UNA Files

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky)1

[Memorandum of Conversation]
secret

Subject: Questions Left Unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks

Participants: The President
The Under Secretary
Mr. Hackworth
Mr. Pasvolsky

Mr. Stettinius explained to the President that there are six principal questions left unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks which need attention. Two of these questions—voting procedure in the Security Council and initial membership—must be settled between the United States, Soviet Russia and Great Britain before invitations to the Conference can be issued. In connection with both of these questions, it is necessary for us to determine our own position before we begin conversations with the other governments.

Voting Procedure

The President thereupon examined the memorandum entitled “Voting Procedure in the Security Council”2 and said that he had come to the conclusion that it is necessary for us to accept a compromise solution, in view of the fact that it is unlikely that this country, in the final analysis, would agree to our not having a vote in any serious or acute situation in which we may be involved. He examined the formula attached to the memorandum and approved it as the position which should be taken by our government.

Invitations to the Conference

The President then read the memorandum entitled “Invitations to the Conference and Initial Membership.”3 He said that in his opinion it was entirely proper that only the signatories to the United Nations Declaration4 should be invited to the Conference. He therefore thought that we should take all the necessary steps to induce the six so-called “associated” nations in South America to regularize their position by declaring war and thus making themselves eligible to becoming signatories of the United Nations Declaration.

In reply to the Under Secretary’s question as to whether or not he remembered ever authorizing or instructing the Department to tell the American Republics that it was not necessary for them to declare [Page 57] war, the President said that he had no recollection of ever having done so and that he was sure that, if the question had ever been brought up, he would not have given any such authorization or instruction.

Location

On the question of the location of the United Nations Organization,5 the President reiterated his belief that the meetings of the various bodies should be in different parts of the world, although he recognized the need for a center. He again said that the Empire State Building might fill the bill, but that there was no need to press the question now. It can well be handled at the Conference itself.

International Trusteeship

With respect to arrangements for international trusteeship,6 the President said that it was his definite desire that the principle of international trusteeship be firmly established and that the international organization should provide adequate machinery for that purpose. He said that the Army and the Navy have been urging upon him the point of view that the United States should take over all or some of the mandated islands in the Pacific, but that he was opposed to such a procedure because it was contrary to the Atlantic Charter. Nor did he think that it was necessary. As far as he could tell, all that we would accomplish by that would be to provide jobs as governors of insignificant islands for inefficient Army and Navy officers or members of the civilian career service. He has discussed the matter of dependent areas with both Churchill and Stalin and expects to discuss it with them further.

He approved the recommendation that the Department of State proceed, in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to a further examination of tentative proposals on the subject of trusteeship. After the studies have been completed, he wants to take up again the question of our transmitting the papers to the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments.

Further Steps

The President also read the memorandum entitled “Further Steps with Respect to Items Left Open at Dumbarton Oaks Meeting.”7 He said that there is as yet no definite indication as to when a meeting of the three heads of government might take place. He, therefore, approved the suggestion that a message be sent by him to Churchill and Stalin, stating our present point of view on the question of voting.8

  1. Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State. See Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 377378.
  2. Ante, pp. 5051.
  3. Ante, pp. 5253.
  4. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 3–4; or Decade, pp. 2–3.
  5. Ante, p. 5354.
  6. Ante, p. 54.
  7. Supra.
  8. The following words are here stricken out in pencil: “and suggesting that there be arranged as soon as possible a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers to discuss the matter and to agree on further procedures”.