There is enclosed with Report no. 15 (sub-enclosure to enclosure No. 1) a
memorandum of a conversation which Mr. Service had with Mr. Mao Tse-tung,
Communist leader, on August 23, 1944. In the course of this conversation Mr.
Mao suggested the desirability of the creation of a provisional national
congress in China in place of the present single-party rule of the
Kuomintang and of the American Government’s using its influence to compel
the Kuomintang to carry out such a proposal. Mr. Mao raised the question of
the attitude of the United States toward the Chinese Communist Party and
said that if United States military forces land on the coast of China there
will have to be cooperation with both Kuomintang and Communist
forces—preferably in separate sectors. Mr. Mao made a plea for American
cooperation and the granting of assistance to the Chinese Communist Party
and said that the Chinese Communists must and will cooperate with the United
States. In his covering report, Mr. Service expressed the belief that Mr.
Mao spoke with frankness and offered the observation that Mr. Mao’s
statements were the clearest indication he had yet received of the part the
Chinese Communists hope to play in the future of China. Mr. Service also
reported that there was at the time a significant concentration of Communist
political and military leaders in Yenan for the probable purpose of
discussing present-day and future Chinese Communist policies. Mr. Service
observed, in this connection, [Page 600] that
the most important question or factor to the Communists is American
policy.
In Report no. 20 (enclosure no. 2) Mr. Service refers to the rise of
Communist power and the decline of the Kuomintang influence and strength,
and suggests that as a result it may be necessary in the near future for the
United States to decide on a definite policy in relation thereto. After
reviewing the trend of events and coming to the conclusion that there is
likely to be either future Communist control of China or important Communist
participation in its government, Mr. Service concludes that the nature,
policies and objectives of the Chinese Communist Party are of vital
long-term concern to the United States and that the determination of our
policy toward that Party should be based, in part at least, on a study of
the actual accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party, its present and
future policies and the quality and capacity of its leadership. Mr. Service
points out that reports on the military accomplishments of the Chinese
Communist Party have been submitted (those coming into the possession of the
Embassy have been or are being transmitted to the Department) and that other
reports on a variety of Communist accomplishments are to be submitted in the
future.
In Report no. 16 (enclosure no. 3) Mr. Service suggests that the United
States should supply the Chinese Communists with urgently needed military
supplies and training in the use of such supplies, to be followed later by
actual tactical cooperation. Mr. Service points out that the implementation
of such a policy is likely to meet with resistance from the Kuomintang, and
suggests that the United States must decide whether the gains which can be
reasonably expected to accrue from assisting the Communists will justify the
overcoming or disregarding of anticipated Kuomintang opposition. He
expresses the view that the limiting of American support and assistance to
the Kuomintang alone will not win the United States an effective ally
whereas impartial support of the Kuomintang and the Communists will provide
an effective force in the latter, will be a constructive influence in China,
and will almost certainly prevent the outbreak of civil war. Asserting that
it is an incontrovertible fact that the Chinese Communists have maintained
and strengthened themselves militarily in a very large area of north and
central China; that they hold strategic positions in proximity to all
Japanese communication lines north of the Yangtze River; that Communist
forces are capable and experienced in mobile and guerrilla warfare; that
they possess the popular support of the people; and that their material
requirements are simple and moderate, Mr. Service observes that the
furnishing of the Chinese Communists with moderate quantities of supplies
will improve their effectiveness.
Although Mr. Service’s estimate of the accomplishments and capabilities of
the Chinese Communists may be modified by the further studies and
investigations being undertaken by the United States Army Observer Section
now operating in Communist-controlled areas, it seems clear that the
problems touched upon in the enclosed reports are of ever-growing concern to
the United States not only because of the trend of events in China but also
because the war in the Pacific is approaching Japan and the China coast. It
appears that we are to be faced inevitably with the problem of determining
whether the Chinese Communists are to be supplied with American arms and
equipment in the struggle against Japan. If the decision is made to supply
the Communists with American arms and equipment, we shall then be faced with
the further problem of how such arms and equipment are to be supplied. Under
present circumstances—the continued inability of the Kuomintang and the
Communists to reach a political and military agreement or to cooperate in
the war against Japan—we may expect the Kuomintang, as Mr. Service has
suggested, to oppose our furnishing the Communists with arms and equipment.
If such Kuomintang opposition should materialize and if the Kuomintang and
the Communists fail to patch up their differences, we shall then be faced
with a very complex problem. It seems obvious that an attempt to supply the
Chinese Communists with American arms and equipment without first obtaining
the sanction of the Kuomintang Government in Chungking—which we have in the
past and continue to recognize as the Government of China—would produce
serious repercussions, if indeed it did not bring about the collapse of the
Chiang Kai-shek regime. On the other hand, our compliance with Kuomintang
wishes not to supply the Chinese Communists with arms and equipment might be
expected to hamper the conduct of military operations against the Japanese
and perhaps prolong the war.
