Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI

893.00/12–2444: Telegram

The Appointed Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, December 24, 1944.
[Received 12:10 p.m.]

Replying to your number 1681, December 20th. In all my negotiations it has been my understanding that the policy of the United States in China is:

(1) To prevent the collapse of the national government.

(2) To sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies.

(3) To harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander.

(4) To promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse and

(5) To unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.

This is a broad outline of my mission. When I arrived in China relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell had approached a deadlock. Battles were being lost, the Chinese Government was facing collapse. Stilwell was recalled. The American General Wedemeyer was appointed to succeed Stilwell as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and Commander of American forces in China. The China theater was separated from the India-Burma Theater. With the cooperation of the Generalissimo, General Wedemeyer has reorganized the United States Army Staff in China by:

(1) Relieving and replacing several high officers and adding competent personnel.

(2) Under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, Wedemeyer has effected some drastic changes in both the Chinese General Staff and Field Commands and has also regrouped armies and changed both tactics and strategy.

(3) Wedemeyer has placed an American General in command of the service of supply and

(4) For the first time the American and Chinese military staffs are coordinated and functioning together in a manner that is having a splendid effect upon the morale of the armed forces.

During the period of military reorganization I was also discussing with the Generalissimo changes in the administration of the civil government. China is a republic in name only. It is a personal government. Perhaps it might be called a benevolent dictatorship. The avowed purpose of Chiang Kai-shek and his government is to make China a united independent democracy. A government of the people, for the people, and by the people, to promote the progress of democratic processes in administration. As you will note later these are also the avowed objectives of the Chinese Communist Party. The critics of Chiang Kai-shek, especially among Americans, condemn him for not being able to create a democracy in China during the war and at once. It should be apparent to men of understanding that the creation of a democracy in China is to be a long and difficult undertaking and cannot be fully achieved until the masses of China have been educated. The Generalissimo has since our arrival made certain drastic changes in the members of his Cabinet and the administration of the civil government. The critics say he has not gone far enough which of course is true but he has gone quite a distance for a first step. He will go further. The present members of the civil administration are cooperating with the American Embassy, the American military establishment and all the American agencies. There was in the past a tendency in the Government to bypass the Embassy on some matters and deal through the army and a corollary tendency to bypass the army if it was thought that dealing through the Embassy would be more expeditious. We have no desire to fix responsibility for that situation on the Embassy, the army or the Chinese Government. We are happy to report that the Generalissimo, the Foreign Office, the National Government of China, the Chinese military officials, the American military officials and the Embassy are cooperating and the results of the united effort is beginning to show in the military situation.

At the time I came here Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Communist Party in China was an instrument of the Soviet Government of Russia. He is now convinced that the Russian Government does not recognize the Chinese Communist Party as Communists at all and that

(1) Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China.

(2) Russia does not want dissensions or civil war in China and

(3) Russia desires more harmonious relations with China.

These facts have gone far toward convincing Chiang Kai-shek that the Communist Party in China is not an agency of the Soviet. He now feels that he can reach a settlement with the Communist Party as a Chinese political party without foreign entanglements. When I first arrived it was thought that civil war after the close of the present war or perhaps before that time was inevitable. Chiang Kai-shek is now convinced that by agreement with the Communist Party of China he can

(1) Unite the military forces of China against Japan and

(2) Avoid civil strife in China.

I might add here that Chiang Kai-shek has requested permission from the Soviet Government to send a personal representative to confer with Marshal Stalin. For this mission he has chosen the present acting President of the Executive Yuan who is concurrently Minister of Foreign Relations, Doctor T. V. Soong. The Soviet Foreign Office has advised that they will receive Dr. Soong the latter part of February or the first part of March. This mission is intended to establish closer and more harmonious relations between Russia and China.

