RSC Lot 60–D 224, Box 96: US Cr Min 10

Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at Washington, Monday, April 16, 1945, 9 a.m.

[Informal Notes—Extracts]

[Here follows list of names of persons (17) present at meeting, and announcement by Senator Connally, presiding in the absence of the Secretary, on the revised opening day arrangements at San Francisco.]

Tentative Allocation of Assignments for Other Countries

Senator Connaixy asked Mr. Hiss to explain the next item on the agenda—the allocation of assignments for other countries at the Conference.

Mr. Hiss distributed to the delegates copies of a chart setting forth the tentative allocation of officerships on the commissions and committees of the Conference.91 He noted that we had suggested that Chile replace Czechoslovakia on one committee, but that this proposal was not acceptable to the British and Russians and that no word had yet been received from the Chinese. Mr. Hiss then explained that the president of Commission I would probably be Mr. Smuts (South Africa), that the president of Commission II would probably be Mr. Spaak (Belgium), that the president of Commission III would probably be Mr. Lie (Norway), and finally that the president of Commission IV would probably be Mr. Para Perez. Mr. Hiss emphasized that the assignments were extremely tentative and that agreement had not yet been reached upon them. He indicated that the British had suggested that a decision be postponed until San Francisco,92 but that our preference was to decide the matter in advance in order to avoid a scramble at the Conference.

Senator Vandenberg questioned the designation of India for the chairmanship of the Committee on Economic and Social Cooperation. Representative Eaton thought the designation of Guatemala on the same commission was questionable. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that it was expected that a very competent person would head the Indian Delegation, and Mr. Hiss added that the British themselves had proposed India for the Executive Committee. Mr. Hiss added that the distribution of posts had been based on the assumption that the four sponsoring powers would have positions on the Executive Committee and Steering Committee, but would not have other positions on the committees and commissions since this might be interpreted as domination of the Conference by the Big Four. He added, however, that [Page 297] the British had asked for permission to have a rapporteur on one of the committees and had specifically notified the other sponsoring powers that they wished the position now designated for Honduras on the second committee of Commission II.

Senator Vandenberg asked what advantage it would be to have a rapporteur.

Mr. Hiss indicated that a rapporteur was a very important official since he would state the position of the commission and would be mainly responsible for assisting the chairman in drafting add reporting. Representative Eaton asked whether the officers on the commissions would be members of the delegations. Mr. Hiss Replied in the affirmative. Senator Connally commented that the United States would then have no chairmanship of committees. Mr. Hiss replied that we probably would have the chairmanship of the Executive Committee and of the Steering Committee. He emphasized of course that the present chart of positions was entirely tentative and had not been agreed to, and suggested that the Delegates return their copies to him for possible revisions.

Assignment of American Delegates, Advisers and Technical Experts93

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Other Papers

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Press Statement on Meetings of the Delegation94

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Character of Changes To Be Proposed by United States Delegation

The Secretary said he thought that the Delegation was going into the San Francisco Conference under pretty favorable conditions, in his mind the only question was the Soviet Government. Representative Eaton commented that this had always been the only question. The Secretary noted that the easiest way to get the Soviet Government to come along was to make as few changes as possible in the Proposals which they had agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks and the voting formula that they had accepted at Yalta. He thought the Soviets would sign these documents today.

Senator Connally thought that the least that was said now as to what had been done by the Delegation the better off the United [Page 298] States would be with respect to other nations. He thought it was plain horse sense to keep our decisions to ourselves.

The Secretary asked how many fundamental changes had actually been agreed to in the course of the discussions. Mr. Dulles said that he thought there was one, which was the suggestion of Mr. Vandenberg on the revision of treaties. Mr. Pasvolsky thought most of the suggestions were by way of clarification and that the one basic change was that of Senator Vandenberg’s. Mr. Pasvolsky added that, if this proposed change was now announced, he was afraid that other nations would interpret it as an attempt to bring pressure on them. He thought it was better to handle the matter subtly and carefully, and that, if it were so handled, it would be possible to secure the addition that Senator Vandenberg favored. Senator Connally agreed that the opposition to this addition would be hardened if the position of the Delegation was now announced. The Secretary thought it would be best at this time to reserve our position.