It seems apparent that the most satisfactory solution to the problems posed
above would involve a thoroughgoing reconciliation between the Kuomintang
and the Communists and a hard-and-fast agreement to unite and cooperate.
Such a reconciliation and agreement might be both political and military in
character, or it might be military alone. It might involve participation of
the Communists and perhaps other independent political groups in some way in
the National Government; it might be limited to the formation of some kind
of coalition military council to deal with military affairs and coordinate
the activities of the Chinese armies. Or it might involve some arrangement
under which an Allied field commander might be appointed to the control of
the armies of the two factions. Admittedly the prospects for
Kuomintang–Communist reconciliation and agreement are not at present bright,
but the bringing to bear of American [Page 602] influence on both factions may even yet result in a harmonious solution.
The only alternative appears to be a continued and progressive
disintegration of the situation in China, followed perhaps by chaos and a
consequent grave impediment to the prosecution of the war against Japan.
[Subenclosure]
Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service) of a
Conversation With Mao Tse-tung
[Yenan,] August 23, 1944.
(After a short general conversation Mao said that he would like to talk
about Kuomintang–Communist relations. The following is the gist of his
remarks.)
The relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is the
key to the problem of China. In the first stage, from 1922 [Page 605] to 1927, there was cooperation. This
made possible the success of the Northern Expedition and the rise to
power of the Kuomintang. But as soon as the Kuomintang got that power it
sought to monopolize it; it turned against and tried to exterminate us.
The result was the second stage—the ten years of civil war from 1927 to
1937. The third stage, a return to cooperation, was impelled by the
imminence of the Japanese invasion. It has continued precariously up to
the present.
This cooperation of the third stage was not entered into gladly or
willingly by the Kuomintang. Its acceptance by the Kmt has never been
sincere or whole-hearted. It was forced on the Kmt by five factors:
- 1.
- The Japanese attack
- 2.
- The pressure of foreign opinion
- 3.
- The enduring strength of the Communists—exploited at
Sian
- 4.
- The will of the people of China—to resist Japan
- 5.
- The internal weakness of the Kmt—which made it unable to
defeat us.
The end of the war (and even its approaching end) will bring a shift in
these forces.
The defeat of Japan will eliminate the most powerful and positive of
these factors.
The Communists are stronger than before. In this way it can be said that
their influence for unity and against civil war is greater. But as long
as the Kmt is under its present type of leadership this greater
Communist strength makes the Kmt more determined on Communist
elimination. This can work only up to a certain point: if the Communists
are too strong, the Kmt will not dare to attack them. But the Kmt
leaders are so grasping for power that they may take long chances.
The people of China are still inarticulate and politically repressed.
They are kept so by the Kmt. The liberals, students, intellectuals,
publicists, newspaper interests, Minor Parties, provincial groups, and
modern industrialists (who have been disillusioned and see no future for
themselves in Kuomintang bureaucratic industrialization) are numerous.
But they are disorganized, disunited and without power. Over them Chiang
holds the bayonets and the secret police.
The Kuomintang is an amorphous body of no definite character or program.
The liberal groups within it have no strong leader, no rallying point,
and no aggressive platform. If they did have these they would have no
way, under present circumstances, of reaching the people. The
controlling leaders of the Kuomintang, though divided into jealous
cliques, are all anti-Communist and anti-democratic. They are united by
their selfish determination to perpetuate their own power.
[Page 606]
Considering these factors alone it seems inevitable, if the country
drifts along under the present leadership, that there will be Kuomintang
provoked civil war.
We Communists know civil war from bitter experience. We know that it will
mean long years of ruin and chaos for China. China’s unity, her
stabilizing influence in the Far East, and her economic development will
all be delayed. Not only the Chinese but also all nations having
interests in the Far East will be affected. China will become a major
international problem. This vitally concerns the United States.
One thing certain is that we Communists dread civil war. We abhor it. We
will not start it. We will do our best to avoid it—even though we know
that as things now are (provided that the Kmt does not receive foreign
help) we would eventually win. But the Communists are of the people. The
people’s interests are our interests. The people will not submit for
long to the despotic Fascism which is now apparent in Chungking and
Sian, and which is foreshadowed even more menacingly in books like
Chiang’s China’s Destiny. If the people fight,
the Communists must fight along with them.
The hope for preventing civil war in China therefore rests to a very
great extent—much more than ever before on the influence of foreign
countries. Among these by far the most important is the United States.
Its growing power in China and in the Far East is already so great that
it can be decisive. The Kuomintang in its situation today must heed the
United States.
American policy in China therefore becomes not merely a matter of concern
to Americans alone; it is also a question of the most vital interest to
the democratic people of China. The Chinese people, accordingly, are
interested in three general questions.
