151. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board0


  • Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
  • Members Present
  • Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence
  • Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, W.D.G.S.
  • Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
  • Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
  • Mr. D. M. Ladd, for Items 1 and 2 (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
  • Also Present
  • Mr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Group
  • Colonel M. N. Huston, G–2
  • Captain R. K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
  • Colonel E. P. Mussett, A–2
  • Lt. Colonel F. K. Newcomer, G–2
  • Colonel L. J. Fortier, Central Intelligence Group
  • Captain W. B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group
  • Colonel R. H. Boberg, Central Intelligence Group
  • Colonel H. F. Cunningham (for Item 1), Central Intelligence Group
  • Captain R. Goldthwaite, USN (for Items 2–4), Central Intelligence Group
  • Colonel C. P. Nicholas, Central Intelligence Group
  • Colonel W. A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
  • Colonel T. J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group
  • Secretariat
  • Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority
  • Mr. J. K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

1. Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties With Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G. 7 and C.I.G. 7/1)1

The proposed amendments to C.I.G. 7, as contained in C.I.G. 7/1, were taken under consideration.

Admiral Souers was of the opinion that the screening committee recommended by the Chief of Naval Intelligence in C.I.G. 7/1 would be difficult to administer and in fact, was an unnecessary duplication of other provisions of the paper, since Paragraph 8 of C.I.G. 7 provided that no individuals could be certified for duties with the Central Intelligence Group until after a security inquiry which would include a records check of member agencies of the I.A.B.

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Commodore Rend felt that it is impossible to do too much in the interests of security. He saw no completely desirable substitute for the proposed formal screening committee, even if it were to involve some degree of duplication, and he was sure that he spoke the views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence in this connection.

Admiral Souers agreed that all practicable security measures should be taken even if they involved extra work, but he thought all such measures should be practical and capable of efficient administration.

In the course of further discussion, in which other members expressed satisfaction with the language of the section as written, Colonel Boberg proposed as the basis of a generally agreeable solution the revision of Paragraph 7 of C.I.G. 7 to read:

“7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for an assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence.”

The amendment was accepted.

The recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the State Department were then considered. Admiral Souers said that he agreed with Mr. Hoover’s criticism of Paragraph 9 of C.I.G. 7 and believed that the remedy should be the addition to that paragraph of the following provision:

“In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate.”

Mr. Ladd and other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed to this change.

Dr. Langer set forth the purpose of the State Department recommendations covering exceptional cases, but after discussion it was agreed that the provisions of C.I.G. 7 (Paragraph 13) were satisfactory to all concerned. After accepting further minor amendments offered by the Central Planning Staff,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved C.I.G. 7, subject to the amendments above (Enclosure to C.I.G. 7 subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 82).

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2. Provision for Monitoring of Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers (C.I.G. 1/1 and C.I.G. 1/2)3

Admiral Souers reviewed the history of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). He noted the recommendation in his own report (C.I.G. 1/1) that the service be continued under C.I.G. direction and War Department administration, and invited attention to the dissenting recommendation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, in C.I.G. 1/2, that the project be administered by the Department of State or by the C.I.G. directly. On the second point, Admiral Souers could not agree with General Vandenberg that the Central Intelligence Group should administer such a service directly. The C.I.G. is not an independent agency and thus is not empowered to sign contracts, nor does it have technical personnel readily available. While the C.I.G. was authorized to perform “such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally”, he believed the most efficient procedure in this case was probably that outlined in C.I.G. 1/1.

General Vandenberg agreed it would be difficult for the C.I.G. to assume direct administrative control of FBIS at this time. Yet he felt that the position of the War Department should be appreciated and understood. As he saw it, the War Department had accepted the interim responsibility for administering FBIS until the end of this fiscal year, in order to serve the many Government agencies interested in the product of monitoring. Now, more than ever, it was clear that the bulk of the information obtained by this means was not primarily related to military intelligence; rather it related to political and economic intelligence, and for this reason was surely of greater interest to the Department of State than to the War Department. He doubted whether G–2 could continue to justify requests for FBIS appropriations for these reasons, and he felt there should be no delay in placing the administration of FBIS in an agency of primary interest, such as State, or in C.I.G. as a centralized service.

Admiral Souers noted that the disposition proposed in C.I.G. 1/1 would require the approval of the National Intelligence Authority. Should the Authority agree that the War Department was the appropriate agency to administer the service, it could be presumed that the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy could defend the conclusion in relation to appropriations.

General Vandenberg thought it would be easier for the three Secretaries to defend the service within State or C.I.G. than in the War Department.

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Admiral Souers said he had originally thought the State Department would be the ideal lodgment for FBIS, and in fact he believed the former Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Mr. McCormack) had once held the same view. However, there had recently been so much question as to the scope of the operations to be undertaken by State that he thought it best to leave the administrative responsibility where it was—that is, in the War Department—with over-all direction from C.I.G.

General Vandenberg pointed out that, since only about 5% of all foreign broadcasts are monitored, priorities must be constantly shifted to meet the most important requirements. The War Department is unable to anticipate the shifting requirements for political and economic information, and thus to adjust its coverage of foreign output, as promptly as would a directly interested agency such as the Department of State. Moreover, all that would be necessary for such a change would be to transfer the existing technical group and point their activities in the direction of major interest.

Dr. Langer said he recognized the force of General Vandenberg’s argument. Much of the material which FBIS was obliged to cover dealt with political, economic, and psychological developments of the greatest interest and importance to the State Department. It might be logical to place FBIS administration under State. At the same time, in view of the current heavy burden on State Department administrative facilities, he was not sure that the Department could now assume a new responsibility of such dimensions. The subject was one on which he could not express a final judgment without checking with his own Department.

General Vandenberg added that G–2 would be glad to lend to State the services of necessary experts, and to arrange for a gradual transfer of administrative responsibility, if such measures would assist a solution.

After concluding discussion, and on the motion of Admiral Souers,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Deferred action on C.I.G. 1/1 pending further study.
Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence directed the Central Planning Staff to consult with appropriate officials in G–2 and the State Department as to the practicability of transferring the monitoring function to the State Department, and to recommend any revisions in C.I.G. 1/1 deemed appropriate.

3. Development of Intelligence on USSR (C.I.G. 84 and C.I.G. 8/15)

The memorandum of the Director of Central Intelligence (C.I.G. 8) and the proposed amendments thereto (C.I.G. 8/1) were considered by the Members.

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After discussion, the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 8 were adopted:

In Paragraph 3 the fourth sentence was revised to read: “The Planning Committee will select a chairman from among its representatives. The Secretary shall be furnished by a member agency by mutual agreement.”
In Paragraph 4.a., the words “as necessary and available” were inserted at the end of the second sentence.
In Paragraph 4.b., the word “practicable” was inserted at the end of the third sentence.

4. Distribution of C.I.G. Daily Summary

Admiral Souers advised that inquiry had been received from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to the possibility of his being placed on the distribution for the C.I.G. Daily Summary. He noted that since the distribution of the Summary had been established by the National Intelligence Authority, any increased distribution would require the Authority’s approval.

After discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would discuss informally with the Secretary of State the distribution of the C.I.G. Daily Summary to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the War Department.
  2. Neither printed. (Both ibid., HS/HC–276)
  3. Dated May 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 130) See the Supplement.
  4. CIG 1, February 25, 1946, CIG 1/1, April 26, 1946, and CIG 1/2, May 8, 1946. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.
  5. Document 148.
  6. Dated May 8, 1946. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) See the Supplement.