174. Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board0


  • Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
  • Members Present
  • Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
  • Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
  • Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
  • Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff–2
  • Also Present
  • Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
  • Mr. James Heck, Department of State
  • Colonel E. K. Wright, Central Intelligence Group (for Item 1 only)
  • Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
  • Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.
  • Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
  • Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
  • Secretariat
  • Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.
  • Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

1. Agenda and Weekly Date for I.A.B. Meeting

General Vandenberg asked Mr. Lay to explain why there were three items left off the agenda of today’s meeting.

Mr. Lay stated that some of the I.A.B. members were not ready to discuss C.I.G. 13 and 15,1 and ICAPS was still working on C.I.G. 18.2

Mr. Lay then asked if it was agreeable with the Board to establish a standard time each week for I.A.B. meetings. He explained that in the [Page 435] event there was nothing to come before the Board, the members would be notified in advance and the meeting would be cancelled for that week.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to set aside 1430 each Thursday as the normal time for I.A.B. meetings, with the understanding that the Secretary would advise each member early in the week whether a meeting was to be held.

2. Intelligence Estimates Prepared by the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 16 and C.I.G. 16/1)3

General Vandenberg asked Mr. Lay to give a brief explanation as to how ORE–14 was prepared and coordinated with the departments.

Mr. Lay stated that C.I.G. was asked to prepare this estimate on Friday to be ready the following Tuesday. He also brought out the fact that the estimate was based on an existing J.I.S. study together with cables received from Moscow, and that it was coordinated with specialized representatives of the I.A.B. before going forward.

General Vandenberg stated that he believed C.I.G. would have difficulty in meeting deadlines if the concurrence of each I.A.B. member had to be obtained by a voting system prior to the forwarding of the estimates.

Admiral Inglis stated that it was his idea to separate concurrences of estimates into three parts, i.e., the Daily Summary, the Weekly Summary, and formal O.R.E. estimates. He further stated that the Naval members of O.R.E. are perfectly competent to represent and concur for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the preparation of daily and Weekly summaries. However, in the case of formal O.R.E. estimates, Admiral Inglis stated that he was in favor of using the J.I.C. vote method, time permitting, and that he would like to have two to three days to consider each paper. If time does not permit, he felt that the paper could be put through with a statement that the estimate does not bear the concurrence of the dissenting department but that such concurrence or comments would follow. Admiral Inglis further stated that while the relationship of J.I.S. to C.I.G. is not up for consideration at this time and is the subject of another paper, he believed its solution would go a long way in solving this present problem.

[Page 436]

General Samford stated that A–2 would like the opportunity to comment on all estimates. He said that he realized that this procedure would be time-consuming, and believed possibly that an A–2 member of ICAPS could be designated to concur for A–2 on the estimates in question.

General Vandenberg stated that an A–2 member of ICAPS could not be the person to be used by A–2 in concurring on these estimates, since ICAPS is concerned with coordination problems rather than the preparation or content of intelligence estimates.

Admiral Inglis said that the Naval members of O.R.E. working on estimates would at all times be in collaboration with people in O.N.I., hence both O.N.I. and the Naval members of O.R.E. would be kept abreast of developments and the latter would know the Navy Department’s views.

Admiral Inglis stated that the question regarding concurrence in the Daily Summary involves possible omissions which can distort the picture. He said that omissions had not happened lately, but he felt that General Vandenberg would be willing to let Naval members of O.R.E. complain to Admiral Inglis if they felt that omissions had occurred.

General Vandenberg expressed the belief that the whole situation would be clarified when the I.A.B. considered C.I.G. 15.

Mr. Eddy said that in the meantime he favored appointing an aide or a staff member as a representative in O.R.E. to check estimates as proposed in C.I.G. 16/1. His reason for favoring this solution, rather than C.I.G. 16, was that, although Army and Naval officers remain in uniform and loyal to their service, civilian employees are now becoming employees of C.I.G. rather than State. Former State Department employees in C.I.G. will therefore have no direct loyalties to State.