First, is there a chance of an American swing
back toward isolationism and a resultant lack of interest in China? Are
Americans [going to ?] close their eyes to foreign problems and let
China “stew in her own juice”? We Communists feel that this problem will
not arise if Roosevelt is re-elected.
(This and other questions about the United States were addressed directly
to me. I therefore made it clear, in the most explicit terms, that I had
no official authority and that my replies were only my purely private
and completely unofficial opinions.
On the above points, I mentioned America’s long and special interest in
China; the fact that we would have no internal reconstruction problem as
a result of war destruction; that on the contrary our greatly expanded
economy and our more international outlook would impel us to seek trade
and investment beyond our borders; that it was therefore unlikely that
we would become isolationist or unconcerned about [Page 607] China; and that I doubted whether
administration of the country by either Republicans or Democrats would
fundamentally affect our China policy.)
Second, is the American Government really
interested in democracy—in its world future? Does it, for instance,
consider democracy in China—one-fourth of the world’s
population—important? Does it want to have the government of China
really representative of the people of China? Is it concerned that the
present government of China, which it recognizes, has no legal status by
any law and is in no way representative of the people of China? Chiang
Kai-shek was elected President by only 90 members of a single political
party, the Kuomintang, who themselves cannot validly claim to represent
even the limited membership of that party. Even Hitler has a better
claim to democratic power. He was selected by the people. And he has a
Reichstag. Does the United States realize the obvious fact that the
present Kuomintang has lost the confidence and support of the Chinese
masses? The important question, however, is not whether the American
Government realizes this fact, but whether it is willing to try to
improve the situation by helping to bring about democracy in China.
(I referred to the numerous official American statements regarding unity
in China and our general hope for democratic development in all
countries. I mentioned the apparent trend of at least an important part
of American opinion as shown in recent critical articles in the American
press.)
It is obvious that the Kuomintang must reform itself and reorganize its
government. On its present basis it cannot hope to fight an effective
war. And even if the war is won for it by the United States, subsequent
chaos is certain.
The government must broaden its base to take in all important groups of
the people. We do not call for full and immediate representative
democracy: it would be impractical. And, under Kuomintang sponsorship
and control, it would be an empty fraud. But what can and should be
done—at once—is to convene a provisional (or transitional) National
Congress. To this all groups should be invited to send delegates. These
delegates must not be selected and appointed by the Kuomintang, as in
the past. They must be genuine representatives—the best qualified
leaders. They should include the Communist Party, all Minor Parties, the
intellectual groups, newspaper interests, students, professional groups,
central organizations of cooperative societies, labor and other mass
organizations.
A workable compromise for the distribution of strength might be that the
Kuomintang would have one-half of the members, all others together the
other half. It would have to be agreed beforehand, for [Page 608] reasons of practical politics, that
the Generalissimo would be confirmed as Temporary President.
This Provisional Congress must have full power to reorganize the
Government and make new laws—to remain in effect until the passage of
the Constitution. The Government should be directly responsible to the
Congress. Its functions and powers might be somewhat like those of the
British House of Commons.
The Provisional Congress would also have full charge of the preparations
for full democracy and Constitutionalism. It would supervise the
elections and then convene the National Congress. It would then turn
over its powers and pass out of existence.
Is the American Government willing to use its influence to force the
Kuomintang to carry out such a proposal? Is the American Government
willing to make the proposal and actively support it?
(Chairman Mao made the suggestion that this matter was of such importance
that it would warrant my making a trip to Chungking to present it to the
Ambassador. I said that the Ambassador would be fully informed. I also
suggested that we had already heard this general proposal from other
quarters in Chungking.
Subsequently on August 26 I learned in a conversation with Chou En-lai
that the Politbureau of the Communist Party was considering the making
of this proposal to the Kuomintang. They would base it on the
Kuomintang’s refusal to discuss the Communist demands for democracy in
their present negotiations on the ground that they are “too
abstract”.)
Third, what is the attitude and policy of the
American Government toward the Chinese Communist Party? Does it
recognize the Communist Party as an active fighting force against Japan?
Does it recognize the Communists as an influence for democracy in China?
Is there any chance of American support of the Chinese Communist Party?
What will be the American attitude—toward the Kuomintang and toward the
Communists—if there is a civil war in China? What is being done to
ensure that the Kuomintang will not use its new American arms to fight a
civil war?
(These questions, especially the points raised in the second and third,
formed the framework of our further conversation. I returned to a number
of points for further amplification and discussion.
Regarding the question of “support” of the Communist Party, I pointed out
that the question was obscure and, in any case, premature inasmuch as
the Communists themselves publicly supported the Central Government and
Chiang Kai-shek.)
