Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224. Box 96: US Cr. Min. 31

Minutes of the Thirty-First Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Monday, May 7, 1945, 9 a.m.

San Francisco, May 7, 1945, 9 a.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of persons (29) present at meeting.]

Senator Connally, in the absence of the Secretary, convened the meeting at 9:00 a.m.

Question of Unofficial Representatives of Official Organizations

Mr. Hiss reported that he had come to the American Delegation to explain the status of the representatives of the five official organizations invited to the Conference. He had heard that the American Delegation was not altogether clear on this question, and although he thought there was no confusion, he thought the best way to handle the matter was to speak to the Delegation directly. He pointed out that the status of the representatives had remained the same since we left Washington. They continued to have an unofficial status and were not allowed in the closed sessions of the Conference, although it had been reported to him that a member of the American Delegation had said they would be admitted. Moreover, it looked as though the organizations might eliminate on their own initiative representatives of neutral nationality. The Permanent Court of International Justice had dropped their Spanish representative. He added that it now looked as though the Committee on the Court would invite to its meetings the representatives of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Mr. Dunn thought the whole question of invitations to committee meetings of unofficial representatives should be referred to the Steering Committee. Mr. Hiss explained that so far the Conference was taking the same position that was taken in Congressional committees where each committee could invite in such persons as it wanted. In any event, he felt it would be better to raise this question at the committee level and not impose a decision from above. Representative Bloom commented that Congressional committees, when in executive session, invited persons to be heard only and only for a limited time. Mr. Hiss emphasized that the unofficial representatives of the five organizations have no status unless they are invited by the committees. He pointed out that one of the most important things was to get rid of the neutral representatives. If the neutral representatives withdrew, it would be possible to publish the names of the unofficial representatives in the Conference list.

Mr. Stassen commented that the question of inviting the two judges had arisen in the discussions of Committee IV/1.¹⁵ It had been pointed out that the question was under consideration in the Steering Committee and therefore should be laid over. Mr. Hiss commented that the question was not under consideration in the Steering Committee and, as far as he knew, the only place it was being considered was in the committees themselves. Mr. Stassen stated that the situation would be chaotic, since different committees would make divergent decisions. He felt it was up to the Steering Committee to define the rules.¹⁶ Mr. Hiss indicated that on this question the Congressional committees made their own rules. Mr. Stassen pointed out that the situation was not comparable in the two cases, since Congressional committees voted on the admission of citizens, whereas the issue before the Conference was whether official organizations should be given a status comparable to that of potential member states. Representative Bloom added that unanimous consent was generally required on Congressional committees for the admission of members.

Mr. Hiss pointed out that his staff was operating on instructions not to raise the question in the Steering Committee until it was negotiated outside the committee. Senator Connally disapproved of the procedure of allowing committees to make their own decisions.

Mr. Sandifer commented that in fact the representatives of the official organizations have from the start been put in a different category from private organizations. The sponsoring governments had opposed the unofficial representation of private organizations, while consenting to the unofficial representation of the five official organizations. Mr. Dunn pointed out that the official organizations had been authorized only to send observers. Mr. Hiss added that the invitation requested that they come for “informal consultation”.¹⁷

Dean Gildersleeve said that for the purpose of the record she would like to make it clear that she had had a conversation with the representatives of the I.L.O. who had inquired concerning what status they would have, but that she herself had said nothing to them on the matter. She recalled that the Delegation had decided that several of its representatives might well meet unofficially with the representatives of the five organizations at some opportune time.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether Mr. Hiss had accomplished his business. Mr. Hiss replied in the affirmative. Senator Vandenberg then said “Goodbye”.

. . . . . . .