General Chamberlin said that he was fundamentally opposed to considering a man assigned to C.I.G. as partially responsible to him. He felt that such a man owes his whole loyalty to C.I.G., and that it is impossible to divide his loyalties.

General Samford thought that this was true except in ICAPS, where he felt there was a residual representation of departmental interests.

Admiral Inglis said that he understood General Chamberlin’s point of view, but he also understood that C.I.G. was to be a cooperative interdepartmental venture. He could see the difference in the situation regarding the State Department. However, in the case of Naval officers, while they were working in C.I.G. he felt they had an additional duty representing the Navy. If they felt that Navy’s interests were not properly represented in C.I.G., then they should express this feeling to Admiral Inglis as their contact with the Navy Department. He reiterated that he understood General Chamberlin’s viewpoint and granted that this situation [Page 437] may cause trouble in the future, but felt that there had been no difficulty so far.

Mr. Eddy said that he thought Admiral Inglis’ viewpoint would definitely cause trouble in the future, especially for the State Department.

Admiral Inglis expressed the understanding that there would always be a few people in C.I.G. who continued to be State Department employees, such as Mr. Huddle.

Mr. Eddy agreed that there would be a few key State Department positions in C.I.G., but these would carry on liaison with the State Department rather than be State Department representatives. He thought that this would encourage a closer relation with State, but expressed the belief that if one of these State Department people assigned to C.I.G. felt that State’s interests were not properly represented, he would appeal not to the State Department, but to General Vandenberg.

General Chamberlin compared this to the situation on the General Staff, where personnel are expected to solve problems as they see it in the General Staff rather than from the viewpoint of the basic arm or service from which they come. He thought that if Admiral Inglis’ interpretation prevailed, it would destroy C.I.G.

General Vandenberg thought that the discussion led back to the solution proposed in C.I.G. 16/1.

General Chamberlin felt that General Vandenberg was appointed to head C.I.G. and that the I.A.B. were only advisers. He felt that General Vandenberg was placed here by the N.I.A. to perform functions assigned by that Authority. He did not feel that the I.A.B. should concern itself with the detailed performance of those functions. He said that General Vandenberg was responsible solely to the N.I.A. and was expected to consult with the departments only sufficiently to ensure coordination.

Admiral Inglis said that the way the directive was written, the I.A.B. was more than an adviser. It is a two-way street and a link between C.I.G. and the departmental agencies. He felt that the I.A.B. had a responsibility for the operations of C.I.G.

General Vandenberg felt that he has the right to put out what C.I.G. thinks is correct. However, to fulfill its obligation as an interdepartmental agency, C.I.G. must have the views of the four departmental agencies. He felt it was best that C.I.G. have not only the agencies’ views, but the reasons for these views. He agreed with Admiral Inglis that the I.A.B. has a responsibility to see, not whether C.I.G. is doing the wrong thing but that it is doing the right thing. In other words, General Vandenberg felt that the solution lay somewhere between the views of Admiral Inglis and of General Chamberlin.

General Chamberlin said that his viewpoint was that a person of General Vandenberg’s caliber should be entrusted to find his own [Page 438] method for determining departmental views. If General Vandenberg sees a difference of opinion, it would be assumed that he would check it with the departments concerned. This should be easy, since C.I.G. will always have close liaison with the departments.

Admiral Inglis felt that it was a fundamental question whether the I.A.B. has a responsibility for C.I.G. operations. He thought that if General Chamberlin’s philosophy were followed to its ultimate conclusion, it would mean that ten years from now O.N.I. would still have to have its same basic organization, since it would not be able to entrust C.I.G. to perform functions for it. If, however, O.N.I. has responsible Naval people within C.I.G., O.N.I. would then feel that the Navy’s views were being represented. He felt that C.I.G. could not go off by itself. If the departmental agencies are represented, C.I.G. could then perform many duties which are now being performed by each departmental agency.

Mr. Eddy felt that the new budget plans for C.I.G. indicated a shift, since C.I.G. may now employ its own people. He did not feel, however, that this eliminated the possibility of having C.I.G. serve the departments. If each department concentrates on its primary interests, then C.I.G. can perform functions of secondary interest and special jobs which no departmental agency can perform. Then, so long as the I.A.B. is a two-way street, C.I.G. and the departmental agencies can make available the best service each to the other.