We Communists accepted Kmt terms in 1936–7 to form the United Front
because the foreign menace of Japan threatened the country. We are,
first of all, Chinese. The 10 years of inconclusive, mutually [Page 609] destructive civil war had to
be stopped in order to fight Japan. Even though we had not started the
civil war, we took the lead in stopping it. Also, the foreign countries
recognized the Kmt and Chiang; they did not support us. But the United
Front was not all one-sided: The Kmt also promised political
reforms—which they have not carried out.
Our support of Chiang does not mean support of despotism: we support him
to fight Japan.
We could not raise this question of recognition before. In a formal sense
it is still premature. We only ask now that American policy try to
induce the Kuomintang to reform itself. This would be a first stage. It
may be the only one necessary: if it is successful there will be no
threat of civil war.
But suppose that the Kmt does not reform. Then there must be a second
stage of American policy. Then this question of American policy toward
the Communists must be raised. We can risk no conflict with the United
States.
We can ignore the question of the supply of American arms now which can
be used by the Kmt in a future civil war. But must we expect a
repetition of past history. In the early days of the Republic, the
Powers recognized only Peking—long after it was apparent that the only
government that could claim to represent the people of China was that in
Canton. Nanking was not recognized until after the success and
completion of the Northern Expedition. Now the internal situation in
China is changing. The lines are not yet clearly drawn. But a somewhat
similar situation may develop. Will the United States continue to give
recognition and support to a government that in ineffectiveness and lack
of popular support can only be compared to the old Peking
Government?
(I suggested the diplomatic impossibility of withdrawing recognition from
a government that had not committed a directly unfriendly act, the
obvious undesirability of working behind a recognized government to
support an opposition party, and finally the delicacy of the whole
problem of interference in the domestic affairs of another country.)
America has intervened in every country where her troops and supplies
have gone. This intervention may not have been intended, and may not
have been direct. But it has been nonetheless real—merely by the
presence of that American influence. For America to insist that arms be
given to all forces who fight Japan, which will include the Communists,
is not interference. For America to give arms only to the Kuomintang
will in its effect be interference because it will enable the Kuomintang
to continue to oppose the will of the people of China. “Interference”
(Mao noted his objection to the term because [Page 610] of its having no meaning in this situation) to further
the true interests of the people of China is not interference. It will
be welcomed by the great mass of the people of China because they want
democracy. Only the Kuomintang is against it.
We do not ask the stopping of all aid to the Kmt forces. The effect would
not be good on the war. The Kmt would collapse and the American landing
in China will be more difficult.
(Chou En-lai in a subsequent conversation developed the following themes
along related lines: (1) The giving of American arms only to the Kmt is
sure to mean civil war; (2) We must not ignore the possibility that
Japan may try to end the war by a “surrender” to Chiang Kai-shek. This
will be a trick on the other Allies and will in effect be a compromise
based on Japan’s desire to keep a weak Kuomintang rather than a strong,
unified and democratic government in China; (3) The only way to be sure
of decisively winning the war in China and avoiding civil war is to give
arms to both Kuomintang and Communists.)
(I raised the question of how American influence could be exerted
effectively, expressing skepticism about “dictation” to Chiang. Mao
vigorously rejected my suggestion.)
Chiang is in a position where he must listen to the United States. Look
at what happened in Honan, is happening now in Hunan, and shows every
sign of happening in Kwangsi! Perhaps it will be Yunnan next. Look at
the economic situation! Chiang is in a corner.
Chiang is stubborn. But fundamentally he is a gangster. That fact must be
understood in order to deal with him. We have had to learn it by
experience. The only way to handle him is to be hard-boiled. You must
not give way to his threats and bullying. Do not let him think you are
afraid: then he will press his advantage. The United States has handled
Chiang very badly. They have let him get away with blackmail—for
instance, talk of being unable to keep up resistance, of having to make
peace, his tactics in getting the 500 million dollar loan, and now
Kung’s mission to the U.S. and the plea for cloth. Cloth! Are we or are
we not fighting the Japanese! Is cloth more important than bullets? We
had no cotton here in the Border region and the Kmt blockade kept us
from getting any from the parts of China that did have it. But we got
busy and soon we are going to be self-sufficient. It would be 100 times
easier for the Kmt, and if they were a government that had an economic
policy they would have done it themselves.
With Chiang you can be friendly only on your own terms. He must give in
to constant, strong and unified pressure. Never relax on your
objectives: keep hammering at him.
[Page 611]
The position of the United States now is entirely different from what it
was just after Pearl Harbor. There is no longer any need or any reason
to cultivate, baby or placate Chiang. The United States can tell Chiang
what he should do—in the interest of the war. American help to Chiang
can be made conditional on his meeting American desires. Another way for
American influence to be exerted is for Americans to talk American
ideals. Every American official meeting any Chinese official, in China
or in the United States, can talk democracy. Visits like Wallace’s give
good opportunities; there should be more of them. Kung’s presence in the
United States should not be wasted.
