Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 19 (Exec)

Minutes of the Nineteenth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation (B), Held at San Francisco, Thursday, April 26, 1945, 9:05 p.m.

San Francisco, April 26, 1945, 9:05 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of persons (24) present at meeting.]

Secretary’s Report on Steering Committee

The Secretary, in opening the session, gave a brief report of the Steering Committee meeting that afternoon.⁵² …

The Secretary said that he had talked to the President and to Mr. Hull regarding the situation and had received from them encouragement to follow the policy which the United States Delegation was advocating. He said that the President particularly said that he felt the Delegation should “stick to its guns” in the matter of advocating the election of a single President.

Election of President of Conference

In reporting the general discussion on the subject of the election of the President, The Secretary said the proposal for the election of a single President [of the] Conference had been supported by Foreign Minister Padilla of Mexico, who had said that it was in the tradition of this Hemisphere. The Secretary said that then the British had advocated—as a compromise proposal—the election of four Presidents of the Conference, but that they had failed even to specify that any one of the four should serve as a chairman. However, he said, the British did propose that the United States representative should be chairman of the Steering and the Executive Committees.

At this point, the Secretary turned the discussion over to Mr. Dunn for a more detailed report on the British position on this matter.

Mr. Dunn said that the previous evening, word had been sent to Mr. Eden that the United States Delegation declined to accept the British proposal of four chairmen for the Conference. He said that Mr. Hiss, on Wednesday night, had talked to Sir Alexander Cadogan and that he, Mr. Dunn, had talked to Sir Alexander on Thursday morning regarding this matter. Mr. Dunn said that it was his understanding that Mr. Eden hoped that Field Marshal Smuts or Prime Minister King would present the Secretary’s name as the President of the Conference, and later, at the Steering Committee meetings Mr. Eden said that he himself would do it. Instead, however, Mr. Eden made the proposal that the Conference have four Presidents arid that each one of the four should rotate as presiding officer at the plenary sessions, with the United States representative being Chairman of the Steering and Executive Committees.

Mr. Dunn said that Mr. Molotov had proposed in the Steering Committee that the Conference have four Presidents of equal status, and that the Conference be run by the four Presidents equally and together. Mr. Padilla had been caught unawares by the British proposal, since he had expected to second the nomination of the Secretary to be the President of the Conference and the other three representatives of the sponsoring Governments to be Vice-Presidents. Consequently, Mr. Padilla, in speaking to the point in the Steering Committee meeting, had to make his case on the basis of the precedent at Inter-American Conferences, and was forced to make the original motion proposing the election of the Secretary as President and the representatives of the other three sponsoring Governments as Vice-Presidents.

Mr. Dunn reported that Mr. Molotov had made a strong speech in reply to Mr. Padilla’s proposal, pointing out that the Soviet Government considered it a principle of equality and unanimity among the four Governments that the Soviet proposal of four Presidents be accepted. Mr. Molotov had implied that Mr. Padilla had made a prepared speech. Mr. Padilla replied—Mr. Dunn reported—that his speech had been prepared on the basis of the traditional operations of Conferences in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Dunn reported that considerable confusion had then developed in the Steering Committee, with Field Marshal Smuts favoring the Soviet proposal, although it was originally understood that he had been furthering Mr. Eden’s proposal. Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, in effect, also supported the Soviet proposal. On the other hand, representatives of the other American republics clearly favored the proposal advanced by Mr. Padilla.

Mr. Dunn further reported at this point in the Steering Committee meeting that the Secretary made it clear that the United States could not accept the Molotov or Eden proposals. Mr. Dunn explained that under the Eden proposals, the Conference would have four presidents who would preside in rotation at the plenary sessions, with the Secretary of State presiding at the Steering and Executive Committee meetings with full authority to conduct the affairs of the Conference. Mr. Dunn also reported that there was clearly great sentiment for the Eden proposal.

Messrs. Dunn and Pasvolsky then both reported the happenings at the Steering Committee meeting during which it developed that Mr. Molotov appeared to favor the first part of Mr. Eden’s proposal for the four Presidents of the Conference, but did not appear to favor the second part of the proposal, whereby the Secretary of State would preside at the Steering and Executive Committees. It was clear, however, that Mr. Molotov had agreed that the Secretary should be chairman of the four Presidents. Further, it developed that Mr. Molotov had also proposed that there be four chairmen who would serve in rotation as heads of the Steering and Executive Committees.

Mr. Dunn reported that a vote had been taken on the issue but that it was not a clear-cut one. In the confusion, Mr. Molotov had made his point that he wanted the vote divided into two parts to cover the two items of the Eden proposal, but Mr. Eden would not consent to such a division, although Mr. Fraser of New Zealand had indicated his willingness. Following the confused situation, the Steering Committee had taken a brief recess and The Secretary reported that he had adjourned the meeting following the end of the recess, since it looked as if the situation would develop beyond control.