Mr. Stassen asked when it was contemplated that the Russians would be told of this suggestion, since he was sure that Foreign Commissar Molotov’s first question would be: “What changes do you propose?” Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that we were still going over the tentative decisions and discussing proposed changes.

The Secretary said he envisaged having the Big Four meet together after the general discussion on the opening days, at which time we could bring forward our two or three changes. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that, if the matter was handled in this way, we would actually find that we had considerable support for our suggestions.

Mr. Stassen asked if the Russians would give up their three votes if we accepted the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Mr. Dulles noted that in fact the Russian proposal was not inconsistent with the Proposals as they stood at present, since the question raised by the Russian proposal was: “What is in fact a state?” If the three republics were considered independent states then they could each be members of the General Assembly under the present Proposals. Mr. Stassen said he thought most of the suggestions were by way of filling in the Proposals and interpreting the document, and that they were not fundamental. He thought that no release would be better than the present one, and that it might at this time be better to remain silent.

The Secretary indicated that at some routine press conference he might say quite informally that the discussions of the Delegation had been entirely satisfactory and that the Delegation was generally in agreement. Senator Vandenberg questioned the phrase “generally in agreement”. Did that mean that the Delegation had agreed to his proposal—to what he believed was indispensable if the Senate was going to ratify the treaty? The Secretary said that his great [Page 299] concern was to have the Delegation act as a unit, and that he thought each member of the Delegation would have to do a little cutting and fitting of the cloth in order to make this possible. He said that he would give up some things to satisfy Senator Vandenberg and that he expected Senator Vandenberg to follow the same policy. Senator Vandenberg said that the press would read meaning into whatever statement was made and that therefore it was important to be sure that we meant what we said. The Secretary suggested that a brief sentence be prepared for him that he could use at a press conference at an early date.

[The Secretary was called from the meeting.]94a

Senator Connally said he did not think it would help the Delegation’s trading position at the Conference if we told in advance what we were going to do. He thought that the important thing was to keep our “cards in the hole”. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed with Senator Connally that the important thing was to do everything that could be done to get the Proposals we want negotiated and that we should therefore consider the problem as negotiators. This would mean that we would have to approach the Russians very carefully and talk the whole matter out with them behind the scenes. He said he was sure that in this way we would have a better chance of getting what we really wanted.

Representative Eaton commented that his concern was to get certain additions to the Proposals without which it would not be possible to get the Proposals through the Senate. Dean Gildersleeve remarked that the Senate was not the only hurdle, and that it would be well to keep in mind that we had to get an agreement acceptable also to a large number of other nations. Representative Eaton stated that in the end the Senate had the final say, however, and that we could never get an agreement that the Senate did not find acceptable.

Senator Connally said it was his view that the more closely we adhered to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals the more apt we would be to get something at San Francisco. Mr. Stassen said that he agreed with this view. Senator Vandenberg thought that certain amendments would be necessary, however, but that most of these would not affect the machinery and basic structure of the organization but would influence the consciousness of the American people. He said we had, of course, to have the American people with us and that we should keep this at the center of our attention. Senator Connally thought that, if our position were now known, the public would be quite satisfied. Mr. Stassen thought we should not at this time say anything to the American public that we had not previously discussed with other sponsoring powers.…

[Page 300]

Vandenberg Proposal on Adjustment of Treaties

Senator Connally indicated that Senator Vandenberg’s proposal concerning the adjustment of treaties still required discussion and that the two remaining questions were: (1) Should the proposal be adopted? and (2) Where should it be placed?

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that he had suggested placing the amendment in the chapter on the General Assembly: Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 6. He proposed adding to that paragraph the sentence “including situations arising out of existing treaties or other prior international engagements”. Senator Connally asked if this would include both prospective and retroactive situations. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that Senator Vandenberg wished to emphasize the revision of treaties that were in force. Senator Connally thought the word “existing” was restrictive. He preferred the phrase “including situations arising out of treaties or other international engagements”. Senator Vandenberg thought the sentence should read “situations arising out of treaties and other prior international engagements.” He thought it was very important to include the word “prior”, which, he said, was the key to the whole matter. He wanted to be able to tell men like Senator LaFollette that this was not an organization to freeze the status quo. Mr. Bowman said that the word “prior” did riot add anything.

