893.00/12–2644
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent)
Ambassador Hurley’s attached telegram of December 24,8 contains information new to the Department in addition to considerable background material.
The five points in which the Ambassador outlines his mission are basically sound. With regard to points one and two, it is desirable however to maintain sufficient flexibility in our attitude toward the political scene in China to avoid embarrassment in the unlikely event that Chiang with his Government is ousted and to take immediate steps to support the elements most likely to carry on resistance.
It is heartening to note that the Generalissimo and General Wedemeyer have taken steps to reorganize the military command in a manner that is having a “splendid effect on the morale of the armed forces”.
Note is also taken of the Ambassador’s statement that, in the reorganization of the Cabinet, Chiang “has gone quite a distance for a first step” and “he will go further”. This has been also the view in the Department.
The Ambassador’s statement that “Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China” may need qualification. Whereas direct material support is not being given, the Communists do draw considerable indirect support from Russia and their attitude toward a settlement with the National Government could no doubt be influenced by Moscow. Nevertheless, it is hoped that, as the Ambassador states, Chiang Kai-shek is becoming convinced “that the Communist Party in China is not an agency of the Soviet”. The Ambassador’s statement that T. V. Soong will go to Moscow in February or March as personal representative of the Generalissmio to confer with Marshal Stalin is encouraging.
In describing the Communist plan, submitted to the National Government for a coalition government, the Ambassador states that “the National Government then had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists. They neglected or did not choose to do so at that time”. However, he points out that “Chiang Kai-shek has appointed a new committee which is now working out a plan that he believes will be feasible and on which he hopes a working agreement can be reached with the Communists”.
(The past attitude and performances of Chiang do not encourage optimism. The differences in the viewpoint between the two groups is simple and fundamental. Chiang is prepared to grant Communist [Page 751] representation in the government provided such representation has no controlling or directing influence. The Communists want a “coalition government” in which they, the Kuomintang, and the so-called “third parties” group will have an equal say.)
The Ambassador’s discussion of the opposition to Chinese unity among foreigners in China (British, French and Dutch diplomats) is interesting but, it is felt that the conclusions reached are based in some degree on misunderstandings. European diplomats in China are generally more cynical—less optimistic—than Americans are with regard to the present prospect of unity in China and their cynicism or pessimism is frequently misinterpreted as opposition to Chinese unity.
The opposition to unity in China on the part of some American military officials and diplomatic officers, as described by the Ambassador, reduces itself simply to an expression of belief that the Chinese Government is doomed to collapse and that therefore the American Government should be prepared to deal with the Chinese Communists, the only strong political element in the country. This point of view is not shared by the Ambassador but in our thinking and planning with regard to relations with China, further disintegration of Chungking’s authority is a contingency which must be taken into account.
(If Chiang’s present efforts to reach a settlement with the Communists do not succeed it is believed that serious consideration should be given to the establishment of a supreme American command, under Chiang, of all troops in China. In this connection, reference is made to a CA memorandum of December 22.9)