Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

240. Memorandum From the General Counsel (Houston) and the Legislative Liaison Officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (Pforzheimer) to the Executive of the Central Intelligence Agency (Shannon)⁰

Washington, September 27, 1949.

SUBJECT

• Legal Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency

1. The interpretation of an act of Congress is often extremely difficult. At times provisions which are perfectly clear when the act is written become subject to various interpretations in practice, making it necessary to fall back on Congressional Committee reports and Floor debates. This appears to be the case in connection with certain authorities under Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 which sets forth the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency. But whatever uncertainty has arisen out of inadequate wording or subsequent interpretations, in our opinion the basic intent of the Congress is clear and unchanged in regard to this Section of the law.

2. Section 102(d) of the National Security Act sets forth certain duties for CIA to perform “under the direction of the National Security Council”. The Agency was placed under the National Security Council, with the approval of the former and present directors of CIA, because it was felt that it should report to a group rather than directly to the President. The President would be too busy to give adequate personal attention to its needs and should not be so burdened. Rather than leave the Agency in a vacuum it was decided that it should answer to a council composed of the President, and the Secretaries of State and the Military Establishment, who were to be the prime users of our material and who should therefore set certain broad patterns and directives for the Agency to follow.

3. While there was little specific discussion on the record, we feel it is quite clear that Congress intended CIA to look to the National Security Council only for broad direction, and that the day-to-day operations of the Agency were to be in the hands of the Director. Furthermore, there is no question but that if anything went wrong with the Agency, or if any questions arose (as they did at the time of the Bogota riots)¹ the Congress would hold the Director personally responsible and would look no further. It was Congressional intent to create an independent intelligence agency to perform the functions set forth in the Act, the agency to look to the National Security Council only for the broadest type of guidance.

4. The first function set forth in Section 102(d) of the National Security Act is that of advising the NSC “in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security.” We believe Congress, by imposing this duty, intended CIA to report and give positive advice on the inadequacies, gaps and overlaps in the entire foreign intelligence field. The other intelligence agencies of the Government have been loath to accept such a concept. They have looked upon CIA as just another Government intelligence agency with no supervisory or directive powers over their own intelligence establishments.

5. Section 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act gives the Agency the duty to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of certain intelligence activities of certain departments and agencies of the Government. In this, we believe the intent of Congress was for CIA to make positive and aggressive recommendations for improvement of all intelligence activities relative to the national security. The recommendations which we have made in this connection are not in fact CIA recommendations as contemplated by the law. They are joint papers concurred in by all the intelligence agencies. Inevitably such compromises lack teeth, and the task of obtaining clearances consumes an undue amount of time. We feel that Congress intended CIA to prepare these recommendations for NSC directives in the form which it deems proper. They might then be circulated to the standing committee for comment. If valid objections are presented, they may be accepted if CIA feels that the purpose of the paper is not thereby impaired. It may be that CIA would likewise include IAC dissents in the final recommendation to the NSC. However, that final paper would be a CIA recommendation, as required by the law, and not the watered-down result of compromise.

6. Section 102(d)(3) places the duty on CIA to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and to provide for its appropriate dissemination within the Government. There is no question as to what the Congress intended in this connection. In placing upon us the burden of correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to the national security, it was inherent that we should receive the raw material necessary to perform this function. In the course of the debate in the House of Representatives on 19 July 1947, Congressman Judd pointed out that all intelligence relating to the national security which was developed by the various agencies of the Government must be made available to the DCI. It was with this thought in mind that Section 102(e) was written into the law, providing that intelligence relating to the national security should be made available to the Director for correlation, evaluation and dissemination. (The special proviso that was written in, making it necessary for the Director to make written request to the Director of the FBI, was included, not to preclude the Director from information from that source, but merely to make it impossible for the Director to inspect specific operations of the FBI which are all in the field of internal security.)

7. The intent of Congress is clearest in its determination to make certain that CIA received all the information which it needed to perform its functions. This is indicated by the authority to inspect intelligence of agencies (other than the FBI) to the extent recommended by the NSC and approved by the President. The present directive (NSCID #1), the wording of which was reached by compromise among the agencies, authorizes inspection by the DCI only through arrangement with the head of the intelligence agency concerned. This qualification vitiates the entire inspection authority.

8. The feeling that there was outside interference with CIA was evident in connection with the Bogota hearings. The sentiment of Members of the Congress was expressed in the statement of Congressman Clarence Brown of Ohio, who served as the Chairman of the Special Subcommittee investigating the Bogota incident, and who was also a member of the original Committee which established CIA. He stated, on 16 April 1948, that:

“It may be necessary for Congress to enact additional legislation to give the CIA the independent status it was generally presumed to enjoy.”

9. The focus brought upon the subject of intelligence was in great measure caused by the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. In connection with its report on this matter, the Committee stated:

“Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7—Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?”

It was the intent of Congress in establishing CIA to establish an independent agency which would be the focal point of all foreign intelligence information, to correlate and evaluate all such information and to disseminate the product to the necessary Government officials. The Congress felt it had conferred the statutory authority necessary for CIA to perform these functions, even though it left broad direction largely to the NSC and the President. We believe there is ample authority latent in the law, and that adequate directives will permit CIA to fulfill the role which, even now, the Congress believes the Agency is playing as an essential element in the national defense and security.

• Lawrence R. Houston ²
• Walter L. Pforzheimer

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–84, Item 3. Confidential. The source text is a transcript prepared for the CIA Historian on September 9, 1952.
1. (and at the time of the Korean invasion.) [Footnote in the source text. The note was obviously added later, perhaps when materials were being selected for the use of the CIA Historian.]
2. Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.