Every American soldier in China should be a walking and talking
advertisement for democracy. He ought to talk it to every Chinese he
meets. American officers ought to talk it to Chinese officers. After
all, we Chinese consider you Americans the ideal of democracy.
(I suggested that the use of our Army as a political propaganda force was
alien—and that we had nothing corresponding to the Communist Political
Department to indoctrinate the troops and direct such work.)
But even if your American soldiers do not actively propagandize, their
mere presence and contact with Chinese has a good effect. We welcome
them in China for this reason. The Kuomintang does not. It wants to
segregate them and keep them from knowing what conditions really are.
How many American observers do you have now in the front lines? We are
happy to take your men anywhere. The Kmt is worried about the effect of
a lot of Americans in China. They fear an American landing only second
to their fear of Russian participation.
The presence of Americans is good in another negative way. If Americans
are scattered widely they will have a restraining effect on the
Kuomintang. It will be more difficult for the Kmt to start trouble. An
example is Kunming. It has become a center of liberal thought and
student freedom because the Kmt doesn’t dare to arrest and throw the
students into concentration camps under the eyes of so many Americans.
Compare this with Sian, where Americans are very few and the Secret
Police unrestrained.
Criticism of the Kuomintang in American periodicals is good. Its effect
may not be immediately apparent. Sometimes it may even seem temporarily
to have a bad reaction. But if it is fair (the Kmt will know if it is)
it causes the Kmt to hesitate and think—because they need American
support.
Finally any contact you Americans have with us Communists is good. Of
course we are glad to have the Observer Section here because [Page 612] it will help to beat Japan. But there
is no use in pretending that—up to now at least—the chief importance of
your coming is its political effect on the Kuomintang.
(I noted his emphasis on American landing in China and suggested that the
war might be won in other ways and a landing not necessary.)
We think the Americans must land in China. It depends, of course on
Japanese strength and the developments of the war. But the main Japanese
strength is in the Yangtze valley and North China—not to speak of
Manchuria.
If the Americans do not land in China, it will be most unfortunate for
China. The Kuomintang will continue as the government—without being able
to be the government.
If there is a landing, there will have to be American cooperation with
both Chinese forces—Kmt and Communist. Our forces now surround Hankow,
Shanghai, Nanking and other large cities. We are the inner ring: The Kmt
is further back.
If there is to be this cooperation with both Communist and Kmt forces, it
is important that we be allowed to work in separate sectors. The Kmt is
too afraid of us to work with us. Their only concern will be to
checkmate us. When we are in separate sectors, the U. S. Army can see
the difference: That we have popular support and can fight.
(I questioned whether open civil war was, as he had suggested, inevitable
if the Kmt was not restrained or induced to reform.)
We can say that civil war is “inevitable but not quite certain.”
Subjectively, the present Kmt leaders are determined on the elimination
of the Communists. They are afraid of us just as, and for the same
reason as, they are afraid of the people. Objectively, there are
factors—the five mentioned at the beginning of the talk—which restrain
the Kmt. The strongest of these—the Japanese will be out of the picture.
Another—strong because outside and independent of the Kmt—is foreign
opinion. But it is now unpredictable. The Kmt still hopes that foreign
influence may be on its side.
The Kmt is already busy preparing pretexts for civil war. The more you
know of us and conditions in our areas, the less value these pretexts
will have.
So the Kmt may resort to indirect methods of attack. It will be hard to
define or set a line to its aggression.
But if the Kmt undoes the progress that has been accomplished in our
areas, if they take away the new democratic rights of the people, the
people will resist and will demand our help.
Another line of Kmt action will be through the puppets. The puppets will
turn back to the Kmt—claiming to have been “patriotic” all the time. The
Kmt will then use the puppets to hold the cities [Page 613] and areas from which the Japanese
withdraw. They will incite the puppets to attack us and to create
friction.
(Chou En-lai carries this line further by suggesting that this may be a
part of the possible fraudulent Japanese surrender to Chiang: The
Japanese will turn over their arms to the puppets (or the Kmt) on the
condition that the Communists will be liquidated.
This may seem at first a little far-fetched. The only possible comment is
that the forces involved in this situation are so complicated and their
hatreds so intense, that almost anything is possible.)
The fact is clear, even to the Kuomintang, that China’s political
tendency is toward us. We hold to the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang
Congress.9 This is a truly great
and democratic document. Sun Yat-sen was no Communist. The Manifesto is
still valid. It will not quickly pass out of date. We will hold to it
even if the Kmt should collapse because its general policies are good
and suited to China. Everything we have done, every article of our
program, is found in that document.
Of course, we do not pretend that we are perfect. We still face problems
of bureaucracy and corruption. But we do face them. And we are beating
them. We welcome observation and criticism—by Americans, by the Kmt or
by anyone else. We are constantly criticizing ourselves and revising our
policies toward greater efficiency and effectiveness.
