Matthews Files
The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)1
Memorandum2
Preparation for Big Three Meeting
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3. The questions having to do with the International Organization I shall leave to Leo,3 but I just want to add my word that if the Russians remain absolutely adamant on the subject of demanding a veto to cover all of Section A of Chapter 84 as well as Section B, I think it would be advisable to postpone any meeting of the United Nations for the present, because I just cannot see the United States taking the position of presenting the other United Nations with a proposal of that kind. In the first place, I do not believe that we would have many of the other nations join the organization and if they did so, would do it with a bad grace and would thus gravely injure the whole basic spirit of the organization, which is to be built on the foundation of friendly international cooperation, if it is ever to be a success. I could go on with the Russians in their demand for veto power as it applies to Section B of Chapter 8, and I think it would be a sound position for this Government to take and would be well received by the American people, but if the Russians will not accept a compromise position, then I would propose that all of Section A be completely eliminated from the proposals and that we accept the [Page 48] Russian position with regard to Section B, that is, enforcement action, as Section B is now written.
4. We would not lose anything by dropping Section A out of the document as the principle and purpose and the whole spirit of the document call repeatedly for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and prohibit the use of force or the threat of force in such disputes. We would still have the World Court and the assembly could debate or discuss any situation which they thought might, if continued, give rise to a threat to the peace. So if we eliminate Section A, we would eliminate all the discussion about the voting procedure in connection with the discussion of disputes, while at the same time the discussion could be held in the assembly under the proposals, as now drafted, and we would concentrate the question of voting on the really crucial point of the whole International Organization, which is enforcement action of any kind whatsoever in connection with a threat to, or a breach of, the peace. If you will sit down and read over again the two sections of Chapter 8, Section A and Section B, you will find there is no action provided for in Section A—merely recommendations—so that by eliminating Section A you would merely leave the authority to make recommendations in the assembly, where it now is, up to the time the Council might wish to take a matter over. As you recall, all the enforcement action is in Section B, so, therefore, if Section A were eliminated, as I said before, we could very well accept the Russian position as to Section B, as it is already half of our compromise proposal.
5. Summary. Try to have the compromise proposal adopted. If the Russians hold firmly to their position and will not accede to the compromise, then consider eliminating Section A completely from the document, leaving Section B and accept the Russian position as to Section B.