Admiral Inglis felt that this would not work unless the departments were represented in C.I.G.

General Chamberlin said that if he were called upon to submit a Naval estimate he would go to the Navy. He felt General Vandenberg would do the same. He thought, however, that if General Vandenberg felt the data on hand in C.I.G. corresponded to the opinions of the departments, General Vandenberg should be authorized to send that data forward as an intelligence estimate.

General Vandenberg said that he was afraid that if people in C.I.G. fail to represent the departmental viewpoint, C.I.G. would get off the track. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should be in close contact with the departments in order to obtain departmental views. He said that he was encouraging all C.I.G. personnel to get the views of all three departments.

General Chamberlin said that he was confident C.I.G. would do that, especially since Army officers in C.I.G. are always subject to detail and rotation. He thought that the War Department’s viewpoint would be represented because of the years of Army training each Army officer in C.I.G. would have. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should express their own views and not pattern them after the opinion of someone in an outside agency.

[Page 439]

Admiral Inglis thought that the idea was to assign people to C.I.G. in order to form a link with the departments, to utilize the sources therein, and have the benefit of the combined thinking of all departments.

General Vandenberg thought that Admiral Inglis’ objective could be gained by having representatives detailed to O.R.E.

Mr. Lay pointed out that the procedure to be followed by each representative in clearing papers was a matter for decision by each I.A.B. member. Admiral Inglis could instruct his representative not to vote until Admiral Inglis had approved each estimate.

Admiral Inglis said that he was willing to appoint a representative part-time, but that this representative would act only as a messenger.

Mr. Eddy said that he would like to see this system tried. He thought that each I.A.B. member might designate a deputy who was well trained and could bring papers to the respective I.A.B. members for clearance when necessary.

General Chamberlin said that he would give his representative the responsibility for deciding whether to act on an estimate or to clear it with General Chamberlin. General Chamberlin felt, however, that this arrangement should not prevent C.I.G. research personnel from working closely with G–2 research sections.

General Chamberlin then expressed the belief that C.I.G. estimates sent to the President should not show a dissenting opinion.

Admiral Inglis thought that the President should know of any dissenting opinions, although he hoped that any differences could be reconciled before the estimates were issued. He felt, however, that estimates should not be held up unduly in an effort to reconcile divergent views.

General Chamberlin said that if each paper were handled in detail it would defeat the purpose of C.I.G., since every word or shade of meaning would be questioned.

Admiral Inglis noted that this was the procedure used in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although it had not worked perfectly, he felt that for every example where this procedure had failed to work there were ten examples where it had worked.

General Chamberlin noted, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has no head or commander, as is the case in C.I.G.

Mr. Lay pointed out that the wording of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 requires only that “substantial dissent” should be noted in C.I.G. estimates, which was intended to preclude discussion of every word or shade of meaning.

Admiral Inglis said that the concept of N.I.A. was that all departments would be represented in all matters. The Director of Central Intelligence is the executive responsible for carrying out the policies of the N.I.A. The I.A.B. is more than merely an adviser. All through the N.I.A. [Page 440] and C.I.G. structure it was intended that there be equal representation of all departments.

General Vandenberg pointed out that it is a matter of record in N.I.A. minutes that the N.I.A. is the agency responsible to the President, and not the Director of Central Intelligence.

General Chamberlin noted that the Director of Central Intelligence is not responsible to the I.A.B., but rather to the N.I.A.

General Vandenberg pointed out, however, that the N.I.A. has delegated to the I.A.B. the right to concur for the N.I.A. members. Therefore, in the final analysis the I.A.B., by this delegation, has a measure of responsibility for the success of C.I.G. activities.

General Chamberlin questioned how this would work, since many other agencies of the Government were involved.

Admiral Inglis noted that this was covered by the fact that other agencies sat as members of the I.A.B. on matters of interest to those agencies.

