861B.6363/199b: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
1492. 1. Subsequent to the signature on March 30 of the Soviet-Japanese agreements regarding the fisheries and oil concessions, there have been numerous expressions of belief by Chungking officials that those agreements either directly by virtue of secret clauses or indirectly because of the resultant détente in Soviet-Japanese relations enabled the Japanese to remove substantial forces from Manchuria for use elsewhere in the Far Eastern theatre and particularly in China. With the recent Japanese drives in Honan and Hunan Provinces, there has been an increase of Chinese professed suspicion of that sort. Specifically General Ho Ying-ch’in, Minister of War, has just communicated to the American military at Chungking the assertion that Japanese forces in Manchuria subsequent to early 1942 have been reduced to 17½ divisions from the previous total of 31½, with 8 divisions withdrawn since March of this year. General Ho has further indicated that the Chinese military situation in view of current Japanese operations is “desperate” and has requested an increase of American military assistance and particularly of American air strength in the China theater. General Ho further requested that the American military authorities consider what measures could be taken to persuade Moscow to undertake such action as would prevent the Japanese from [Page 106] continuing the removal of their troops and air strength from Manchuria for utilization in China. With reference to this latter request the Ambassador at Chungking has been informed that it is not opportune at the present time to request the Soviets to carry out any diversionary movements in eastern Siberia.
2. The Chinese warning of “grave danger” and the concomitant request for American aid are of course not new: there have been similar Chinese moves on the part of Chungking periodically since December 1941. Information obtained from American, as distinct from Chinese, sources in China would indicate that the present Japanese move nevertheless contains a greater element of danger, and has consequently caused in Chinese governmental circles a greater degree of real inquietude, than perhaps any Japanese move since 1938. American military authorities in Chungking to date have been unable definitely to confirm the previously reported removal of Japanese troops from Manchuria for use in China. Current military analysis of the situation conceives the possibility that a strong Japanese thrust from Hankow southward, perhaps accompanied by a northward drive from Canton, could effect the capture of the Hankow–Canton Railway, the major portion of which is at the present time in operation (as distinct from the Chengchow–Hankow Railway, from the most of which the rails have been removed). It is considered by some observers to be possible, although not probable, that the Japanese might even in addition launch an attack on Chungking and Kunming for the complete stabilization of their position in China, and that such a move is militarily feasible “if they are willing to pay the price”. Any Japanese moves as thus outlined would be furthered by the schism which has already appeared in incipient form within the Kuomintang military and political machine itself. The danger to the Chinese, in short, appears to be serious.
3. The United States continues to be desirous and willing to give to China all feasible support and assistance. However, in view of the magnitude and urgency of our military operations in Europe, it is not possible at the present time to increase substantially our military aid to China. It is believed nevertheless that some improvement of the military situation might be effected within China itself if the Chinese could be persuaded to take action along the following lines: effecting of (a) that reconciliation of the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist groups which would make possible the coordinated employment of their joint forces against the common enemy, (b) a better utilization of such men and matériel as the Chinese forces have at present at hand, and (c) better military intelligence and coordination with participation of American staff officers. War Department officials at Washington concur.
[Page 107]4. The Department is authorizing Ambassador Gauss, in his discretion, to discuss the current situation in China with President Chiang Kai-shek in a frank and friendly manner along the lines indicated and to endeavor to impress upon him the urgent importance especially at this time of adopting the measures outlined above as a means of strengthening coordination of action against the common foe.
5. This telegram is sent you for your background information. It is requested that you show it to General Deane.4 It should not be used for the making of separate representations to Soviet officials; the factual material, however, may be used by you at your discretion in your general conversations with the Soviet Government on the subject of American policy in respect to China.
- Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U. S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.↩