Our experience proves that the Chinese people understand democracy and
want it. It does not take long experience or education or “tutelage”.
The Chinese peasant is not stupid; he is shrewd and like everyone else,
concerned over his rights and interests. You can see the difference in
our areas—the people are alive, interested, friendly. They have a human
outlet. They are free from deadening repression.
(I queried his emphasis on the importance of the United States and his
neglect to consider Russia.)
Soviet participation either in the Far Eastern War or in China’s post-war
reconstruction depends entirely on the circumstances of the Soviet
Union. The Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their
hands full with their own job of rebuilding. We do not expect Russian
help.
Furthermore, the Kmt because of its anti-Communist phobia is
anti-Russian. Therefore Kmt-Soviet cooperation is impossible. And for us
to seek it would only make the situation in China worse. China is
dis-unified enough already! In any case Soviet help is not likely even
if the Kmt wanted it.
[Page 614]
But Russia will not oppose American interests in China if they are
constructive and democratic. There will be no possible point of
conflict. Russia only wants a friendly and democratic China. Cooperation
between America and the Chinese Communist Party will be beneficial and
satisfactory to all concerned.
(I jokingly remarked that the name “Communist” might not be reassuring to
some American business men. Mao laughed and said that they had thought
of changing their name but that if people knew them they would not be
frightened.)
The policies of the Chinese Communist Party are merely liberal. Our rent
reduction is from the old 80–70–60% down to the legal (by unenforced
Kuomintang law) 37½%. Even this we only try to accomplish gradually
because we don’t want to drive away the landlords. Our limit on interest
is 10% a year. This is not extreme—though it is much lower than it used
to be.
Even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our
program to take exception to.
China must industrialize. This can be done—in China—only by free
enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American
interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically
and politically. We can and must work together.
The United States would find us more cooperative than the Kuomintang. We
will not be afraid of democratic American influence—we will welcome it.
We have no silly ideas of taking only Western mechanical techniques.
Also we will not be interested in monopolistic, bureaucratic capitalism
that stifles the economic development of the country and only enriches
the officials. We will be interested in the most rapid possible
development of the country on constructive and productive lines. First
will be the raising of the living standard of the people (see what we
have done here with our limited resources). After that we can come to
the “national defense industry” that Chiang talks of in his China’s Destiny. We will be interested in the
welfare of the Chinese people.
America does not need to fear that we will not be cooperative. We must
cooperate and we must have American help. This is why it is so important
to us Communists to know what you Americans are thinking and planning.
We cannot risk crossing you—cannot risk any conflict with you.
[Enclosure 2]
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
No. 20
[Yenan,] September 3, 1944.
Subject: The Need of an American Policy Toward the
Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF–CBI, APO 879.
An important development in China during, and partly as a result of, the
war against Japan has been the phenomenal growth and spread of influence
of the Chinese Communist Party. It is now in control of most of North
and a part of Central China, and is the only active force carrying on
the war there against the Japanese. It claims, probably with some
foundation, the effective government of 86,000,000 people—about
one-fifth of the population of China.
This development has come at the same time as an apparent loss of
vitality of the Kuomintang, and a deterioration of conditions in the
areas under its control. These have had serious effects on the
prosecution of the war by the Central Government.
This shift in the balance of Chinese political forces has resulted in
internal tension—due primarily to the Kuomintang’s fear of losing its
monopolistic power—which has brought about a situation practically
equivalent to civil war. This has had further depressive effects on the
Kuomintang’s will and ability to fight Japan, and will be an impediment
to the unity, democratic progress and economic rehabilitation of China
which the United States (not to speak of the great majority of the
Chinese people) hoped for.
Without the intercession of external factors, it now seems inevitable
that this tension will result in catastrophic civil war—probably soon
after the defeat, chiefly by our efforts, of Japan.
Even though such a civil war would be immensely harmful to our own
interests, we must consider that we would be accused—with much
justification—of having contributed to it by our present arming of the
military forces of the Kuomintang.
These various circumstances may force the United States, despite its
natural disinclination, to take a more or less active part in the
influencing of China’s internal affairs. Our influence in China will
never be greater than it is now: And progress of events in this part of
the world will not allow delay. The crisis will increase as the defeat
of Japan is approached. It may therefore be necessary in the very near
future for the United States to decide on a definite policy in regard to
the problems created by the rise of the Chinese Communist Party.
[Page 616]
The ramifications of these problems do not need emphasis. They are of
great and immediate military importance; but they are also highly
political in their short and long term effects.
For instance, we may well decide, on the basis of what the Chinese
Communist military forces have achieved and their apparent
potentialities for contributing to the defeat of Japan, that those
military forces deserve our active support—probably in the form of
military supplies.