Reconsideration of Four-Power Amendment of Regional Arrangements, Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2

Senator Connally called on Senator Vandenberg to present his proposal to apply the same type of exemption to the “regional agreements” of the Pan American Union under the Act of Chapultepec which we allow to our European allies in respect to our European enemies.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that he must have had a brain fag at the end of the meeting on Friday for he now felt that our proposal for Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2, made it impossible for us to face either our European friends on the one hand or our Latin American friends on the other. He therefore had written the letter which the Secretary had distributed to the members of the Delegation (Letter by A. H. Vandenberg, May 5, 1945¹⁸). He remarked that from his point of view the question of fortifying our position with our American friends was so utterly fundamental that he would hate to impair this position by any action that might be taken.

Mr. Bowman reported that in the discussion that had taken place Sunday on this question no one could recall clearly the objections raised by Mr. Stassen to the proposal, objections stated during the “bedroom session.” Mr. Bowman asked Mr. Stassen to explain those objections¹⁹ if he was willing.

Mr. Stassen remarked that his objections concerned the clause which took the whole European scene away from the Security Council, at the same time leaving the entire Western Hemisphere within the jurisdiction of the Security Council. He stated that he did not wish to see more areas taken out of the jurisdiction of the Security Council, but preferred to soften the veto power. He indicated that the draft as it stood, as we submitted it to the Secretary-General, was an improvement over the earlier language and that this explained why he had felt so strongly about the original language. He urged that the Security Council would be a very weak body if it was deprived of jurisdiction over events in this hemisphere. On the other hand, it was difficult to see how this hemisphere could be left under the Security Council and Europe outside. He pointed out that the way the language now stood we would have to have the support of the Soviet Union to take enforcement action in this hemisphere, whereas the Soviet Union would not require our vote in taking action in Europe. He proposed that the issue be met, however, not by making further inroads on the powers of the Security Council, but by increasing the exemptions from its jurisdiction.

He pointed out that one important question was whether France could act under the regional arrangements against Germany and at the same time Veto our action through the Security Council.

Senator Vandenberg noted that Mr. Stassen had suggested handling the situation by a change in the voting section. He questioned whether this was the way to handle the matter. His proposal, he said, did not involve robbing the Security Council of authority to act in the event that a situation was not being adequately cared for under a regional arrangement. On the other hand he felt it would preserve to us, until such time as the effectiveness of the world organization was demonstrated, the right to take advantage of the 100 or more procedures of the Pan American system including solidarity of mutual defense.

Senator Connally commented that in view of the present position perhaps our best immediate procedure would be to ask the Secretary to withdraw our consent to the proposed amendment to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2. Senator Vandenberg agreed this was the next step.

Mr. Dunn remarked that Mr. Molotov had called on the Secretary late Saturday²⁰ and had indicated the entire agreement of the Soviet Union with our two additional amendments. Representative Bloom proposed that rather than withdraw our amendment we should proceed, if necessary, to amend it in discussion. Senator Vandenberg thought the Secretary could say to Mr. Molotov that we were not proposing to alter or modify the regional provision as it related to the Soviet Union, but that we have to have a comparable right for this hemisphere, particularly in order to get the right for the Soviet Union. Senator Vandenberg suggested an informal conference between Mr. Molotov and the Secretary.

Mr. Dulles indicated that our regional proposal was substantially similar to the one included in Chapter XII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Moreover, he thought that we should give very thorough consideration to the problem and not immediately go into discussion with Mr. Molotov. The fact of the matter is, he said, we had filed an amendment which the Russians approved.

Mr. Stassen commented that this amendment was not one of our own proposals, but was rather an alternative that we had worked out to meet the demands of the French and the Russians.

Mr. Dulles remarked that the best way to handle this question was by amending our own amendment when proposals from other countries developed. He was sure that such proposals would be forthcoming. The important thing, he added, was not to let Mr. Molotov go home before this question was reopened. If he returned and we then opened the question, he certainly would charge us with bad faith and he would justifiably feel about our action some of the things that we have been feeling are typical of the Soviet Union. He added that we should do whatever we can in this situation to preserve our integrity. Senator Vandenberg thought we could approach Mr. Molotov on the basis of the position that we did stand by our agreement as far as he was concerned, intending no change in the provisions affecting the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles suggested that we would actually be altering the power of the Soviet Union if we made Senator Vandenberg’s proposal, since we would deprive the Soviet Union of veto over action in this hemisphere.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that we were not deprived of an opportunity to give subsequent consideration to this proposal. In fact, it was obvious that further consideration of it would have to be given since smaller powers would be making their own proposals on this same subject.