Mr. Dulles suggested the draft “including situations arising out of then existing treaties or other international engagements”. He thought that the word “then” would relate to the time when the Assembly dealt with a particular situation. In this way he thought it would be possible to omit the word “prior”. Senator Connally questioned whether Mr. Dulles’ suggestion improved the draft. He favored “including situations arising out of treaties or other international engagements”.

Senator Vandenberg commented that Mr. Pasvolsky said that the authority he was now trying to bring out in the document was implicitly an authority of the General Assembly. However, many critics have said what Mr. Pasvolsky reads into the document cannot properly be read into it. He would like to see the matter clarified so that it was absolutely certain that the Organization could look backward as well as forward.

Senator Connally thought the word “prior” limited the conception. Mr. Bowman raised the question whether the mention of the date, January 1, 1942, did not complicate the addition of the sentence as suggested by Mr. Dulles. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that it was not possible to say “arising out of then existing treaties” with the prior statement of the date of the Declaration by the United Nations. Senator Connally said that he did not seriously object to the use of the [Page 301] word “then” or “prior”. Mr. Dunn said the term “then” implied the time at which the Assembly took the matter up. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the draft might read “including situations arising out of any treaties or other international engagements”. Mr. Stassen suggested the omission of the word “any”. Senator Vandenberg thought that this wording was good except that he would recommend the omission of the word “other”.

Senator Connally asked whether this new proposal obviated the difficulty with the mention of the date, January 1, 1942. Mr. Pasvolsky replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the power of the Assembly in this connection was subject to the limitations indicated in paragraph 2 of Section B, Chapter V. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the power of the Assembly to make recommendations concerning situations arising out of any treaties or international engagements was not subject to the limitations of paragraph 2 of Section B, Chapter V.

Senator Connally said that, while he had no objection to the Assembly discussing and making recommendations for the adjustment of situations arising out of treaties, he did not wish to empower the Security Council to revise such situations. Mr. Pasvolsky said that that was the reason why he had suggested the addition of paragraph 6, Section B, Chapter V of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Senator Connally said he wanted to be absolutely sure on this matter, and Mr. Pasvolsky reassured him that there was no question and that that was why we had not proposed that the Security Council be empowered to impose a settlement.

Mr. Armstrong said that the reference to the United Nations Declaration was in his view a great mistake and should be taken out. He said the declaration was a wartime declaration and referred to the principles of the Atlantic Charter only in the preamble. Senator Vandenberg suggested that this was the only point at which the signatories of the Declaration were identified and that he saw no objection to it. It was generally agreed that the reference to the United Nations Declaration should remain but that it should be redrafted to read: “or to violate the principles accepted by them in the preamble of the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942”.

Review of Proposals and Suggestions

Chapter VIII, Section C—Regional Arrangements

Senator Connally announced that the Delegation would now discuss Chapter VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals on Regional Arrangements.

[Here follows list of names of persons (14) present at meeting.]

[Page 302]

Mr. Pasvolsky said that the Committee on Security Aspects of Preparation for the United Nations Conference95 had recommended that no changes be made in Section C, a statement which was confirmed by Mr. Dunn. Mr. Pasvolsky further remarked that consideration had been given to proposals of foreign governments with respect to this chapter, but that it had been agreed to support none of these proposals. Senator Connally then asked if the Delegation were agreed as to making no changes, and without objection, the section was allowed to stand.

Mr. Dulles indicated, however, that, as paragraph 2 of Section C stood, any permanent member of the Security Council could veto enforcement action under a regional arrangement, whereupon Senator Connally read the paragraph in question and Mr. Pasvolsky confirmed the power to veto. Both Mr. Dulles and Commander Stassen interposed that this would permit France and China, for example, to veto American regional action in the Western Hemisphere. Senator Connally thought that the Security Council could veto enforcement action in a region but that no one power could veto an investigation.