It may not be necessary for us to give this support directly and against
the opposition of the Kuomintang. Our diplomatic influence, quietly but
firmly exerted, or the growingly obvious deterioration of its own
position, may impel the Kuomintang to share its power with a more truly
representative national government. This presumably would have to
include the Communists. There would then be a new United Front, the
present blockade of the Communist areas would be ended, and the
Government itself should give the Communist forces, as a part of the
national armies, some share of American supplies. Present indications,
however, do not encourage hope of such a reversal of attitude by the
Kuomintang. It is probable, even if a nominally national government is
set up, that the Kuomintang would continue to block any aid to the
Communist forces. Should we, under these circumstances, insist on giving
this military aid?
The giving of any American military support to the Communists, whether
directly or by some indirect means as mentioned above, would be certain
to have an important effect on the political situation in China. The
Communist army is as much a political as a military force. These dual
characteristics cannot be separated. And this political nature cannot be
taken away—even by incorporation of the Communist forces into the
National Army. Our support would be generally interpreted as an
indication of American approval. And by improving the military
effectiveness of the Communist forces, it would increase their claimable
share in winning the war. Both of these factors would raise the prestige
of the Communist Party and ultimately its influence in China.
This boosting of the Communists might swing the balance of political
forces in China far enough so that the Kuomintang would be forced to
reform its policies and—even more important—the manner of their
execution, to change its present reactionary leadership, and thus to
move toward the cooperation with the Communists which would lead toward
unity, democracy and national strength. These are the effects we would
hope to have result.
We could not, however, ignore the possibility that the present Kuomintang
leadership—apparently lacking in statesmanship and thoroughly selfish
for power—will not, even under these conditions, [Page 617] release its stranglehold on the Party.
If the Kuomintang thus refuses to reform itself, it will be courting
suicide. It will, indeed, be questionable whether it can in this form
survive the crisis of the present war. If it does survive, we can at
least be confident that we will have prevented, by our moral and
material support of the Communists, the civil war that would otherwise
have been certain.
If this possibility of the collapse of the Kuomintang—chiefly through its
own intransigeance—is admitted, we must consider what forces would rise
to take its place in China. At present it appears certain that the
strongest of these would be the Communist Party, and that after a fairly
short period it would succeed in unifying the country.
Even if the Communist Party does not have this opportunity to rise to
control, we must expect, because of the vitality it is showing and the
popular support it has won, that it will be influential in China and an
important element in the democratic structure which must, as an
alternative, be created.
We can limit ourselves to these two possibilities of (a) Communist control of the country, or (b) important Communist political participation, because it is
now apparent that the present Kuomintang cannot unaidedly exterminate
the Communists, and because it can be taken for granted that we will not
willingly, or knowingly, give this aid. The Communist Party, therefore,
under any circumstances, must be counted a continuing and important
influence in China.
Whichever possibility—control or influential participation—is realized,
it is obvious that the nature, policies and objectives of the Chinese
Communist Party are of vital long-term concern to the United States.
Answers to these questions, and the determination of our proper policy
toward the Chinese Communist Party—whether we use our diplomatic
influence in its favor, whether we remain neutral, or whether we ignore
the Communist Party and continue our support only of the
Kuomintang—should be determined, in part at least, by the study of: (1)
the actual accomplishments of the Communist Party; (2) its policies,
both present and what they may be expected to be in future; and (3) the
quality and capacity of its leadership.
The military accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party during the
present war, and the fact that these depend on a political base of
popular support which the Communists have created, are now fairly well
known. I have touched on these subjects in my reports nos. 6 (August
3),10 10 (August 15),11 17 (August 30),12 18 (August [Page 618] 31)13 and 19 (August 31).14 Colonel Barrett has also submitted a number of
reports on the Communist participation in the war, the development of
their main bases, and the quality of their military forces and arms. In
addition a series of reports will be submitted on specific phases of
Communist accomplishments: the extent of democracy in the areas under
their control; their methods for the creation of popular support; their
political use of the Army; the organization and working of their
governments; their educational program; their legal system; the economic
developments in their bases, and so on. Because of the importance of the
time element, the logical order will be in some cases reversed by
submitting generalized reports before the completion of basic
specialized studies.
To commence work on the other two proposed points, there are being
attempted in following reports: (1) an analysis of present Communist
policies and probable extensions into the future; and (2) a general
group impression of the personality, character and apparent capability
of the leaders of the Communist Party.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
Requested distribution:
It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the
American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF–CBI, for the
information of Mr. Davies.
[Enclosure 3]
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
No. 16
[Yenan,] August 29, 1944.
Subject: Desirability of American Military Aid to the
Chinese Communist Armies.
To: Commanding General, USAF–CBI.
The U.S. Army has made a start in cooperation with the military forces of
the Chinese Communists. So far this has been passive on our part—the
tapping of Communist intelligence sources and the rescue of American air
crews. The obvious success which this half-way cooperation has had
should lead logically to the consideration of more active measures.