Mr. Armstrong pointed out that the general organization would be ruined if we made general exceptions for regional arrangements. The Soviet Union would demand freedom in Europe. The Latin American states would demand freedom in this Hemisphere. He wondered whether it would not be possible to handle the matter by itemizing occasions upon which the veto power would not hold. In this way it would not be necessary to make general exceptions for regional arrangements. He thought a rather simple list of events would do the trick.

Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that the Soviet Union under the exemption we had given them would on the basis of unilateral treaties build up a system which would amount to a strong regional system. Senator Vandenberg asked Mr. Rockefeller what the reaction of the Latin American states was to this exception. Mr. Rockefeller explained that they were frankly disturbed. They felt that without consultation with them we had in fact liquidated Chapter VIII, Section C. They now felt that we would not ratify any treaty on the basis of the Act of Chapultepec so that they feel we have liquidated the agreement made there. The Ministers he had talked to, he said, believe that something substantially new has been done in which they had no voice and which they feel has given them no security or protection. Mr. Stassen pointed out that the Act of Chapultepec explicitly states that action should be subject to the purposes and principles of the Organization. Mr. Dulles asked why the Latin American Minister felt the question had arisen as a new issue. Mr. Rockefeller explained that the whole matter had been threshed out on a democratic basis in Mexico City and that now the Latin American Ministers were confronted with an agreement made without consultation with them.

Mr. Notter asked whether we intended to go back on Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Declaration with its reference to consultation in taking action against enemy states.²¹ Mr. Stassen said he assumed that we would be in all action taken with respect to enemy states under the surrender terms. Mr. McCloy stated that having our armies in Europe would also keep us in the picture.

Senator Vandenberg said he would now like to ask whether the Military Advisers had any comments to make on this question. Mr. McCloy stated that he did not see how we could vote against a South American proposition for hemisphere solidarity. We had agreed to the Act of Chapultepec. In the discussions with the Big Four we did not get the full implication of the provision with respect to enemy states. We find that we have wiped out the veto provision in Europe permitting the Russians without restraint by us to deal on their own terms with the enemy states. Since the veto on Europe has been wiped out it would seem wise to wipe out the veto provision altogether. Rather than add an exception for the Western Hemisphere it would make sense to wipe out the veto provision altogether and allow regional organizations to operate on their own impetus.

Mr. Armstrong asked Mr. McCloy what he thought of the suggestion to enumerate a number of occasions on which the veto power would not be exercised. Mr. Dulles questioned whether agreement on such a list could be reached here. Mr. Dulles added that while the Soviet Union would have a free hand in Eastern Europe under our amendment, we would still have a voice in Western Europe. From his point of view the question was whether it was worth it to us to save our position in Western Europe or whether we should trade this off to assure American solidarity. This decision, he felt, would be the highest decision of national policy—whether or not to build on hemisphere solidarity alone and throw away all of Europe or whether to save our voice in Western Europe. Mr. McCloy thought it was essential not to sacrifice our position with the British Empire as well as with Western Europe. Mr. Stassen proposed that we not deal ourselves out of Europe for fear of a possible circumstance when we would want to rely exclusively on the Western Hemisphere. The taking on of more exceptions he said would result in our being crowded out of the rest of the world. In any event he did not feel we should take a decision rapidly and should certainly confer fully with the President.