Mr. Pasvolsky replied that parties to a dispute could use any pacific means of their own choice to settle a question, but that the Security Council had a right to call on them to settle by pacific procedure according to regional arrangements at their disposal. The Security Council, under paragraph 1 of Section C, had the authority either under the initiative of regional arrangements or of the Security Council to seek for settlement. The only time the Security Council would come into the picture was when the procedure was moving too slowly, but it could not stop the procedure.

Commander Stassen declared, however, that any one of the Great Powers might veto action, nothing new had been added to the instruments of pacific procedure by Chapter VIII, Section C, and the procedure was subject to the veto of any one Great Power. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that provision had been made, in this respect, for unanimous agreement of the Great Powers. Representative Eaton wondered whether the whole concept had not been based on the assumption of a dispute between minor nations and asked what would happen if a dispute occurred, for example, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Pasvolsky admitted that this was an important point. All the nations were obligated to settle their disputes peacefully. If a dispute occurred between a small state and a Great Power, the Security Council could recommend that the vote [Page 303] of the parties in dispute would not count. The purpose was to make the section as strong as possible.

Commander Stassen cited a hypothetical example in which trouble might arise in Latin America and the Inter-American System wanted to act. Suppose the Security Council approved action but France and China as permanent members of the Council objected. What would happen then? Mr. Pasvolsky replied that, of course, if the Security Council failed to preserve the peace, the International Organization would have failed. Commander Stassen stated that he was merely citing an example; that he did not want the organization to fail because of two negative votes of powers like France and China. Commander Stassen agreed with Mr. Pasvolsky that it was necessary to preserve the veto of the Great Powers. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that there were two matters under consideration: (1) the enforcement powers of the Security Council; and (2) the power of the Security Council in the matter of recommendations. The basis of the idea of unanimity among the Great Powers was at times to prevent unilateral action. The Great Powers, under the Charter, were all committed to pacific procedure. If this were broken down, we might have force employed by a Great Power or a group of Great Powers.

Representative Eaton wanted to know if it were not implicit that the final assurance we could have in the International Organization was the moral obligation, and thought this was a job for the preachers. Mr. Dulles said that the use of force should rest on law, it would work automatically, and that perhaps it would function better regionally than it would universally. He thought, therefore, that the Security Council should facilitate the development of regional arrangements. If it were always necessary to submit procedures under regional arrangements to the Security Council, the Great Powers would be able to exercise a veto and the International Organization might prove an obstacle to peace in that case.

Mr. Rockefeller cited the possibility that the Soviet Union, as some Latin Americans feared, might foment trouble in the Western Hemisphere, and then it might block action in the Security Council if the states of the Western Hemisphere desired to take collective regional action. Commander Stassen reiterated that he saw danger in the veto of the Great Powers and especially of states like China and France blocking regional action in the Americas unless we had some reservations. He did not want the Inter-American System destroyed, but Mr. Pasvolsky replied that to weaken the authority of the Security Council in regional matters would be tantamount to throwing all Europe into the hands of the Soviet Union, and would break the world up into regional units. Commander Stassen did not agree with this statement. He reverted to his original example of [Page 304] the Security Council approving action under a regional arrangement with France and China voting against any action.

Senator Connally felt that the regional issue should not becloud the thinking of the Delegation because of the Inter-American System, since he believed that the principles applied in the Americas would apply everywhere. He approved of the Declaration of Chapultepec96 and did not want the regional principle endangered but Commander Stassen insisted that the principles of the Declaration of Chapultepec could be vetoed by any one of the Great Powers at any time. Mr. Pasvolsky, however, pointed out that aside from the temporary provisions for a hemispheric alliance against aggression during the present war, the Declaration of Chapultepec provided only for consultation. Commander Stassen replied that it was hoped that the system would develop.

Mr. Dulles declared that if the legal basis for collective action were established by regional arrangements and were approved by the Security Council, then it would work automatically. Why not act under the law? Mr. Pasvolsky stated that this position presupposed a world under which the same law applied everywhere; that because there were lacunae in the law, political decisions entered the field. Mr. Dulles insisted that the position adopted by Mr. Pasvolsky would have prevented the formation of the American Union. But Mr. Pasvolsky denied this and stated that it could not have prevented the development either of the American Union or the Pan American Union. He was not sure, however, what was going to happen with respect to the Inter-American System in the development of an International Organization on a universal basis. Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that the initiative as to regional arrangements at the Mexico City Conference had come from the Latin American states, not the United States.