The Secretary said that he wished to have Ambassador Harriman report upon his conversation with Mr. Eden and other British officials regarding their apparent failure to carry out the understanding of the previous evening whereby they would have proposed that the United States representative be elected President of the Conference.

Mr. Harriman said that he had seen Messrs. Eden and Attlee, Lord Cranborne, Lord Halifax and Sir Alexander Cadogan just prior to the meeting of the United States Delegation. He said that he had told them that the United States Delegation felt that they had been “let down” by the British Delegation. Mr. Harriman said that Mr. Eden told him that they had understood that the United States Delegation had accepted the British proposal made the previous evening, stressing particularly that Sir Alexander Cadogan said he so understood from his conversation with Mr. Dunn. Mr. Harriman also reported that Mr. Eden said it was his understanding that Mr. Molotov did not accept the British resolution made in the Steering Committee meeting that afternoon, but accepted only that part of the proposal covering the four Presidents for the Conference. Mr. Harriman said he reported to them that the Secretary had talked with the President and that the President had insisted that the host Government have the presiding officer for the Conference. Furthermore, he said, he had reported to them that, in the opinion of the United States Delegation, this whole question was a matter of substance and not of form. Furthermore, he said, he had conveyed to them the views of the United States Delegation that the Delegation would not accept any proposal under which the Secretary of State was not made President of the Conference, chairman of the Steering and Executive Committees, and responsible—with full authority—for the conduct of the Conference.

Mr. Harriman reported that Mr. Eden said he would consult the representatives of the Dominions and would report their reactions later in the evening. He said that Mr. Eden felt that if his own proposal were divided into two parts as suggested by Mr. Molotov, he—Mr. Eden—and the British Delegation would support the United States proposal on the Conference Presidency. In response to an inquiry from Senator Connally, The Secretary assured him that the British had known of the United States proposal for the Conference Presidency for more than a month. Mr. Dunn said that he had even called Sir Alexander Cadogan to find out which of the British Dominions was going to nominate Mr. Stettinius for the post. Senator Connally said that he felt that this appeared to be a lack of good faith on the part of the British Delegation.

Mr. Harriman said that he felt that Mr. Eden and the British Delegation thought they were carrying out the wishes of the U.S. Delegation in the matter in the Steering Committee. He said that in his conversations with them he had said that the United States Delegation would undertake to handle the matter with the other American Republics if the British would undertake to handle the question with the Dominions. He said that, in his opinion, it would be better not to let this matter come to a vote in the Steering Committee without careful political preparation.

Representative Bloom inquired as to why the Dominions had opposed the United States proposal of that afternoon. Mr. Harriman replied that in his judgment, the matter had not been discussed with them properly, and as a consequence, misunderstanding had occurred.

The Secretary at this point said that he wished to make clear his position in regard to this whole matter. He said that he did not think that the issue of the Presidency of the Conference was of terrific importance insofar as the San Francisco Conference was concerned. But he did believe that if the Soviet proposal were accepted by the Conference, there would be thereby provided a pattern for the proposed international organization which might prove to be very serious in the end. Mr. Harriman added that, in his opinion, the Soviets were advocating four Presidents for the Conference because they wanted a “veto” position, which attitude arises out of their mistrust of other nations.

Senator Connally inquired as to whether it might not be possible that the British Delegation were using the Dominion Delegations in this instance as a “stalking horse”. Mr. Pasvolsky said that in his opinion such was not the case; that Mr. Eden had said in the Steering Committee meeting that his original position was the same as that of Mr. Padilla. Mr. Eden said that the compromise which he had put forth was advanced in the hope that if he moved from his original position Mr. Molotov would also move and it might be possible to agree on a compromise proposal.

Senator Connally inquired as to whether there was any possibility that the British Delegation was doublecrossing us; that they were petting the Russians at our expense. Mr. Harriman replied that he did not believe that such was the case; that the entire affair was due entirely to a misunderstanding and because of that fact he believed that it would be possible for the United States Delegation to straighten out this situation. Furthermore, he said that in his opinion, no useful purpose was served in questioning the motivations of the British Delegation in this particular instance. Dean Gildersleeve said that she agreed with this general position of Mr. Harriman. Senator Connally said that in his opinion it all developed into an unfortunate situation.

Representative Bloom then inquired as to whether the Delegation would continue to maintain the original United States position in this matter. The Secretary said that both the President and Mr. Hull had advised him to stick to the original position. He also said that he would like to have the advice of the Delegation in this matter as to whether (a) he should stick to the original position or (b) accept the Eden proposal.

The Delegation was then polled by the Secretary with the following results: Dean Gildersleeve said that if the Eden compromise satisfied the Soviet Delegation, then she thought it should be acceptable to us. If it did not, then she thought we should revert to our original position. Representative Bloom said that he thought we ought to adhere to the original United States position in this matter, but if the Soviet Delegation was willing to accept the Eden, compromise, he thought it should be accepted by us.

