740.0011 Pacific War/3952: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 15—11:30 a.m.]
1038. General gloom and a discouraged and somewhat defeatist attitude is becoming prevalent at Chungking in Chinese official and other circles, including some higher circles where conditions and developments are best known. While I find no suggestion that China should or must abandon the struggle or seek a compromise peace (and we believe that China’s leaders realize fully that their only hope is to keep China steadfastly among the United Nations), the attitude is one of general discouragement.
On the military side, the failure of China’s armies in Honan to offer any appreciable resistance to the Japs and the admitted fact that even the Chinese peasants turned on the Chinese troops, who had long been repressing them due to their own deplorable condition, has come as a particularly hard blow to Chinese official confidence. There is general expectation that Changsha will fall shortly and [doubt]99 whether the Chinese forces can be relied upon to stand at Hengshan or Hengyang when Japs approach those objectives. It is repeatedly emphasized by Chinese spokesmen that Japan has mobilized large forces for the present campaigns and it is too readily accepted as fact by most of Chinese officialdom that China’s armies cannot put up effective resistance. It is now reported that the Japs have resumed their drive in Honan and are thrusting toward Tungkuan and that with the possible fall of that city—too readily accepted as possible—it may be expected that the Japs will push into Shensi and cut off the northwest. It is also generally expected that the Jap thrust south from Hankow will be followed by a movement north from Canton, that eastern China will be cut off, and that the Japs will then menace Kweilin, Kunming and Chungking.
There is press and other articulate criticism that we have not supplied the Chinese armies with arms; that the excursion into northern Burma was a mistake; and that the forces on the Salween which we did equip should have been assigned to the eastern front.
[Page 101]My latest secret information is that the Hunan situation is developing unsatisfactorily and that the Generalissimo himself is proposing to proceed to that front.
While there is a much larger Jap concentration on the Hankow and Canton areas than usual in connection with Jap operations, Embassy is inclined to agree with Military Attaché that the Jap strength at present concentrated is not adequate to take and hold the areas threatened. Of course, additional forces may be mobilized elsewhere to come forward later.
On the political side, there is covert and fearful criticism by officials, intellectuals and others of Generalissimo Chiang; of his complete concentration of all power and authority in his own hands; of his engrossment with a heavy volume of petty details of administration; of his present capricious, suspicious and irascible attitude on both domestic and foreign problems; of his unwillingness to repose any confidence, authority or trust in anyone or to consult or seek or consider any advice or intelligent opinion; of his attitude of suspicion of Soviet Russia and his irritation that he has not been able to infect the United States with such suspicion, et cetera. There is harsh comment on the failure of the recent CEC meeting to adopt any constructive measures in China’s present crisis or to look to the democratization of the party and the government in an effort to regain the confidence and support of the intelligent classes.
To me the most disturbing note is the lack of confidence in facing the situation. The opinion is generally expressed that there is no one who can reach the Generalissimo and persuade him to a “change of heart” and a more balanced and liberal outlook. There is expression of the hope that Vice President Wallace during his visit may do something, but there is lack of understanding and appreciation of the difficult position of any non-Chinese seeking to influence a person of the character of the Generalissimo.
I do not wish to stress the situation now developing but I would be remiss if I did not inform the Government of it frankly. In my opinion, while there is reason for the discouragement reflected by so many fine and able Chinese, there is not yet justification for their extreme gloom and their defeatism. I trust that events will take a turn to dispel their present fears and restore confidence. One encouraging element is the activity of United States air forces in support of China’s armies. This support should greatly encourage the troops and a revival of a spirit of resistance should restore confidence.
I confess there is nothing that I can suggest at this time that we might do in the present situation that is not already being done by our own continuing demonstration of confidence and faith in China and by our continuing active air support, except if it be possible [Page 102] to increase such air support. Victories in the Pacific are, of course, a sustaining factor of some effectiveness. Direct attack upon Japan will also help. But what the Chinese need for their morale is more direct effective military aid in China and I perceive of no such aid which can be furnished at present unless it is somehow possible to expand considerably our air operations in China against the Jap ground and air forces.
- Insertion made on the original by Augustus S. Chase of the Division of Chinese Affairs.↩