Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

36. Memorandum From the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, Department of War (Hull) to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (Lovett)⁰

Washington, October 28, 1945.

SUBJECT

• Report on Intelligence Matters

The following report is submitted as requested in your memorandum dated 23 October 1945, subject as above.¹ Headings of paragraphs below correspond to those in your memorandum. Since OPD is not an intelligence agency, no answers are submitted to questions in paragraphs a, c and e, Part I and d, Part II.

Part I

b. The following relations existed between OPD and the indicated intelligence agencies during the period of the war:

(1) G–2

(a) OPD in collaboration with G–2, maintained current estimate of the situation for use in connection with the preparation of over-all strategic and operational plans.

(b) OPD reviewed and coordinated all intelligence matters under consideration by JCS or CCS.

(2) OSS

(a) OSS activities in theaters were under theater commanders, who in turn were under OPD in the latter’s capacity as command post for the Chief of Staff.

(b) OSS functioned under general policies and directives issued by JCS, OPD having reviewed and coordinated all JCS matters within the War Department.

d. It is believed that in time of peace the military attaché system serves a definite purpose in obtaining certain military information limited to that which foreign governments are willing to part with, or that which is obtainable without arousing the suspicion of such foreign governments. However, this system both in time of peace and particularly in time of war is unable to obtain vital military information and vital economic, political and scientific intelligence both of which are essential in determining capabilities and intentions of foreign governments. On the other hand, it is believed that OSS in certain of its fields contributed considerably to the war effort. Its work in connection with resistance movements and research and analysis were of inestimable value. Its sabotage, intelligence and counter-intelligence activities were of considerable value. It is felt that there was unfortunate rivalry and duplication of effort between G–2 and OSS during the war. It is believed that a well organized and thoroughly integrated national intelligence system in peace would have considerably increased our capabilities to make sound and timely estimates in the years prior to this war and would have materially improved our wartime intelligence.

Part II

a, b and c. The Operations Division agrees with the concept contained in the directive proposed by the JCS in JCS 1181/5 regarding the coordination of intelligence activities. This directive sets forth, particularly in paragraph 5 thereof, in broad outline, the missions and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is recognized that the final answer on the difficult problem presented must be obtained as a result of study of the synthesis of the views of all the War Department agencies concerned.

(1) The field of intelligence should be considered as a whole. It is believed dangerous to attempt tight compartmentalization into technical subdivisions, e.g., air, ground, naval, political, scientific, etc.

(2) While probably broad policies must be evolved on the committee basis for the Central Intelligence Agency, the administration and operations undertaken by this Agency should not be subject to the details, compromises and inefficiencies inherent in discussions by committees and subcommittees, but rather should be the responsibility of single heads of subdivision responsible to the Director of the Agency.

(3) One of the first tasks in producing a comprehensive national intelligence system is the development of a comprehensive intelligence plan. This plan should begin by setting down intelligence objectives which probably could be broken down into two categories: (a) routine objectives such as strengths and dispositions of foreign forces and (b) special projects, such as present Russian actions with reference to uranium. The comprehensive plan should go on from the objectives to the scheme for collecting information thereon and this scheme should include the way in which the various agencies undertaking intelligence operations will function in the over-all pattern.

(4) Two functions of the Central Intelligence Agency should include assuring adequate arrangements so that each item of war intelligence is made available to every organization possibly having an interest therein. The exact procedure in accomplishing this objective must be a subject of further study. There is some question as to whether the Central Intelligence Agency can support an organization adequate to act as a “clearing house” for every item of raw intelligence.

(5) The Central Intelligence Agency should be charged with development of a plan and program as a matter of priority for an adequate foreign secret intelligence system for the U.S. It is thought that this might be worked out as a coordinated operation between departmental agencies and an agency working directly under the Central Intelligence Agency coordinating the entire project. The operating agency of the Central Intelligence Agency might also be reasonably charged with the mission of undertaking special intelligence projects, although not necessarily to the exclusion of activities by departmental agencies in connection with the same projects.

(6) The functions of the Central Intelligence Agency should include coordination of the activities of all agencies to determine omissions and duplications and to arrange for the necessary action to remedy such omissions and duplications.

(7) The National Intelligence Authority will of necessity be rather public in character. It will be well to hide the activation of the Central Intelligence Agency. An obscure location and name in the State Department might be a satisfactory method of achieving this objective.

(8) Radio intercept seems to be a technical activity and from the operational standpoint, will probably continue to function best with the departments. As a vital source of information it should be subject to coordination by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The problems which now face the U.S. and will continue to face this country in the future dictate that the heads of the State, War and Navy Departments have knowledge of intentions and capabilities, both political and military, of the other countries. The Central Intelligence Agency should be charged with preparing the required estimates which should be made available to the State, War and Navy Departments and to the JCS to guide them in their plans and preparations.

On the specific problem of the disposition of the remnants of the Office of Strategic Services, it is believed that the Central Intelligence Agency should have a talented analysis and evaluation section. This section should not attempt to handle those matters which fall within the sphere of single departments, but should rather devote its talents to studies which assist the Director and the Authority in determining the current intelligence objectives and the mechanisms for obtaining them. In addition the Central Agency’s evaluation section should be the nucleus in preparation of long range over-all intelligence estimates. Such of the OSS personnel and organization now assigned to the State Department as are suitable for the foregoing might well be retained for use in the Central Intelligence Agency.

As to the OSS unit now attached to the War Department,² it is believed that any secret intelligence networks it possesses plus personnel should be retained for review by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to determine whether he desires to use any personnel or operating facilities directly under his Agency, the remaining personnel to be absorbed in existing departmental agencies. In this connection the appointment of a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is a pressing matter.

It is OPD’s opinion that the objective of U.S. intelligence coordinated under the Central Intelligence Agency is:

“Establishment and maintenance of a world-wide intelligence and counter-intelligence system capable of furnishing timely information not only of a purely military but also of a political, economic, industrial and scientific nature; of preventing the obtaining by foreign powers of similar information concerning the U.S.; and of deceiving possible enemies as to the capabilities and intentions of the U.S. when that is to her interest.” (Quote from para. c, page 10, JCS 1518.)

J. E. Hull ³

Lieutenant General, GSC

0. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Troy Papers, Box 10, Folder 73. Top Secret.
1. Document 32.
2. The Strategic Services Unit.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.