165. Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Hoover) to the
President’s Chief of Staff (Leahy)0
Washington, August 23, 1946.
Dear Admiral
Leahy: I am sure you will recall your recent
conversation with Mr. Tamm of my
office, on August 12th,1 last, concerning the Central
Intelligence Group. With further reference to the matters discussed at that
time I thought I should call to your attention the proposed CIG Directive No. 152 which recently has been referred to me for
approval and/or comment.3
Some of the provisions incorporated in this Directive have caused me
considerable concern. Briefly, they provide for CIG operations within the United States and its Territories in
a fashion which I regard to be an invasion of domestic intelligence coverage
which, according to our laws, is the sole responsibility of this Bureau. I
am attaching a copy of my letter of reply to General Vandenberg, in which I outlined my objections in
detail. This letter should be self-explanatory.
We are sure you will agree that it is imperative that the present arrangement
for domestic intelligence coverage should not be tampered with at this
critical period. If the proposed Directive should be placed
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into effect, it is our feeling that it
definitely would create considerable difficulty and would inevitably lead to
confusion, duplication of effort and intolerable conditions to the detriment
of the national well-being.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment4
Washington, August 23, 1946.
Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Hoover) to the
Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg)
Dear General
Vandenberg: I refer to your memorandum of August
21, 1946, concerning the exploitation of American business concerns,
non-governmental groups, and individuals with connections abroad as
sources of foreign intelligence information.5 I must
advise that the proposed directive which was attached does not
incorporate the changes suggested in my letter of August 6, 1946,6 and I, therefore, cannot
approve it. This new directive also includes provisions and statements
in which I cannot concur and, in fact, must oppose.
In the discussion attached to this new proposed directive it is stated:
“Foreign intelligence information related to the national security,
although it may be collected from sources whose headquarters are within
the limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely part
of the national intelligence mission, the coordination of which is
specifically a function of the National Intelligence Authority under the
provisions of the President’s letter of 22 January, 1946.” This
statement is not in agreement with Section 9 of the President’s letter
of January 22 which states: “Nothing herein shall be construed to
authorize the making of investigations inside the continental limits of
the United States and its possessions except as provided by law and
Presidential Directives.”
I note that in the proposed directive it is stated that field agents of
the Central Intelligence Group will establish and maintain liaison with
the
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intelligence officers of
local Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters. If this
means that the CIG will establish
offices in the United States or will operate field agents within the
United States or its possessions, I am of the opinion that this is not
within the provisions of the President’s original directive. I did not
understand that the President’s original directive contemplated the
Central Intelligence Group engaging in any such activities within the
United States and its possessions.
In connection with the proposed directive, as previously advised, I will
approve a directive providing for the Director of Central Intelligence
establishing uniform procedures for securing the cooperation of American
business concerns in supplying foreign intelligence information required
for the national security. As set forth in my letter of August 6
concerning the original proposed directive, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation should be exempt from provisions requiring clearance from
the Central Contact Register inasmuch as it is necessary for us to
contact such various firms on a daily basis in matters involving the
discharge of our domestic responsibilities. I desire also to reiterate
my suggestion that the Central Contact Register advise the FBI with reference to each American
business firm with which arrangements are made to secure foreign
intelligence in order to prevent duplication of effort and possible
embarrassment to both the FBI and the
CIG.
I shall, of course, be most anxious to promptly transmit to the Central
Intelligence Group any information gathered through our domestic
operations involving foreign intelligence information relating to the
national security.
With best wishes and kind regards,
Sincerely yours,7