Representative Bloom asked what Mr. McCloy thought of Senator Vandenberg’s proposal on page 2 of his letter beginning “and with the exception of measures which may be taken under Resolution VIII, known as the Act of Chapultepec”, etc. Mr. McCloy said that this exception would take care of the point he had but would not satisfy Mr. Stassen. The protocol method moreover might be preferable.

Senator Connally asked whether action should be taken to do away with the veto. Mr. McCloy felt that to do away with the veto would mean the elimination of the clause now in Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 2 that no enforcement action should be taken by regional organizations without the authorization of the Security Council. Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that the exception with regard to treaties in Europe already does away with the veto power. Mr. Stassen objected. Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that the argument had been made that if the Security Council refused to act, enforcement action would be taken in any event by this country in self-defense. He asked what would prevent Russia, on the basis of this same argument, from also taking independent action.

Mr. Stassen replied that if the organization failed to act we would not spinelessly give up. Mr. Rockefeller then asked what significance the veto had. Mr. Stassen replied that if the veto power impairs effective action for international security then we would have to act anyway. Mr. Rockefeller thought then that the veto power meant nothing more than a piece of paper. Mr. Stassen said that any one of the major powers could destroy the organization. Mr. Rockefeller recalled that at an earlier meeting Mr. Stassen had urged that a provision be included so that if the Council failed to act, force could still be employed on a regional basis without destroying the organization. Mr. Stassen pointed out that he had always preferred some modification of the veto power. Mr. Rockefeller indicated that the position he was taking did not imply any lessening of the power of the Security Council to take action in a situation if the Security Council thought such action was necessary. Mr. Bloom noted that Senator Vandenberg’s proposal was limited in time by the phrase “until such time as the organization may, by consent of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, be charged with this function”. Senator Vandenberg thought this proposal would be acceptable. Mr. Bloom agreed that this limitation narrowed the exception and made it less objectionable. Mr. Rockefeller agreed.

Mr. Stassen urged that to adopt Senator Vandenberg’s amendment would be to destroy the organization. If we intend to make this kind of a provision in Chapter VIII we should do it in Chapter I and realize that we were undermining the whole effort.

Mr. Rockefeller asked why Mr. Stassen had not objected to the weakening of the Organization by the exception for the Russian-French treaty. Mr. Stassen said he had strongly objected. He hoped that the definition of enemy states could be narrowed and moreover he thought it useful to point out that our amendment applied not only to action by European states against enemy states but also to action by any states in the world against former Axis states. The position we had taken in the amendment in its present form is in line with Senator Vandenberg’s speech.²² Mr. Stassen said he believed that it was not a general exception but was a limited and restricted exception that seems to have had the general approval of the public, if one can judge by the reaction to Senator Vandenberg’s speech. Mr. Stassen said he would not approve a further exception being made in the basic document itself. He would, however, go along with an agreement made in advance that the Western Hemisphere would receive prior authorization to take action on local disputes. In this way the regional organization would be kept subordinate to the general organization. Dean Gildersleeve commented that we had assumed that some such blanket authorization in advance would be forthcoming. Mr. McCloy indicated that he had recently talked with some of his friends, both French and English, who had indicated that they would support us on anything we wanted in connection with the Monroe Doctrine. Dean Gilpersleeve said that Mr. Koo had talked in the same vein. Mr. McCloy suggested that the problem comes down to getting agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. Notter stated that he could not refrain from pointing out that the proposed exceptions would wreck the international organization. He felt that the present amendment that we had proposed, even without further exceptions, undermined the Organization since no time limit was indicated for the treaties and action might be taken under them independently of the Organization forever. Mr. Notter pointed out that our amendment gave legal sanction to our Allies to build up a system that could in time be turned against us, He believed that all exceptions should be strongly fought in the name of American security. Senator Connally asked Mr. Notter what he recommended. Mr. Notter proposed that we return to the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Mr. Rockefeller stated that he would be satisfied with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals with a provision for prior authorization for action under the Latin American system. He stated that the Latin Americans felt that the United States had let them down and they were contemplating the disintegration of the Western Hemisphere system.