Senator Connally inquired whether under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals the Security Council had the authority to determine whether regional arrangements should exist and Mr. Pasvolsky replied in the negative, pointing out that it had the authority only to determine whether obligations under such arrangements were consistent with the Charter of the International Organization. There were two theories involved: (1) The theory of regional organizations and an over-all International Organization; and (2) one world organization.

Senator Connally doubted the value of regional organizations except as to pacific procedure. In the matter of war and economic sanctions [Page 305] there would not be much value. There was general agreement with this position.

At this point Senator Connally directed attention to the “draft statement97 in support of the retention of Chapter VIII, Section C, on regional arrangements of The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals”, which had been approved by the Committee on Security Aspects of Preparation for the United Nations Conference, and asked the military and naval advisers of the Delegation if they had any comments to make. Admiral Hepburn indicated that he had seen the paper and although he had not had an opportunity to read it carefully, endorsed it. General Embick was fearful lest the Declaration of Chapultepec, by implication, loosen the control of the United States over the Western Hemisphere. He approved of Chapter VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as it stood, but did not agree that peace was indivisible, since he could think of local disputes, particularly in Latin America, which had produced armed conflict.

General Fairchild stressed that there was nothing in paragraph 2, Section C, Chapter VIII, which would prevent the Security Council from giving a general prior authority to a regional organization to act. If the Security Council acted in good faith, there was no reason why the Inter-American System could not appeal for prior authority, where a local dispute did not threaten the peace of the world. In that case a regional organization could go ahead without the interference of the veto of an outside Great Power. He thought this was a practical scheme. Senator Connally said that this was just the point he had been trying to make. General Fairchild stated that a regional organization could go ahead as to pacific procedure as paragraph 2 stood and could obtain prior authority for the Council for enforcement action. Senator Vandenberg thought this was implicit but not entirely apparent.

Admiral Willson , at this point, indicated that the basic issue involved in regionalism was whether stress was to be laid on the whole or on the parts—whether the whole were to be greater than the parts thereof, or vice versa. While it was true, as Commander Stassen had stated, that China and France might have a veto as to Inter-American regional action, if’ China had no veto as to this hemisphere, then the United States would have no veto as to any other parts of the world. The Charter, he thought, was quite adequate as a basis for discussion at San Francisco.

Admiral Hepburn pointed out that the discussion really involved the whole Charter of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The Great Powers had decided to “stick together”, and it was necessary to have some faith. He thought the chapter should stand as it was. Senator [Page 306] Connally thought that this was the heart of the problem and Admiral Hepburn reiterated that the whole thing rested on faith, on promises. The Great Powers were not imposing anything on the smaller powers, but were simply asking them to contribute to the organization of peace. Senator Connally stated that in fact only the Great Powers which had the power to make war could enforce the peace. Admiral Hepburn indicated that no two of the three really Great Powers could enforce their will on the other one. Commander Stassen stated that he still did not like to see China and France have a veto over possible regional action in this hemisphere, but Admiral Hepburn said that he did not see how any discrimination could be made, although he thought there was a weak point in the situation. Commander Stassen cited the possibility that France, with the assistance of a Latin American state, might make trouble, and then wondered what would happen, but Admiral Hepburn thought the three Great Powers might have the means to bring pressure on France in such a case. Mr. Rockefeller stated that it was also possible for France and the Soviet Union to make trouble in Europe.