When he was asked for his views, Senator Connally inquired as to what the wishes of President Truman were. The Secretary replied that the President preferred a single President for the Conference, to be chosen from the United States Delegation, but that we were authorized to accept the proposal advanced by Mr. Eden.

Senator Vandenberg said that he felt the Secretary had been too scrupulous in this matter; that he was, in effect, tying his own hands too much by asking for detailed instructions from the Delegation. He said that in his opinion the Secretary should be authorized to accept the proposition upon which the United States Delegation could obtain the most votes.

Commander Stassen said that in his opinion the question of equal authority and rank of the four nations was involved. Mr. Dunn added that the Soviet Delegation wanted four equal Presidents so that no one could act without the approval of the other three. Mr. Stassen suggested that it might be wise to find out if the Soviet Delegation would accept the Eden compromise. If the Soviets would not, then, he suggested, the United States, Delegation might determine whether it could obtain the necessary votes for the original United States proposal. He further stated that he thought the Secretary should make a clear statement in the Steering Committee meeting that no question of rank was involved in these matters. Furthermore, Commander Stassen thought it might be helpful if the Secretary would get in touch with the Soviet Delegation at once.

The Secretary then asked for further opinions on this matter of the Advisers to the Delegation, with the following results:

Messrs. Pasvolsky and Harrovian said that if the Soviet Delegation did not get its way in this question, there was a possibility that they might withdraw from their position as a sponsoring power in order that they might have a free hand in the Conference.

Mr. Hackworth pointed out that the same situation had been faced in the Committee of Jurists in Washington; that the Soviet representative there would not serve as one of the three Vice Presidents after the Soviet proposal for four chairmen of the Committee had been defeated.⁵³

Messrs. Gates and Dulles agreed that it might be better to delay the vote in the Steering Committee the next day in order to gain time to consider the situation and mobilize support for the United States proposal.

At this point Mr. Hiss entered the meeting and The Secretary inquired as to whether there was any possibility of a misunderstanding the previous evening when Mr. Hiss had conveyed to the British Delegation the views of the United States Delegation on the British proposal. Mr. Hiss said that he thought that he had clearly stated the situation to Sir Alexander Cadogan and that there was no doubt in his mind at the time that the British Delegation clearly understood what the views of the United States Delegation were in the matter.

The Secretary said that it was his sense of the discussion that the United States Delegation was willing to accept the compromise advanced by Mr. Eden but that, in the opinion of the Delegation, it would be better to go back to the original United States proposal.

Senator Vandenberg suggested that the Delegation might advance a proposal under which the Conference would have four Presidents with the Secretary of State as Executive Chairman of the Conference chosen by the four Presidents. Messrs. Dunn and Pasvolsky opined that the Soviet Delegation would accept such a proposal at once.

Senator Connally said that in his opinion the United States Delegation was defeated on its original stand and that it could not go back to the original United States position. Therefore, it appeared better to him to accept the Eden compromise.

In attempting to summarize the discussion again, The Secretary said that it was his view that the Delegation preferred the original United States proposal but that they would authorize him to compromise on the Eden proposal as a minimum. Mr. Armstrong added that in his opinion it would be much better if the Delegation were defeated supporting the compromise than if they were defeated on their original proposal.

Dr. Bowman said that this discussion had somewhat disturbed him because he felt that the Delegation was attempting to go too far in giving detailed instructions to the Secretary as to what his position should be. He felt that this was the type of a decision which should be made at the top, and that only the general position of the Delegates and the Advisers ought to be stated.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that after what had happened that afternoon, the smaller countries now thought that the present situation in the Steering Committee was essentially a fight among the four sponsoring Governments. Therefore, it was impossible at this time to obtain a real heartfelt vote on the original United States proposal. He said that he felt that it would be better, however, to let the original proposal stand and if it were accepted by the Conference to see what the Soviet reaction would be. If Mr. Molotov refused to server as one of the Vice Presidents, that situation would have to be met when it arose. Therefore, he thought it might be well for the Secretary to talk to Mr. Molotov regarding this situation before the next meeting of the Steering Committee.

The meeting of the Delegation closed with Mr. Dulles expressing the view that the Secretary should attempt to obtain the best deal that he could; with Senator Connally expressing the belief that the original United States proposal was a better one but that the Delegation was licked on it and that it would have to go ahead on a compromise; and finally, with both Commander Stassen and Senator Connally stating clearly to the Secretary that he had their vote to do whatever he thought was best under the circumstances.

The meeting was adjourned by the Secretary at 10:35 p.m.

52. Reference is made to the meeting of the Heads of Delegations at 10:37 a.m. 2:30 p.m., April 26. After the three meetings of the Heads of Delegations, April 26, 10:30 a.m., April 27, 10:45 a.m., and April 30, 11:18 a.m., they became the Steering Committee which came into existence in accordance with recommendations of the Heads of Delegations adopted by a plenary session of the Conference on April 30.
53. See exchange of notes on this subject by the United States and the Soviet Union, April 11 and 14, pp. 269 and 291, respectively.