Senator Connally thought that it would be necessary for the Secretary to see Mr. Molotov promptly and to tell him that we were agreed that we could not put over our proposed joint amendment. Since we did not have the votes we might ask him for a release from our proposals and then reconsider them. Mr. Bloom asked whether, if we went back to Dumbarton Oaks, that would take care of the Act of Chapultepec. Mr. Notter thought that there was a danger of us selling out under the Act of Chapultepec simply in order to provide for an ultimate event that would probably not take place.

Mr. Dunn thought that there was no need for an exception for the Western Hemisphere. If we went back to the original language of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals the Inter-American System would have adequate protection. He noted that the exception in our proposed amendment was very similar to the exception formerly placed in Chapter XII of the Proposals. In fact, he said, it was the same provision in a different place. He questioned any decision that would compound the number of exceptions. He wondered why the original language of Chapter XII would not be perfectly satisfactory.

Senator Connally noted that Mr. Molotov was wedded to protection for his French treaty. Mr. Dunn commented that Mr. Molotov had his French treaty even under the old Chapter XII. Mr. Dunn suggested that if we proposed an exception for the Western Hemisphere the Soviet Union would want to extend its exception over all regional arrangements without any limitation. We had successfully narrowed down our exception to rights already in the Proposals. If we now request an exception for the Western Hemisphere the pressure will be great to arrange exceptions for all regional arrangements. Mr. Dulles questioned whether or not the basic question was to save our position in Western Europe.

Mr. Stassen said that even if Great Britain and other countries favored additional exceptions he felt that we should oppose them since they would tend to destroy the World organization. Senator Connally asked whether the regional organization could function under the original language of the. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Mr. Dunn replied in the affirmative, noting that the regional organization would have to be consistent with the General Organization. It would not be allowed, however, to take military action without authorization. Mr. Dunn added that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were built on the theory that there should be one General International Organization with teeth in it. If you distribute the right of enforcement action to regional organizations you distribute the teeth. Of course, he said, the decision might be made that the Inter-American System was so unique and so important that one had to sacrifice everything for it. If this is done, he said, the character of the world organization is changed. With the teeth distributed we would have to face the fact that any combination of powers might start up war in an area and we would have nothing whatever to say about it. Mr. Rockefeller said this was the case now under our amendment. Mr. Dunn noted that while any combination could take a stand against Germany there was not a general right to take enforcement action without authorization.

Mr. Stassen indicated that the provisions of our amendment as they now stood had been generally accepted as our national policy. Mr. Dunn agreed that the exception was a narrow one, for example, we had not given the Soviet Union and France the right to take action against Belgium without authorization. If we make one exception of a general nature he felt we would start the chain of exceptions until any group anywhere could take enforcement action without review or authorization by the Council. This system he said would be the end of the Organization.

Senator Vandenberg asked what we would say to the Latin American Republics who asked for some exception. Mr. Dunn replied that we would have to decide as to the type of organization we wanted. If we wanted regional organization we could go along with further exceptions. If we wanted overall supervision we should not make further exceptions. He thought that the Latin Americans would see the point of the exception in Europe. Since the Monroe Doctrine was protected by our right of veto and since the Act of Chapultepec does not itself call for the use of force he thought the Latin Americans would come along with us.

Mr. Rockefeller suggested that Mr. Dunn was making a legal interpretation. While the Act of Chapultepec was not a treaty and did not call for the use of force on a permanent basis we had agreed—we had pledged—our word of honor to work for a treaty. If we wished to continue good relations with the Latin Americans he said we would have to continue to work on the basis of good faith. (The Secretary joined the meeting).

The Secretary announced that he had been busy all day long on the telephone talking with the President concerning the development of the war situation. He wanted to be sure that the Delegation knew that Mr. Molotov had called on him Saturday late in the evening and had said that the Soviet Union accepted the two points on which the Soviet Union had reserved its position. There was now unanimity of the four powers on the amendments to the Proposals. The Secretary commented that the public angle on this question was important and that his judgment would be to leave Mr. Molotov to make his own announcement in his own good time.

