500.CC/12–544: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)1
2784. For the Urgent and Personal Attention of the Ambassador.
1. Please arrange to call in person on Marshal Stalin in order to deliver the following message from the President to him:
“In view of the fact that prospects for an early meeting between us are still unsettled and because of my conviction, with which I am sure you agree, that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations on the subject of international organization, I am asking Ambassador Harriman to deliver this message to you and to discuss with you on my behalf the important subject of voting procedure in the Security Council. This and other questions will, of course, have to be agreed between us before the general conference will be possible. I am also taking up this matter with Mr. Churchill.
After giving this whole subject further consideration, I now feel that the substance of the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:
proposal for section c of the chapter on the security council
C. Voting
1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
You will note that this calls for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace and to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I can see, as a practical matter, that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible, and I am, therefore, prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character each permanent member would always have a vote.
At the same time, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals also provide in Chapter VIII, Section A, for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which the Security Council may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. Here, too, I am satisfied that recommendations of the Security Council will carry far greater weight if they are concurred in by the permanent members. [Page 59] But I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice, and, therefore, by accepting a provision under which, with regard to such procedures, all parties to a dispute should abstain from voting. I firmly believe that willingness on the part of the permanent members not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace, without in any way jeopardizing their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests the Great Powers must act unanimously. It would certainly make the whole plan, which must necessarily assign a special position to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace, far more acceptable to all nations.
Neither the Soviet nor the American memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks contained specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this nature. Our representatives there were not, of course, in a position to reach a definite agreement on the subject. You and I must now find a way of completing the work which they have so well carried forward on our behalf.
If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council as I now suggest, would you be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Mr. Churchill to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general United Nations conference?”
2. We assume that you will wish to have a careful Russian translation made of the foregoing message so that you can hand to Marshal Stalin both the English and Russian texts of the President’s message.
3. The contemplated meeting referred to in the last paragraph of the President’s message would be an informal one in which only two or three representatives of each of the three countries would participate. In other words, we do not have in mind anything in the nature of a reconvening of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. We have no fixed idea at the present time as to just who these representatives would be or as to where they should meet, although perhaps London might prove to be appropriate and convenient.
4. You may wish to present orally, and perhaps in a separate memorandum, additional observations in support of the President’s views which necessarily are stated in restricted compass in the message itself. Among the additional considerations which impress us and some or all of which you should feel free to use as you see fit as representing the views of your Government are the following: Unanimity of thought and action on the part of the great powers in all decisions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security is of the greatest importance. With the great powers unanimous in thought and in action and equally and instantly ready to employ measures of enforcement in behalf of peace and security when and as necessary, [Page 60] there will be the greatest inducement for parties to disputes to arrive at peaceful settlements. Such an atmosphere of harmony among the great powers and general willingness to resort to measures of peaceful settlement should result in conditions of more assured stability in international relations than has ever before obtained in history. These realizable conditions will mean that all states will look first to the major powers themselves to abide by the obligations contained in the charter of the organization to seek peaceful adjustment or settlement of any differences in which they may be concerned. We can conceive of no more effective justification of the special position of the great powers as principal guardians of the peace than the voluntary undertaking by each of them, along with all other members of the organization, to abstain in any controversy in which it may be engaged from voting on procedures which in the eyes of mankind will partake of an impartial examination of the controversy by the highest tribunal of the world society. This should further make evident that the leadership of the great powers is to be based not alone upon size, strength, and resources, but on those enduring qualifications of moral leadership which can raise the whole level of international relations the world over. The assurance and the enhancing of this leadership is in the interest of each of the great powers, as well as of all the world.
5. We have great confidence in your ability to convince Marshal Stalin of the reasonableness of our views which we feel are fully as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as in those of all other states. We do not, of course, feel that we are in any sense asking simply for a yes or no answer, although we would naturally be highly gratified to ascertain that Marshal Stalin agrees with our views. We agree entirely with the view which you emphasized in Washington that, even if you are not entirely successful at this time in persuading the Marshal to adopt as his own the views expressed in the President’s message, it is essential to keep the issue open and to avoid any crystallization of a negative attitude on the part of the Soviet Government on this vitally significant matter.
- Drafted by Hiss. The message was sent through the White House Map Room to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Corresponding messages were sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, for transmittal to Prime Minister Churchill, and to Winant at London for background only (500.CC/12–644).↩