After further discussion of detailed amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Concurred in the issuance of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1 subject to amendment to read as follows:

  • “1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
  • “2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.
  • “3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4 below.
  • “4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If concurrence or dissenting opinions cannot be obtained in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement that only limited coordination has been attained and substantial dissent, if any, will be submitted at a later date.
  • “5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates.”

(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32.)

[Page 441]

3. Plan for Coordination of Biographic Intelligence (C.I.G. 17)5

General Vandenberg gave a brief description of the plan recommended in C.I.G. 17.

General Chamberlin raised the question as to whether paragraph 2–c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive would authorize biographic intelligence data of one department to be made available to another department.

General Vandenberg stated that if the biographic intelligence data of one department was not available to other departments, such a system would cause a great deal of duplication.

Mr. Eddy stated that he believed the word “responsibility” should be left out of the first sentence of paragraph 2–c.

General Vandenberg said that he was agreeable to this omission.

Admiral Inglis said that he objected to the last sentence in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, since O.N.I. does have a good index system and it is maintained up to date.

Mr. Edgar stated that at the time the covering memorandum was written he did not know that the Navy’s index system had been completed.

Admiral Inglis questioned whether this proposed Directive would govern domestic coverage and, if so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have a chance to express its views on the matter under consideration.

General Vandenberg replied that the paper did not govern domestic coverage, and was for foreign biographic intelligence only.

Admiral Inglis stated that the majority of inquiries made to O.N.I. were in the domestic field and he felt that this paper was too elaborate a plan for the coordination of foreign biographic intelligence.

General Vandenberg stated that if the plan in this paper did not work, it could be recalled.

Mr. Edgar stated that it was desirable to get approval on this paper in order to gain proper coordination in the field.

General Vandenberg stated that he should have central machine records in order to point out biographic intelligence information contained in other agencies.

Admiral Inglis agreed.

[Page 442]

Mr. Eddy stated that the provisions of paragraph 3–b of the covering memorandum would cause too much work for the State Department to undertake at this time, since the State Department had a mass of biographic information that dated back to 1790, and that to reproduce this information would be a staggering job.

Mr. Edgar explained that it was not the intent of this paper to reproduce all biographic information presently on file in the departments, but rather C.I.G. would start a new from a given date, and the information contained in the central file would be only enough to indicate the type of personality whose name appeared on each card. This would make it possible to decide whether it was desirable to obtain further details from the department having the basic file on a given individual.

Mr. Heck stated that the State Department drew from a wider scope than would be reported on standard forms, and that only one or two per cent of the names in State Department file would be covered by standard report forms. He suggested that each agency concentrate on an assigned area of responsibility.

General Chamberlin said that he was heartily in favor of a central file which could be consulted rather than having to contact all of the agencies in each case on which information might be desired.

General Vandenberg said that to have to go to the files of each agency on each case would take a lot of unnecessary time.

Mr. Heck reiterated that such a central file would show only a small per cent of the names presently on file in the State Department.

General Vandenberg stated that the central file proposed would be starting a new, and, while he realized it would be slow in building up, eventually it would be of benefit to all concerned.

Mr. Heck stated that he believed that if the information contained on these cards got much beyond a name stage, it would involve too much duplication.

General Vandenberg said that there would naturally have to be some duplication. However, at the present time, with the volume of files in the agencies and no central index system, no one knows exactly what we do have.

Mr. Heck felt that this proposal would put a heavy burden on the departmental agencies, since it would require additional people to extract the information and put it on standard cards.

General Chamberlin suggested that each time an agency made a summary for its own index, it send a copy to C.I.G.

Admiral Inglis suggested that to eliminate workload, cards for C.I.G. be prepared on each new report from the field or whenever departmental agencies took action to prepare a summary—as, for example, in [Page 443] answer to a request. He thought that on this basis the C.I.G. file would be very useful five years from now.

General Vandenberg said that was all C.I.G. asked the agencies to do.

Mr. Edgar said that C.I.G. would be willing to receive the standard form on new field reports, and copies of completed summary reports which are prepared by the agencies in answer to a request. He said that in the latter case C.I.G. would be willing to make up the central file card.