Mr. Dulles reported that the New York Times had reported Mr. Molotov’s agreement with our Proposals.

The Secretary announced that the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Spaak, had left suddenly for Belgium. Whereas he had not checked out in the normal way the Secretary assumed there was no reason for his departure other than the urgency of his work at home. Mr. Dunn reported that a political crisis was pending in Belgium and that Mr. Spaak wished to be there for the reorganization of the government. The Secretary reported that he had been personally hurt by Mr. Spaak’s not taking leave of either Mr. Dunn or himself. Mr. Hickerson reported that Mr. Spaak hopes to return to the Conference.

The Secretary reported that Mr. Lie of Norway had been instructed to return and that he had explained to Mr. Lie that this would be embarrassing in view of his chairmanship. It would be a great blow, he said. Mr. Lie had assured him of his full confidence in the success of the enterprise and had in no way indicated any difficulty arising from the Conference.

The Secretary indicated that work would have to be speeded up in view of the day’s developments, with Mr. Molotov leaving in a few days and with the possibility that he might himself have to leave for Washington. He pointed out that he had asked for a special meeting of the Steering Committee and that he thought it was time to set up a drafting committee to get the charter knocked into shape.

Mr. Stassen commented that there was a danger in this procedure since we were just getting to the small power stage and we should take advantage of the Conference organization to permit the smaller states, particularly the dominions, to make their contribution. In addition to these regular Conference meetings, however, Mr. Stassen thought it would be possible to make special provisions for special sessions with the Secretary in the Penthouse of members of the other delegations. Senator Vandenberg agreed that these special meetings in the Penthouse might prove a shortcut to the ponderous procedure of the Conference. The Secretary asked how these meetings might be organized. Mr. Rockefeller replied that the countries might be divided into eight key groups and that if the Secretary could meet with them it might go a long way to answer the problems that had arisen because they had been left out of the meetings of the Big Four.

Mr. Dulles thought it would be possible even while the general discussions were going on in the Conference committees to have a small group of some five individuals whipping the Charter into shape so that a first draft would be ready for submission to the Steering Committee with such last minute changes as proved necessary.

The Secretary emphasized that the work of the Conference would have to be speeded along. Mr. Stassen thought it would do no damage to have a “flat week”, if meanwhile the heads of delegations were being invited by the Secretary to the Penthouse in order to present their views. Senator Vandenberg remarked that it would be out of the dog house into the Penthouse. The Secretary agreed with the suggestion and asked Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Rockefeller to prepare the plans for the meetings. The Secretary agreed that he would postpone the Steering Committee meeting today. Mr. Stassen emphasized that the primary purpose of the meeting of the delegations would be to receive their views.

The Secretary pointed out that the meetings with the heads of delegations should start today and continue tomorrow.

The Secretary stated that we could not reverse ourselves on our proposed amendment. He did not see how he could go to Mr. Molotov and make an about face. Senator Connally said he preferred the protocol arrangement under which the Pan American group would be authorized in advance to take regional enforcement action in local disputes. Mr. Dunn suggested that the protocol involved an assurance from the permanent members that they would permit prior authorization of the Pan American group.

Mr. Rockefeller stated that this was quite in line with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and could be raised with Mr. Molotov. The Secretary said he preferred to wait until later, at least until tomorrow, since it was psychologically impossible for him to discuss the revision of an amendment that was still warm.

Statements by Representatives of Labor

The Secretary welcomed the representatives of American labor organizations who had been invited to meet with the Delegation. …

The Secretary assured these representatives that the United States Delegation was doing everything in its power to represent their interests at the Conference and welcomed the opportunity of hearing their views. He explained that he was working on some important European matters and had asked Senator Connally to preside.

. . . . . . .

