761.93/1777a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss)
829. 1. The Department has given careful study to the contents of your telegrams of June 1, 3 p.m. and June 8, 2 p.m., and of other recent telegrams and despatches in regard to the subject of Sino-Soviet relations, and it is naturally greatly concerned in view of the importance which this Government attaches to the maintenance of solidarity among the United Nations. It has consequently given careful thought to the possible means of improvement of those relations. With particular reference to the current Chinese charges that the Russo-Japanese agreements of March 30 have resulted in the removal of substantial Japanese forces from Manchuria for service particularly in China, it does not appear to be established that the Chinese themselves are in common agreement in respect to that belief (see the contradiction, for instance, between the information submitted by two different Chinese officials as reported in your telegrams of May 31, noon and June 1, 6 p.m.) It appears to the Department that the particular allegation that nine divisions have been transported from Manchuria into China Proper since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese agreements must be considered unsubstantiated and in its present form exaggerated. As you were informed in regard to preliminary conversations concerned with post-war security, the Secretary has endeavored to disabuse Ambassador Wei of suspicions the latter professes to entertain regarding the significance of the Russo-Japanese agreements. It is suggested that you do likewise in the course of conversations with Chinese officials and point out that current Chinese propaganda directed against the Soviets is likely to operate to the detriment of good relations between the United Nations.
2. The Department believes that it is not opportune to suggest at this juncture that the Soviets undertake diversionary movements designed to impede Japanese troop movements from Manchuria. It is believed that the Japanese military leaders fully appreciate how deeply the U. S. S. R. is at present committed to war in the European theater, [Page 103] and that any Japanese movements which may at present be taking place are based upon the Japanese estimate that the Soviet Union would not choose at this time to attack Japan and could not in any event commit sufficient forces to the task in view of present exigencies in Europe. It is felt that if the Chinese general staff would itself make dispositions of available Chinese forces effectively to confront the enemy with the whole of Chinese military strength, the situation in China would undergo substantial improvement. The full utilization of Chinese forces which are now understood to be disposed in positions against each other, rather than against the Japanese, would improve the Chinese position.
3. It appears to the Department that a frank and friendly discussion with President Chiang Kai-shek in regard to these various matters would be beneficial and helpful to our common war effort. It is desired that, before you undertake that discussion, you confer with General Stilwell’s Headquarters regarding the problems involved and show to General Ferris this telegram. With particular reference to telegram Warx 49456 of June 11 from the War Department,1 you should ascertain whether that Headquarters would concur in your presentation to President Chiang of the military matters set forth below under items 1 and 2, in general support of the position of our military vis-à-vis the Chinese Government. Upon clearance of these points with General Ferris, you are authorized at your discretion and whenever an opportunity occurs to discuss the present situation with the Generalissimo along the lines indicated in the preceding paragraphs and to urge that the following specific measures be taken with a view to improving the military situation: (1) the granting of permission to American staff officers to operate with Chinese units in the field and also independently in order to obtain necessary military intelligence (inability of this Government to obtain satisfactory evidence of such matters as the alleged Japanese troop movements, for instance, is due in some extent to Chinese refusals to permit the American observers heretofore to operate in the field in China); (2) the more adequate employment in the field against the Japanese forces of the better-equipped units of the Chinese army and the amalgamation of the Chinese air force with the Chinese-American Composite Wing to increase the strength of Allied air forces in China; (3) the effecting of such agreement between the Kuomintang authorities and the Chinese Communist leaders as would result in the elimination of the present blockade of the so-called Communist area and the release of the troops of both the Central Government and of the 18th Route Army for employment against the Japanese; and (4) the undertaking by the Chinese of measures designed to effect a closer understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
[Page 104]4. You might point out to President Chiang that the military situation in Asia requires every effort on the part of the Allied forces, including the Chinese, and that the length of the war will be determined by (a) the effectiveness of those efforts and (b) assistance which, depending upon the future course of events, may possibly be rendered later by the U. S. S. R. In the latter connection please point out that the United States desires to see a better understanding between the Soviet Union and China which would be of fundamental benefit for the common war effort in Asia. The information submitted in your telegram of May 31, 11 a.m.,2 if a true picture of the Soviet attitude, would appear to indicate that the U. S. S. R. is not fundamentally opposed to a rapprochement with the National Government but that it is concerned with the anti-Sovietism of important Chinese leaders. It must be obvious that the difficulties of China will increase in direct proportion to the length of the war, and that it is very definitely to China’s interest that the war shall be terminated as soon as possible. The Soviet Union, it may be expected, will continue to exhibit reluctance to extend substantial political or economic aid to the National Government so long as the present tension between the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist groups persists.
5. In your conversation with President Chiang please emphasize that it is purely on the basis of military exigency that the United States Government recommends in the most friendly way to President Chiang that he initiate appropriate steps to bring about, in the form proposed, improvement of Allied intelligence and military coordination in China, better utilization of available matériel and military personnel, an improvement of domestic and foreign political relations. Please also emphasize that the United States Government remains desirous and willing to do everything feasible to assist China but in view of the magnitude and urgency of the military operations in Europe it is not possible at the present time substantially to increase our military aid to China. Therefore, any immediate amelioration of the situation would necessarily have to be effected by action taken within China itself rather than through major assistance from the outside. In this connection please point out that, while the material assistance which we can immediately bring to China is unfortunately limited, there is every prospect that, with the defeat of Germany, there will rapidly develop a very different situation in the Far East, placing us “in a position to” render assistance on a scale which will not only enable China to play a major role in evicting the Japanese from Chinese territory, but also enormously improve China’s capacity to assume and enjoy the responsibilities and advantages awaiting her [Page 105] as one of the four great powers in the United Nations organization for the postwar world.
6. The Department has discussed with concerned officers in the War Department the measures proposed above, which have their full accord. You will learn from the above-cited telegram from the War Department what assistance the American military are in a position to render to aid in meeting the current Japanese threat.
7. The Department is telegraphing the Ambassador at Moscow3 background information regarding the present military situation in China and that aspect of Russo-Chinese relations treated in this telegram. Ambassador Harriman is being authorized to make such use of that information as may in his discretion seem desirable in the course of any discussions with officials at Moscow.
8. It is requested that you bring this telegram, and other pertinent information, to the attention of the Vice President for such use as he may deem appropriate and helpful.