64. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence (Souers) to Clark M. Clifford 0

SUBJECT

  • Central Intelligence Agency
1.
As you have requested, I am attaching:
(a)
Copy of the State Department Plan.1
(b)
Copy of draft of directive proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2
(c)
Detailed comparison of Plans (a) and (b).3
2.
Differences between the two plans are far greater, and more fundamental, than they appear to be on the surface.
3.
Mr. McCormack, author of the State Department plan, advocates that the Secretary of State should control America’s intelligence effort. The Secretary of State or his representative, Mr. McCormack feels, should determine the character of the intelligence furnished the President. He made this point clear not only in his published plan, but also in his talk to the public over the radio,4 and in various addresses to Army and Naval officers intended to sell the State Department plan.
4.
There are three serious objections to Mr. McCormack’s proposal:
(a)
Recent experience has shown all too clearly that as long as the Army and Navy may be called upon in the last analysis to support the nation’s foreign policy, the Services should have a voice reaching the President as unmistakable as that of the State Department.
(b)
The evaluation of information is not an exact science and every safeguard should be imposed to prevent any one department from having the opportunity to interpret information in such a way as to make it seem to support previously accepted policies or preconceived opinions.
(c)
Should the McCormack plan be adopted, it is inevitable that it would be looked upon in time as a State Department intelligence system, not an inter-governmental system. The Army and Navy meanwhile would be maintaining their own complete intelligence systems.
5.
The plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff seems more likely to provide the President with unbiased intelligence, derived from all available sources, and approved by all three departments of the Government primarily concerned with foreign policy—State, War and Navy. Under the JCS Plan, the interest of the President would seem to be better protected than under the McCormack plan for the following reasons:
(a)
The Authority would be set up under the President, and therefore on a level higher than that of any single department. As a result, no one department could influence unduly the type of intelligence produced. Furthermore, more balanced control could be expected, as no single department would be dominant.
(b)
The President would appoint the Director, making it possible to procure a man of outstanding ability and integrity.
(c)
Through the pooling of expert personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency, many functions now performed by various intelligence agencies could be carried out more efficiently, expeditiously, and economically than could be expected under the McCormack plan. (Mr. McCormack has indicated in interviews that he is not in favor of a central intelligence agency.)
(d)
The JCS Plan provides for the preparation of summaries and estimates approved by the participating agencies for the use of those who need them most: the President, those on a Cabinet level responsible for advising the President, and the Joint Planners.
(e)
The JCS Plan contemplates a full partnership between the three departments, created and operated in the spirit of free consideration, and with a feeling of a full share of responsibility for its success. The whole-hearted cooperation of participating agencies would be assured inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency is designed to operate on a reciprocal basis.
6.
The JCS Plan has the further advantage of having been under consideration for many months. It was prepared after long consideration by the technical staff of the J.I.C. and unanimously approved by the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which included the heads of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments. It was then approved, with minor changes, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff comprising Fleet Admirals Leahy and King, Generals of the Army Marshall and Arnold. The recommendations of the JCS were concurred in at that time by the Secretaries of War and the Navy.
7.
I recommend that a directive substantially in line with the draft attached (JCS Plan) be issued by the President as I believe it will provide a program which will best serve him and the national interest.
8.
As you know, my interest in this subject is wholly objective as I am not a candidate for the job of Director and couldn’t accept even if it were offered me.
Sidney W. Souers
  1. Source: Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, National Military Establishment: CIA. Top Secret; Personal. Also reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman , pp. 17–19. On another copy of this memorandum a marginal notation written by Souers reads: “Comdr. Clifford asked for my recommendation at the request of the President.” (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–135) Clifford was appointed Naval Aide to the President in early 1946 and then Special Counsel to the President on June 27, 1946. Apparently he was not formally a Presidential appointee at this time.
  2. Document 56.
  3. The undated draft directive was a slight modification of the appendix to Document 13. It included in paragraph 1 a representative of the JCS as a member of the proposed National Intelligence Authority. A handwritten revision, apparently by Clifford, changed the language of the JCS to read “and an additional representative of the President of the United States.” (Truman Library, Papers of Clark M. Clifford) See the Supplement.
  4. See the Supplement.
  5. For McCormack’s remarks in a December 22 radio talk, see Department of State Bulletin, December 23, 1945, pp. 987–993 and 1006.