Assignment of Delegates and Advisers

Dean Gildersleeve urged that in so far as possible members of the Delegation should attend committee meetings as they had not been able to do the last few days.

Mr. Sandifer suggested that a final decision should be made on the assignment of advisers to committees.²³ The Secretary said he thought this matter had already been settled, but that if not a recommendation should be prepared by the Secretary-General after discussion with the delegates in charge and final decision made as promptly as possible. Mr. Stassen pointed out that Mr. Sandifer had attempted to get a decision on this question a number of times but that the Delegation had each time pushed the matter aside.

Mr. Bloom asked whether he was on the trusteeship committee. After a brief discussion Mr. Stassen indicated that he would be happy to have Mr. Bloom go with him on that committee.

Reconsideration of Four-Power Amendment on Regional Arrangements, Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2

Mr. Dunn pointed out that a decision would have to be made as to what would go into the protocol. Senator Vandenberg asked who should take responsibility for drafting the protocol. It was agreed that the committee should consist of Mr. Dunn, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Rockefeller, and Mr. Pasvolsky with possibly additional naval and military advisers.

Senator Connally indicated that we still had to decide whether we wished to pursue the method of the protocol.

General Fairchild thought the protocol would let us off the horns of our dilemma. We could maintain the right to take regional action at the same time that we would not violate the Charter. Mr. Bowman asked under the theory of the protocol when and in what form we would announce the decision. Mr. Dunn thought the whole question should, of course, be settled first among the Big Four.

Senator Connally proposed that the Secretary might go to Mr. Molotov and get his suggestion as to the proper procedure to follow. He doubted whether it would be possible to get agreement with the Russians on a satisfactory protocol.

Mr. Bloom suggested that two drafts be prepared, one, an amendment to Paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII, and a second amendment in the form of a protocol.

Mr. Stassen proposed that (a) the Secretary should promptly notify Mr. Molotov that this question was pending and should advise Mr. Molotov on the general nature of the problem we are facing, leaving to the discretion of the Secretary how far he would pursue this preliminary discussion; (b) appoint a technical committee to prepare a draft protocol; and (c) provide that the final decision as to the disposition of this problem would be made by the American Delegation before negotiations were opened.

(Mr. Pasvolsky entered the meeting.)

The motion made by Mr. Stassen was passed and the names of members of the Committee approved finally: Mr. Dunn, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Rockefeller, and Mr. Pasvolsky.

Mr. Pasvolsky made the statement that having read Mr. Vandenberg’s letter that had been before the Committee, he was completely flabbergasted.

Mr. Hickerson suggested that it might be best for the Secretary to meet with the members of the Latin American delegations alone. Mr. Stassen favored a meeting of the four powers with the American Delegation and the Latin American representatives. Mr. Bloom proposed that the meeting be of the five powers together with one or more members of the American Delegation accompanying the Secretary. After a brief discussion this last suggestion was agreed to.

… The meeting was adjourned by Senator Connally at 12:30 p.m.

15. Doc. 99, IV/1/2, May 5, UNCIO Documents, vol. 14, p. 137.
16. Doc. 165, ST/4, May 9, ibid., vol. 5, p. 189.
17. UNCIO Documents, vol. 1, p. 3.
18. Not printed; see The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, pp. 186 ff.
19. See minutes of the thirtieth meeting (Executive Session) of the United States delegation, Friday, May 4, 7:10 p.m., p. 607; during the recess period in the fifth Four-Power Consultative meeting at that time, the United States delegation adjourned to Mr. Stettinius’ bedroom where this discussion took place (Stettinius Diary, tenth day, May 4, pp. 2–3).
20. May 5.
21. Paragraph numbered 3 of the Moscow Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, November 1, 1943 states: “That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.” ( Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 756.)
22. January 10, 1945; Congressional Record, vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 164–167.
23. For list of delegates, advisers, and technical experts assigned to Conference Commissions, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1945, p. 858.