French representative also indicated his agreement with this limitation. The French Foreign Minister today said that he would reserve his position. In other words, the matter is not altogether “smoked out”.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that he had one important point which he felt should be emphasized. If we open up the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to allow for regional enforcement action on a collective basis, the world organization is finished. In that event, we have accepted the thesis brought forward openly, at the beginning by the British and voiced also in the Russian press. We then move into a system in which we rely for our security on regional groups, large states with their spheres of influence surrounded by groups of smaller states. We will convert the world into armed camps and end up with a world war unlike any we have yet seen.

Senator Vandenberg asked what the purpose was of the Act of Chapultepec.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the Act of Chapultepec fulfilled one useful and very necessary purpose. In 1940 at the Conference at Habana³² the Monroe Doctrine was extended, so that if any one of the American states was attacked by a non-American power each assumed the responsibility to consider it an attack upon itself. Under that Doctrine we were able to call upon the other American states when Japan attacked us, since the Japanese attack was under this Doctrine an attack on each of the American states. The only state that did not respond was Argentina. All the other states broke their relations with the Axis or put their resources at our disposal.

Recently there was some feeling that the Doctrine developed at Habana was not enough. It did not cover an attack by one American state upon other American states. This explains the Act of Chapultepec which extends the area of the doctrine of joint responsibility, so that the attack by any American state upon another American state is an attack upon each American state.

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that there were some at Mexico City who attempted to build a super-structure of a full-fledged regional system on the basis of this Doctrine. When first proposed, the draft for the Act of Chapultepec contained a mandatory obligation to use force which went way beyond the consultative obligations assumed under the Act of Habana. According to the first proposal, enforcement action would be mandatory for all American states when adopted by a majority. So, six Central American states, three island states, Venezuela, and Ecuador could send into action the forces of the United States. This mandatory obligation became in the course of negotiation an obligation to consult with the American states with a view to deciding what action should be taken.

Mr. Pasvolsky said he would like to point out that we are not now obligated permanently, as a treaty is envisaged in the Act of Chapultepec which would have to be ratified by the Senate. For the time being we are committed only to consulting and to determining what action is necessary to further the war effort. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that there was written into the Act of Chapultepec an enumeration of measures corresponding to those in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which were there, he said, for some unaccountable reason. Moreover, there is the obligation, after the establishment of peace, to consider the conclusion of a treaty under which the wartime obligations would be assumed in perpetuity. Very important, however, was the fact stated in Chapter III of the Act of Chapultepec that the operation of the Act shall be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Organization, when that Organization is set up.

Mr. Rockefeller stated that he tended to agree with Mr. Pasvolsky’s statement and that it was interesting to note that the initiative for the Act of Chapultepec had come from Mr. Roosevelt, who had proposed to the Colombians that they propose a resolution for the mutual guarantee of borders in this hemisphere.³³ Mr. Roosevelt had said he would tell the Chinese and the Russians that this is what we intended to do. Mr. Rockefeller explained that the Latin Americans had no desire to withdraw from the World Organization and wanted to play their part fully. He thought that if Mr. Pasvolsky’s suggestion was adopted we would be able to move forward happily with the Latin Americans.

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that there were three items not thoroughly considered in connection with the Act of Chapultepec:

(1) We never considered whether under this system we committed all of our forces or only a part of our forces.

(2) We never faced the question as to the kind of procedures by which our forces would be set in motion.

(3) Action could be taken, not only if a certain event took place, but also if there was suspicion of such an event, and we have not clarified our interpretation of intervention.

Senator Vandenberg stated that the problem was that we would be helpless to act in the new world if our action was not wanted by China or Russia. Mr. Pasvolsky noted that thanks to our own veto power no state could interfere in this hemisphere. In the event of an attack upon us from within or without, we would go to the Security Council, and if the Security Council refused to act, we would take action in self-defense. There was no question, he said, but that if our security was immediately imperiled by the failure of the Organization to act, we would ourselves act.

Senator Vandenberg said this amounted to doing as we pleased. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that we would do as we pleased only if we were attacked and the council would not act. He asked what Senator Vandenberg thought we ought to do if the system failed. Senator Vandenberg asked Mr. Pasvolsky whether he would be willing to have him tell the Senate that if the Security Council voted no and we thought action was vitally necessary we could take action on our own. Mr. Pasvolsky remarked that he would have no objection to Senator Vandenberg making the statement that if the Security Council failed we would have to go ahead and act.