Review of Proposals and Suggestions

Chapter XII—Transitional Arrangements

At this time the Delegation passed on to a consideration of Chapter XII which dealt with Transitional Arrangements. Mr. Dunn stated that the Committee on Security Aspects for Preparation for the United Nations Conference had recommended that this chapter stand as it was written. Paragraph 1 provided that pending the entry into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5, and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Four Nations Declaration signed at Moscow on October 30, 1943,98 “the states parties to that Declaration should consult with one another and as occasion arises, with other members of the organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”

Mr. Armstrong, citing a view of Senator Vandenberg, indicated, however that paragraph 1 might be clarified to give the Security Council authority to determine when action should be taken. Senator Vandenberg stated that the paragraph did not pin responsibility for initiating moves. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the reason for this lack of precision was the desire not to commit the United States to the use of force. This was an interim provision based on the Moscow Declaration. Senator Vandenberg said that he was not suggesting any change in procedure but thought the role of the Security Council [Page 307] should be clarified. Mr. Dunn said that every one of the four powers could initiate action. When Senator Connally inquired whether other nations might not feel slighted, Mr. Dunn said that no objection had been raised to this chapter. Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the question would come up at San Francisco and that it might be necessary to refer to the Security Council in drafting at the conference.

Mr. Dunn then read paragraph 2 which stated that “no provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present state by governments having responsibility for such action”. The Committee on Security Aspects of Preparation for the United Nations Conference had recommended no change. If clarification were needed, however, the following paragraph should be substituted:

“The armaments and armed forces of the enemy states (to be named later) should be governed by the terms of their surrender and by the authority established thereunder. The Security Council should be enpowered to take responsibility for assuring the execution of stipulations governing the armaments and armed forces of the enemy states to the extent that such responsibility may devolve upon it in succession to the authority established under the surrender terms.”

Commander Stassen thought that we might not have formal surrender either in the case of Japan or of Germany and therefore, the term “surrender” might not fit the case. It was agreed that the text might be changed to cover the situation, using such a phrase as “terms imposed”. Senator Vandenberg wanted to know who would take the responsibility in the matter of the disarmament and control of Germany or Japan, and Mr. Dunn stated that the victorious powers would do so, although it was possible that, in time, the international organization might be asked to do so. It was admitted that occupation of the enemy states might endure for years, and that a formal peace might not be made for some time, since one had to be negotiated with a recognized government.

Senator Vandenberg thought that we might run the danger of not disarming Germany and of seeing powers like Great Britain disarm again, which got us into the present war, he thought, and might get us into another world war. Mr. Pasvolsky thought that the victorious powers were responsible for seeing to this but Senator Vandenberg indicated his skepticism as to the set policies of these powers. Senator Connally believed that the treaties of peace would take care of this matter but Senator Vandenberg thought this matter would take ten years and Mr. Armstrong recalled the failure of the United States Senate to approve the Anglo-French-American Tripartite [Page 308] Treaty of 1919.99 It was agreed that this was a separate subject but Senator Vandenberg considered it utterly fundamental.

Meeting With the President

As the meeting was apparently drawing to a close, Senator Connally stated that President Truman would receive the Delegation at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday.1

Chapter VIII, Section A, Paragraph 72

At Mr. Pasvolsky’s suggestion the meeting then passed to a reconsideration of Chapter VIII, Section A, paragraph 7, concerning “situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned.” Mr. Pasvolsky said it was a question of whether (1) the paragraph should limit the effects of the section to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5, or from 1 to 6; and (2) what provision should be made for determining the question of “domestic jurisdiction”. It had been suggested at the last meeting that it might be determined by unanimous agreement of members of the Security Council or the Court of International Justice.

Mr. Dulles said that he had objected to this paragraph at the time of his discussions with Secretary of State Hull in the fall of 1944.3 It was, he thought, a contradiction in terms to say that a matter which threatened the peace of the world was solely a matter of “domestic jurisdiction”. How could this be? We had to have limitations as to Section B dealing with action concerning threats to the peace or acts of aggression, but the whole effect of Chapter VIII would be destroyed with such a limitation in it. The Security Council should have authority to consider any matter which threatened the peace of the world.

Commander Stassen said he thought the Charter would be better off without paragraph 7, but Senator Vandenberg declared that without it there would be no possibility of getting the Charter approved by the United States Senate. Commander Stassen said that [Page 309] that might be true but he still insisted on his position, pointing out that a state like Argentina might provide bombs and air force, etc., and then proceed to cause trouble and no action could be taken until its forces stepped across a boundary line. Mr. Armstrong pointed to the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria in 1934.4

Mr. Dulles said that the trouble with international law was that it had reserved the right of any state to do as it pleased, although the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals represented an attempt to break this principle down. He wondered whether something might not be gotten through the Senate. Senator Vandenberg said that a reading of the Senate’s comments on the advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice were not reassuring. Commander Stassen thought the Senate had probably changed its opinions, since the debate on the court, and paid high praise to Senator Vandenberg’s leadership in this respect. Senator Vandenberg stated, however, that this was one of the “fantasies obsessing the Senate”. Commander Stassen said that wars broke out because nations took cover under the concept that their actions fell only within their domestic jurisdiction.

