411. Memorandum for the Record0

SUBJECT

  • CIA Daily Staff Summary (Blue Book)

In the course of conversation on other matters, Bill Sheppard, Jim Lay, and I discussed the CIA daily top secret Intelligence Summary.

Lay pointed out among other things that the whole project stems from a considered decision by the old NIA (Committee of the Secretary of State and Service Departments, etc., in charge of Intelligence) whose decision it was, following the desires of the President, that the CIA produce such a summary, that the summary be both operational and intelligence. The NIA also specifically approved the distribution list.

Lay also pointed out that regardless of our views of the merits of the Staff Summary, every indication is that the President likes it and wants it. Furthermore, there is no indication that the President is aware of or disparages the fact that it is duplicative of State Department cables and information summaries sent directly to him from the Department.

Lay also said incidentally that Dennison is the staff officer in the White House who usually shows it to the President without comment and that the CIA encloses the original cable with the staff summary of the cable.

In answer to a question, Lay discounted the possibility that there was any thought the Staff Summary would serve as a “check” upon the flow of information to the President; that by having another source of information, the President could be assured that he received everything. It was pointed out that such a view, if held, was fallacious in any event because the Department controlled the information going to CIA. Lay felt that the CIA was not in the least aware that they may be jeopardizing their flow of State cables by producing a summary which (a) contained large amounts of policy which was the responsibility of the State Department (b) failed to include military intelligence (c) distributed throughout the Government State Department information over which the Department itself should have the control.

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Lay saw no reason why constructive suggestions and recommendations might not be made to improve the Staff Summary, but such should be formulated within the framework of the knowledge that the President favors the Staff Summary.

Note: Lay was most cooperative and friendly in discussing this project, and the information and views which he gave should be treated confidentially. F. H.)

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Lot 58 D 776, State–CIA Relationship 1949–1956. Confidential. Drafted by Howe. Appended to the source text is a handwritten “Note for file” by Sheppard dated January 27 which reads as follows: “In conversation with Howe and Barnes it was decided: (1) State now has sufficient control over the content of the daily summary. (2) In view of the CIA situation & the President’s interest, (3) We should now do nothing to rock the boat. W.S.S.”