Mr. Heck pointed out that this would mean that C.I.G. had a very incomplete file, representing only about five per cent of the State Department’s files.

Mr. Edgar expressed the belief that, if C.I.G. received all completed summary reports, it would have information at least on personalities in which there is an active interest.

Admiral Inglis agreed that would be true in many cases, but pointed out that it would be a long time before any reliance could be felt that C.I.G.’s list was complete.

Mr. Eddy stated that he believed this file should be called the central index.

Mr. Edgar stated that he believed the name of the file should indicate that it contained more than just names.

Mr. Eddy suggested that the file be called a “reference index file”.

Admiral Inglis recommended that the phrase “nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files”, in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, be omitted.

The Enclosure to C.I.G. 17 was then discussed and amendments thereto agreed upon by the Board.

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed that the phrase “nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files”, at the end of paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, should be deleted.
Concurred in the recommendation in paragraph 3–b of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, subject to insertion of the word “index” between “reference” and “file” on the second line thereof.
Concurred in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 17, subject to the following amendments:
Delete the word “responsible” from the second line of paragraph 2–c.
Reword the first sentence of paragraph 3–a to read as follows: “The chief of mission of each embassy, legation or foreign post has the [Page 444] over-all responsibility, in accordance with the principles of this Directive, for coordinating the collection of biographic intelligence in his geographical area.”
Delete paragraph 3–b–(7).
Delete paragraph 5–b.

(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 16.)6

4. National Intelligence Requirements—China (C.I.G. 19)7

Mr. Eddy suggested that this item be postponed until the next I.A.B. meeting.

General Chamberlin agreed, since he had not had sufficient time to study this paper. He expressed the belief, however, that the titles of Parts I and II of the proposed N.I.A. directive were reversed.

Mr. Edgar asked if, since the proposed directive had the concurrence of representatives of the I.A.B., the Board would authorize use of the directive, pending final approval, as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.

General Chamberlin said that he would like to know what collection responsibilities are involved before deciding what information should be collected.

Mr. Edgar explained that it was felt that the collection people must know what information the researchers want before they can decide on the assignment of collection responsibilities.

Admiral Inglis said that although he felt the wording could be improved, he was prepared to approve the directive as it stands.

After further discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Agreed to defer consideration of C.I.G. 19 until a meeting next Thursday, 7 November 1946.
Pending final approval, authorized the use of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19 as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.

5. Status of N.I.A. 6 8

Admiral Inglis asked what was being done on N.I.A. 6, in view of the appointment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

[Page 445]

Mr. Lay explained that N.I.A. 6 was presently awaiting approval by the President, and that General Vandenberg was taking steps to get a decision on this matter.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
  2. See Document 170.
  3. In CIG 18, “Responsibility of the Department of State for Reporting and Collection of Information and Intelligence,” October 25, the Department of State recommended that in order to avoid duplication of effort it should assume complete responsibility for the overt procurement of information and intelligence in foreign areas on all political, economic, social, and cultural matters and such scientific information and intelligence which did not fall within the military and naval fields. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement. See also the minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Committee on Intelligence, October 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees—State Department, Lot File No. 122, Records of the Secretary’s Staff Committee 1944–47, Box 94) See the Supplement.
  4. CIG 16, October 14, which sought to establish a procedure for intelligence estimates, was a proposal by Rear Admiral Inglis, the Chief of Naval Intelligence. CIG 16/1 (October 26) was a counterproposal by the Director of Central Intelligence. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement for both.
  5. ORE–1, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” July 23, the first intelligence estimate produced by CIG’s newly established Office of Research and Evaluation is reproduced in CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman , pp. 65–76.
  6. CIG 17, October 25, proposed to establish within CIG a central biographic reference file that would contain basic factual data on all foreign personalities on whom supporting files were maintained by the departmental intelligence agencies. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
  7. Dated November 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 130) See the Supplement.
  8. CIG 19 as amended became NIA Directive No. 8, February 12, 1947. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132)
  9. See Documents 163 and 164.