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  4. Document 379

379. Memorandum From the Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating and Planning Staff (Childs) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter0

Washington, April 6, 1949.
1.
With reference to the Under Secretary of State’s memo1 to Mr. Souers, dated April 4, about the basic issues raised by the Dulles Report, I hope you will have a chance to express your opinion at the NSC meeting tomorrow and that you will be able to say—with reference to Paragraph 2 it is fine to have the Intelligence Advisory Committee “participate more actively”, but as you will recall, there have been very few, if any, positive results reached at the meetings of this Committee, who prefer to have staff work done before and/or after any subject is brought up (and they usually disavow or do not agree with the result of such staff work!!). Certainly, such meetings could never, around that table, “produce finished estimates”. Their “facilities” now do participate in the production of estimates by staff meetings at working levels, etc., and by concurrences, etc., but according to Admiral Inglis this is assuming no collective responsibility for these estimates. I think that “collective responsibility” phrase is misleading. The DCI and CIA have the responsibility for coordinating, etc., but the various intelligence agencies may well assume responsibility for their portions of the whole. If they would stick to their dominant interests, we would like it better.
2.
We hope any decision by the NSC on these “basic issues” will be very carefully and precisely worded (not generalities) as each IAC Agency will interpret it in its own light and in accordance with its established wishes if it can possibly do so. To clear up the ambiguities, definite instructions will have to come down from the top to the Intelligence Agencies. For example, we assume under CIA’s “forthright leadership” mentioned in Paragraph 2a, we can prepare original drafts or indicate what we are going to do and tell the boys to follow on, i.e., take it or leave it just as much as though that paragraph said under the “direction” of CIA. Our own eager beavers will certainly interpret it that way.
PC
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86–B00269R, Box 5. No classification marking.↩
  2. Document 378.↩