Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

219. Central Intelligence Group Memorandum⁰

Washington, July 21, 1947.

MEMORANDUM OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

1.

• (a). The provisions of Section 102 of S. 758 relating to the Central Intelligence Agency are thoroughly acceptable and workable.
• (b). However, if Section 102 of S. 758 is adopted by the Conferees, it would be preferable if it were also to include Section 105 (e) of H.R. 4214. It gives the Director the right to terminate the employment of any employee of the Agency. This provision is extremely important at the present time, in order that any possible subversives may be removed at once.

2. Section 105 of H.R. 4214 as originally introduced is also thoroughly acceptable and workable. It is, in fact, preferable to Section 102 of S. 758. It is to be preferred for the following reasons:

(a) The salary of the Director is placed at $14,000, which is more in keeping with the relative importance of the position within the national security structure.

(b) It authorizes the Director to terminate the employment of any employee.

(c) It more clearly delineates the functions of the Agency instead of relying on the provisions of the Executive Order of 22 January 1946.

3. By amendment, the House of Representatives has changed Section 105 (a) of H.R. 4214 to provide that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be selected only from civilian life. Previous versions had provided that the Director be selected from civilian or military life. It is hoped that the Conferees will restore the provision permitting the President to select the Director either from civilian or military life. In this connection, the provisions of S. 758, attached as Tab “A”,¹ or the provisions of H.R. 4214 as originally introduced, attached as Tab “B” herewith, are both thoroughly acceptable. In addition, as an alternative, a possible compromise is submitted as Tab “C”, attached hereto.

4. The provision requiring that the Director may be appointed only from civilian life appears to place an unfortunate restriction upon the Presidential powers of appointment. The President should be allowed to exercise his discretion in appointing the best available Director, either from civilian or military life, depending upon the qualifications of personnel available at the time of appointment. The necessity of Senate confirmation of the Director would eliminate the possibility of a poor selection; and the Senate in its discretion would probably reject appointees from the armed services if they were continually rotated for short tours of duty. If at some time in the future we were plunged into another war, the most qualified appointee might well be a reserve officer who had entered on active duty from civilian life. The proposed restriction would prevent his appointment by the President. Such a limitation would have prevented the appointment of the Director of Strategic Services during the past war.

5. The main argument advanced in the House of Representatives against a military Director was that the people “are afraid, in this particular instance, over the possibility that there might be some sort of a Gestapo set up in this country.… You might have a military officer who would like to do that; … if you require a civilian to be the head of this Agency, then you will not have any danger within the Agency of military influences or military dictatorship. It is felt that this argument is an excessive interpretation of the facts. The Agency deals only with foreign intelligence. It would have none of the publicity necessary for building its Director into a public figure of such stature that he might aspire to dictatorship. The Director of Central Intelligence, heading a small organization, would never be in a position to build up that great popular following upon which dictatorship must be predicated.

The New York Herald Tribune, commenting editorially on the above quotation, on 21 July 1947, stated that it “reflects the ancient American misunderstanding and suspicion of the military and military affairs, which throughout our history has always made sound military policy so difficult for the civil arm.”

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 90–00610R, Box 1, Folder 5. No classification marking. The source text is neither addressed nor signed and contains no drafting information. It appears that it was drafted in the office of the CIG’s General Counsel. At the time that this memorandum was written, the differing House and Senate versions of the national security legislation had gone to conference.
1. None of the tabs is printed; see the Supplement.