UNA Files
The Special Assistant to the Director of the
Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Chief of the
Division of International Security and Organization
(Notter)
[Washington,] October 27,
1944.
The attached drafts of two memoranda to the President have been
prepared in response to directions given by Mr. Stettinius yesterday. It was his
feeling that the main memorandum should simply list the “open”
items, should indicate without specification that settlement of some
of these items could best be handled by the President personally,
should request an opportunity to discuss methods of settlement, and
should attach a supplementary memorandum on the question of the
position to be taken with respect to voting in the Council.
He has asked that both drafts be circulated at this time to you and
to Messrs. Dunn, Hackworth and Wilson for comment, Mr. [Page 45]
Stettinius thought that the
supplementary memorandum should be cleared with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff before it is finally sent to the President.1 However, this step will not of
course be taken until after the memorandum has been approved within
the Department.
[Attachment 1—Draft]
[Washington,] October 27,
1944.
Memorandum to the President
Subject: Questions Left Unsettled At Dumbarton
Oaks.
For your convenience I am listing hereunder the questions which
still have to be settled in connection with the establishment of
a world security organization.
- 1.
- What voting procedure should be followed in the
Council? This involves not only the extremely important
question of the extent to which the permanent members of
the Council shall be authorized to veto discussion in or
action by the Council, but it also involves the less
controversial question of whether decisions of the
Council should in some or all cases be by a simple
majority vote (either of those present and voting or of
the full Council membership) or by some prescribed
greater majority.
- 2.
- Should the proposed charter of the world security
organization provide for territorial trusteeship and if
so what should be the nature of such provision?
- 3.
- Who should be the initial members of the
organization?
- 4.
- Where should the proposed organization and its
component parts be located?
- 5.
- What provision should be made for orderly termination
of the functions of the League of Nations and perhaps
for transfer to the new organization of the League’s
property?
- 6.
- What arrangements should be made for detailed drafting
of the statute of the proposed international court of
justice and of the actual charter of the proposed
organization (the latter will, of course, be based on
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals but it will be a job of
some complexity as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are
quite informal in character)?
It would appear that some of these matters had best be settled by
your own direct action in such manner as you yourself determine;
others may lend themselves readily to settlement by more routine
diplomatic action undertaken by the Department. I should
appreciate an early opportunity to discuss with you the methods
which you feel should be followed to accomplish settlement of
the above open items.
I am attaching hereto a brief supplementary memorandum which sets
forth our recommendations as to the position this Government
should take at this time on the most difficult of the unsettled
items, namely the extent of the veto power to be accorded to
permanent [Page 46] members of the
Council. This supplementary memorandum has been approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.2 Will you please indicate whether you
approve of the recommendations therein set forth?
[Attachment 2—Draft]
[Washington,] October 27,
1944.
Supplementary Memorandum
Subject: Recommended Position On the Question of
Veto Power of Permanent Members
1. Procedures of the
Council.
The Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of
peace and security and to this end two main types of procedure
are specified in some detail in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.
First, the Council is authorized to facilitate the pacific
settlement of disputes between nations. Secondly, the Council is
authorized to take diplomatic, economic or military measures to
maintain peace and security.
2. Preferred American
position.
It is recommended that from the point of view of American
interests the most desirable rule as to the veto power of
permanent members would be to eliminate, in the first category
of procedures, the power of veto on the part of any such member
involved in a dispute, but to provide that unanimity of the
permanent members must prevail before any action can be taken by
the Council in the second category of procedures. Under such a
formula judicial and quasi-judicial procedures would be based on
the traditional Anglo-American principle that a party to a
dispute should not be able to prevent consideration of that
dispute. At the same time this formula would insure, among other
desirable objectives, express statement of the right of the
United States to prevent any use of its armed forces without its
specific consent.
3. Soviet and British
positions.
The Soviet Government can be expected to maintain strongly its
position that the rule of unanimity of permanent members should
prevail in both categories of procedures in the Council.
The British position at Dumbarton Oaks was that in both types of
procedures a permanent member, if involved in a dispute, should
be deprived of its power of veto. As you are aware, we have
received, since the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks
conversations, information indicating that the British position
now coincides with the Soviet position.
[Page 47]
4. Recommended alternative
American position.
In the event that it should prove impossible to obtain the
agreement of both the Soviet and the British Governments to our
preferred position, it is recommended that we reluctantly accept
the unqualified principle of unanimity of permanent members in
both categories of procedures, provided this rule is explicitly
adopted only as a provisional and temporary measure. The
duration of such a measure might be (1) for a fixed number of
years, or (2) subject to reconsideration by the Council after a
fixed number of years, or (3) for such time as the present
number and distribution of permanent seats on the Council
continue. It is believed that such a frankly temporary and
provisional arrangement would not be in violation of our
principles and, if necessary to obtain establishment of the
organization, would be acceptable to public opinion in this
country and elsewhere.