With the consent, advice and direction of the Generalissimo and members of his Cabinet and on the invitation of the leaders of the Communist Party. I began discussion with the Communist Party and Communist military leaders of China for the purpose of effecting an agreement to regroup, coordinate and unite all the military forces of China for the defeat of Japan. The defeat of Japan is of course the primary objective but we should all understand that if an agreement is not reached between the two great military establishments of China, civil war will in all probability ensue. I received cordial cooperation from the Communist leaders. They submitted through me to the National Government a plan for a coalition government and the unification of the military forces. The Communists also acknowledge the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and pledged themselves to support the establishment in China of a government “of the people, for the people, and by the people”. They pledge themselves also to support all the individual rights of man and to promote the growth of democratic processes in government. The Kuomintang and the National Government then had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists. They neglected or did not choose to do so at that time. They said the Communist plan was not acceptable to the National Government. The National Government did however submit a counter proposal which was not acceptable to the Communist leaders. We are in daily conferences with the Generalissimo and members of his Cabinet endeavoring to liberalize the counter proposal made by the National Government to the Communists. We are having some success. The Generalissimo states that he is anxious that the military forces of the Communist Party in China and those of the National Government be united to drive the invader from China. The Communist leaders declare this is also their objective. I have persuaded Chiang Kai-shek and others in the National Government that in order to unite the military forces of China and prevent civil conflict it will be necessary for him and the Kuomintang and the National Government to make liberal political concessions to the Communist Party and to give them adequate representation in the National Government. Chiang Kai-shek has appointed a new committee which is now working out a plan that he believes will be feasible and on which he hopes a working agreement can be reached with the Communists. The Kuomintang is trying to avoid the use of the word “coalition”. They do not want to admit that they have formed a coalition with the Communists. The Kuomintang still hopes to keep China under one-party rule. Notwithstanding all this you should bear in mind that the Communists have acknowledged the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and have accepted nearly all of his avowed principles. There is very little difference, if any, between the avowed principles of the National Government [of?] the Kuomintang and the avowed principles of the Chinese Communist Party.

There is formidable opposition to the unification of the Chinese military forces and the coalition of the Chinese political parties. We find some opposition to the unification of China among the diehards of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party. The greatest opposition to the unification of China comes from foreigners. There is a great current of public opinion in China that is directed by those who believe that their interests in Asia will be more definitely safeguarded if China is divided against herself than there would be if China should establish herself as a free united democratic nation. Generally speaking the opponents to unity in China are the imperialist nations who are now fighting for the reconquest of their colonies in Southeast Asia and for the reestablishment of imperialist colonial governments in the colonies. All of this group try to convince the Chinese that everything America does to unite and strengthen China is interference in Chinese internal affairs. Each of these nations and some of their dominions have Embassies in Chungking and wield some influence not only with the Government but through their agents among the people of both Free and Occupied China. The agencies that are working along those lines are:

(1) The Embassy of the Netherlands

(2) The French Embassy

(3) The British Embassy

(4) The Canadian Embassy

(5) The Australian Legation and

(6) The office of General Carton de Wiart, personal representative of Prime Minister Churchill. In addition there are some American military officials and diplomatic officers who believe that the present Chinese Government will eventually collapse and that there can be no military or political unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek and his “diehard” supporters in the Kuomintang. This group expresses the opinions:

(1) That the Generalissimo has made a deal with Japan.

(2) That without such a deal his Government would collapse.

(3) That the Communists should not unite with the National Government.

(4) That the Communists should not permit their troops to be united with the Chinese Army and

(5) That the United States should deal with the Communist Party and not with the National Government.

I have not been impressed by any of the arguments made by the imperialists and other opponents of a unified China but I am enumerating them here so that you may have them definitely before you and give them what weight you think they deserve. The senior officers of the Embassy are in agreement with me in these matters. The final argument that is intended to convince us is that America’s policy to unite the military forces of China, to help China win the war, to prevent civil war in China and to establish a free united democratic Chinese nation is detrimental if not completely destructive to the position of the white man in the Orient. Nearly all of the arguments against the unification of China should generally be classed as the stock arguments of the imperialists and of all others who oppose the principles of the Atlantic Charter.^7a

This is a quick reply to your message which I received late yesterday. I am sending it by Navy Radio as I have found that to be more expeditious as well as more competent than commercial radio.

Hurley

1. Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.