Representative Bloom asked whether the Monroe Doctrine still remained untouched. Mr. Pasvolsky replied in the affirmative. Senator Connally asked how the Monroe Doctrine was protected. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the Monroe Doctrine is protected by our right of veto and by the obligation assumed by all the states, including the big powers, not to intervene. The old [whole?] system, he said, rests upon the good faith of the big powers and their willingness to behave. If they fall out there is no opportunity to keep the peace.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that our only protection was then our right of independent action. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that this was not our only protection, but that there was certainly no statement in the text under which we would give up our right of independent action. Mr. Dulles indicated his general agreement with Mr. Pasvolsky, but pointed out that he would argue the case on different grounds. He thought that Senator Vandenberg could say that at no point would the member states give up their right to use force in all circumstances. Under principle four they pledged to refrain from the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization. Since the prevention of aggression was a purpose of the organization, action to prevent aggression in the absence of action by the Security Council would be consistent with the purposes of the organization. He thought that if a European country vetoed action to prevent aggression in the Western Hemisphere, we would be entirely free to use force. Mr. Stassen stated that in order to keep us free to use force under these circumstances, he had previously favored the omission of the phrase in principle four “consistent with the provisions of the Charter”. Senator Vandenberg commented that he had no further complaint to make, but that he was now convinced that the people would be disillusioned beyond words when they realized the plan. Mr. Stassen said he would be willing to speak on the subject and would gladly testify before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Senator Vandenberg thought that there was a general renunciation of the right to use force. Both Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen pointed out that this was not the case.

Senator Connally suggested that Mr. McCloy make a statement. Mr. McCloy pointed out that he had just had a talk with certain Latin American delegates who had, in a tolerant and composed way, shown that they knew our problem and appreciated our situation. He felt there was a good chance that in the discussion of paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII, an effort would be made to eliminate the veto provision. Mr. McCloy had asked the Latin American delegates whether if we withdrew our proposal, making an exception of treaties against enemy states, this would solve the difficulty. He reported that they had replied in the negative, suggesting that the whole issue would have arisen anyway in connection with the veto power of the major nations. They appreciated the fact that we felt it necessary to keep our hand in Europe, realizing that we had spent our men and our resources in wars that had arisen in Europe over minor incidents. He reported that they appreciated our need of finding a formula, and that they were quite sympathetic.

Mr. McCloy suggested that the question might be confronted by weighing the relative assets of Europe against the assets of this hemisphere. He personally believed that both assets were important in their own way, and he did not feel that we could sit here deciding between the value of the two assets in a hypothetical way. Mr. McCloy felt we would have the sympathy of our Latin American friends in reaching a formula. He thought that if such a formula was reached we should consult the President. He proposed that the procedure suggested by Ambassador Harriman, to consult only after our position was clear and to hear from the Latin American delegations as to their attitude on the problem, would go a long, long way in helping the situation.

Senator Vandenberg asked Mr. McCloy what he recommended. Mr. McCloy recommended that we follow along the lines of the protocol already suggested. He realized, however, that the main difficulty lay in the veto power of the major powers.

Mr. Rockefeller expressed the feeling that we would lose the conception of consultation before acting if we accepted the proposal made by Mr. Stassen and Mr. Pasvolsky. Mr. Stassen pointed out that it was assumed that we would act in this hemisphere, in the event of the Security Council failing to act, only after consultation with the other states.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the following procedure be adopted:

(1) We should not take up changes in paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII, as our proposals;

(2) We should take up the issue in the course of consultations with other countries and should state our position in the course of these consultations. A number of proposals, including the Cuban proposal,³⁴ have been brought forward on this question. We should present our case in the course of discussing these proposals.

(3) The Secretary should meet with the Latin American representatives as promptly as possible to get their views prior to discussing the question with Mr. Molotov. He added that we were now through with the period for refining the amendments of the Big Four and had come to the period for the discussion of the proposals of other governments. It was then perfectly natural to raise our problem in connection with the discussion of these other proposals.

Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that in addition to the Cuban proposals there were proposals by Chile and Paraguay.³⁵ Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that at the meeting the next day these proposals be brought up, that at first the five powers talk them over, and that then consultations should continue with the heads of the other delegations. Mr. Rockefeller agreed that this was sound procedure.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether, in supporting the treaty that came out of this conference, which he expected to do, if he was asked to answer the question whether a state had the right of self-defense, Mr. Pasvolsky would support him in making a reservation on this question. He added that he expected that the Senate would insist on such a reservation and that he would want to support it. Representative Bloom asked whether the Senator meant an interpretation or a reservation. Senator Vandenberg replied that he meant an interpretative reservation. Senator Vandenberg thought that some reassurance would have to be given the Senate on the right of self-defense. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that if the system failed, that is, if the Security Council did not act when it ought to, obviously a state was free to act to defend itself. Mr. McCloy commented that the issue might not arise as a clear case of self-defense. There was a possibility that the situation might arise in a more confused way. Senator Vandenberg asked what he should then say to the Senate. Mr. Pasvolsky urged that he did not promise intervention, and Mr. Rockefeller thought that the emphasis should not be on unilateral action, but rather on action through consultation.

Senator Connally asked what would happen if one South American country attacked another. The Council might wish to intervene, but we could veto action and act ourselves. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that there would be a bad situation if a state acted first and talked to the Security Council afterward. Mr. Stassen said that he agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky that action should take place only when the Security Council failed to act or unduly delayed action. Mr. Pasvolsky said that he thought that Mr. Stassen earlier had said that we could act only “until” the Security Council takes action. Mr. Stassen said this was not what he had meant to imply.

The Secretary requested that a statement be prepared that evening setting forth the issue as a basis for his talk with the President. Mr. Bowman thought it was very important for the Secretary to be thoroughly briefed on this question since in his view it was at the heart of the whole problem.

The Secretary asked that a further statement be prepared by Mr. Hickerson and his assistants for the use by the Secretary in talking with Mr. Molotov. Agreement was reached that Mr. Stassen, Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Rockefeller, and Mr. Bowman would join the Secretary in his talks with the Latin American representatives at 9:00 a.m. the next morning.

Mr. McCloy took issue with Mr. Pasvolsky’s suggestion, and urged that we present the problem before us to Mr. Molotov as our own and not as a problem raised by the Latin American countries. The Secretary thought we should sleep on this question, but that he personally preferred at this time raising the issue in connection with the discussion of the proposals by other governments. Mr. Rockefeller thought that it was safer to be perfectly honest in this matter, and Mr. McCloy agreed that any other tack would arouse suspicion.

Mr. Pasvolsky added that we were now through with the period of defining the amendments of the Big Four and had come to the period for the discussion of the proposals of other governments. It was then perfectly natural to raise our problem in connection with the discussion of these other proposals. Mr. Pasvolsky said he intended to raise this question as the number one problem in the subcommittee appointed by the Big Five that afternoon.

The Secretary asked that Mr. Dunn speak immediately to Mr. Gromyko, explaining that the Secretary would want to see Mr. Molotov before he left.

Mr. Stassen asked for the consent of the Delegation to the holding of a press conference by Mr. Bloom and himself to give background information on trusteeship. He noted that there was considerable demand for such a press conference. The request was granted.

The Secretary adjourned the meeting at 7:30 p.m.

28. Statement issued by Mr. Molotov at press conference, May 7, not printed.
29. Press statement by Senator Vandenberg, May 5, not found in Department files. For United States-proposed amendments, chapter V, section B, paragraph 6, May 2, see Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 681; also, Doc. 2, G/14(v) May 6, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 598.
30. Minutes of meeting, May 7, 9 a.m., p. 615.
31. Congressional Record, vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 164–167.
32. For documentation on the second meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Habana, July 21–30, 1940, see Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. v, pp. 180 ff.
33. For draft resolution No. 42 (submitted to the Mexico City Conference, February 21–March 8, 1945), entitled “Declaration on Solidarity against all Aggression”, see Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21–March 8, 1945 (Department of State publication No. 2497), p. 185; for documentation on the Conference, see Foreign Relations, vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.
34. Doc. 2, G/14 (g) (3), May 6, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 524.
35. Doc. 2, G/28, May 6, “Joint draft amendment to chapter VIII, section C of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals by the delegations of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru”, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p. 620; no record found of proposed amendment by Paraguay on this subject; see remarks presented by the Government of Paraguay at the Mexico City Conference, ibid., p. 347.