Senator Connally was skeptical whether the Senate would approve the idea of permitting the Security Council to decide as to “domestic jurisdiction”. Mr. Dulles thought it was just a matter of talk in the Security Council in any case. Senator Connally thought that “talk” would imply responsibility and action. Senator Vandenberg thought we would be lucky to get by the Senate with the reservations in any case, since the Senate had always thought that the United States should decide what was within its “domestic jurisdiction”.

Senator Connally said that we were covering virgin territory, find it would be best to proceed conservatively in order to accomplish anything at all. There was considerable objection, he thought, and we must allow experience and the passing of the years to develop the structure of peace. What we were now doing was starting, and he wanted to lay the foundations for success. Mr. Armstrong suggested that paragraph 7 might be modified to give the Security Council authority to determine whether a question were purely domestic, pointing out that we have a veto power in the Security Council, an idea which Senator Vandenberg approved.

Dr. Bowman thought we might accomplish something by leaving out the reference to international law in paragraph 7, since he believed this was restrictive in the sense that international law had developed [Page 310] only up to a certain point. Mr. Sandifer thought this would remove the criteria by which the Council should act, although Dr. Bowman did not mean to remove all standards for such determination. In the last analysis Commander Stassen thought it best to leave the paragraph as it is since the public had offered no real objection. Mr. Dulles confirmed this although Mr. Armstrong pointed out that the Hudson Group6 had objected to it. Mr. Dulles thought that this group and others which would go further—had challenged it because any nation could go to war under it.

Further Topics for Discussion

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  1. Not printed; see final chart (doc. 67, G/20), May 5, UNCIO Documents, vol. i, p. 78.
  2. See minutes of second and third meetings of the Informal Organizing Group, April 10 and 13, pp. 235 and 283, respectively.
  3. For press release listing assignments, May 2, see Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1945, p. 858.
  4. Draft press release not printed; for final statement on the work of the delegation, released to the press on April 18, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1945, p. 724.
  5. Brackets appear in the original.
  6. This ad hoc Committee, consisting chiefly of the civilian and military advisers and experts assigned to the delegation, held four meetings under the chairmanship of Mr. Dunn, April 3–11, to consider the provisions on international security in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals; the Committee’s views on security provisions were presented to the delegation on April 16.
  7. For Act of Chapultepec, resolution VIII, “Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity”, see Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21–March 8, 1945 (Washington, 1946), p. 72. For documentation on this subject, see vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.
  8. Not printed.
  9. Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 755.
  10. Bilateral treaties between the United States and France and between France and the United Kingdom regarding assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919. The treaty between the United States and France was submitted to the Senate July 29, 1919. It was not considered by the Senate and was returned to the Secretary of State by resolution of the Senate February 12, 1935. For text, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 757. For discussions in the Council of Four, see ibid., vol. vi, index entries under “France: Guarantee against German aggression,” p. 1006.
  11. April 18.
  12. See minutes of meeting of April 12, 9 a.m., p. 269.
  13. For general information on conversations of Secretary Hull with Mr. Dulles, adviser to Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for the Presidency, in August 1944, see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. ii, pp. 1689–1693.
  14. Engelbert Dollfuss, Austrian Premier, whose assassination resulted from the Nazi coup in Vienna on July 25, 1934. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. ii, pp. 2930.
  15. The Hudson New York Group, a small informal committee convened by Judge Manley O. Hudson, of the Permanent Court of International Justice, met in New York. The group included Raymond B. Fosdick, Arthur Sweetser, Philip Jessup, Herbert L. May, George H. Rublee, Huntington Gilchrist, Frank Boudreau, Malcolm Davis, James T. Shotwell, Frank W. Aydelotte, and Philip C. Nash.