Such active cooperation would begin with our furnishing basic military
supplies now desperately lacked by the Communist forces. It [Page 619] should be supported by training in the
effective use of these supplies. It should be planned to lead, as the
war in China develops into its late stages, to actual tactical
cooperation of Communist with air and other ground forces.
The physical difficulties of supplying the Communist forces admittedly
will be great. These difficulties can be overcome. But the decision to
start this cooperation will involve questions of both military and
political policy. It is sure, to begin with, to meet the strong and
obstinate opposition of the Kuomintang. We must decide whether the gains
we can reasonably expect from aiding the communists will justify the
overcoming—or disregarding—of this Kuomintang opposition.
The decision, I suggest, depends on the following considerations:
A. Political
We are now enough acquainted with conditions in China, and sufficiently
experienced in cooperation with the Kuomintang, to say that the
Kuomintang—as it is today—is weak, incompetent and uncooperative.
The chief concern of the politically blind and thoroughly selfish leaders
of the Kuomintang is to preserve their tottering power. Lacking popular
support and afraid to carry out reforms necessary to gain it, the
Kuomintang knows that its miserable and dispirited conscript armies
cannot stand combat against the Japanese. But its power depends, in its
present narrow view, on the preservation of those armies and the
equipment which it hopes we will give them. Lacking any effective
economic policies, the Kuomintang is allowing the country to drift
rapidly toward an economic collapse. It fears that this process will be
accelerated by any large-scale military operations—by itself or by us—in
China.
The Kuomintang therefore fears, and seeks to avoid, the further attrition
of its resources by large-scale involvement in the war. It wants to have
the war won for it—outside of China. It fears, second only to its fear
of Russian participation, a large-scale extension of American military
operations onto the Chinese mainland.
The situation as far as the Chinese Communists are concerned, is just the
opposite. The war has given them the chance to grow and greatly extend
their influence. They have acquired real popular support and mobilized
an important part of the population of North China by convincing the
people that this is their war and that they must take a part in it. The
fact that their aggressive participation in the war against the Japanese
has given the Communists their chance to come to by far their greatest
power is of great importance. The Communists realize that if they play a
major part in winning this war they will greatly strengthen not only
their domestic, but also [Page 620] their
international position. For these, if for no other more idealistic and
patriotic reasons, the Communists really want to fight.
Against this background, the following conclusions can be drawn:
- (a)
- The limitation of our support and supplies to the Kuomintang
will not win us an effective and whole-hearted ally.
- (b)
- Instead, it will only encourage the Kuomintang in its present
undemocratic tendencies. While it may help to prolong the
Kuomintang’s precarious power, it is doubtful, as long as the
Kuomintang refuses to reform, whether it can for long delay the
inevitable internal crisis. It may even encourage its
Fascist-minded leaders to embark on a civil war which could only
be disastrous to China, to post-war peace in this part of the
world, and to our peaceful interests here.
- (c)
- The impartial support of both Kuomintang and Communists will
make effective at least one force, the Communists, which is
really interested in fighting.
- (d)
- Such impartial support will actually be a constructive
influence in China. The Kuomintang will be forced to compete not
only for our support but for that of the Chinese people. We may
thus help to stimulate the Kuomintang toward reform.
- (e)
- Finally, the aid we give the Communists will almost certainly
make it impossible for the Kuomintang to start a civil war. At
the same time we will not likely be contributing to a
Communist-provoked civil war; their policies are against civil
war, the weapons they want from us (in contrast to those asked
for by the Kuomintang) are light and simple rather than heavy
offensive weapons, and, if the progress of the Kuomintang which
our policy should promote is realized, civil war will be
unnecessary.
Summing up: If the Kuomintang is actually what it claims to be—democratic
and sincerely anxious to defeat the Japanese as quickly as possible—it
should not oppose our insistence on giving at least proportional aid to
the Communists. It is not too much to say that the strength of
Kuomintang opposition will be a measure of the desirability of support
of the Communists.
B. Military
Although we have not yet completed field observations in the actual
fighting zones, enough is now known about the Communists to warrant the
drawing of a number of conclusions. These are supported by the results
of such cooperation as we have already received from the Communists. But
above all else is the incontrovertible fact that the Communists,
starting from almost nothing at the beginning of the war, have not only
maintained but greatly strengthened themselves in a very large area of
North and Central China, where they continue to tie down considerable
Japanese forces.
- (a)
- The Communist forces hold strategic positions along and in very
close proximity to all the Japanese communication lines north of the
Yangtze River. The map of their positions speaks for itself. [Page 621] Communist claims are
supported by their furnishing of intelligence and by their rescue of
American air crews. From these positions they have access to the
main cities and can cut the railways. As our control of the China
Sea becomes more complete, these communications will become more
important. They will, for instance, be vital to the Japanese if we
make a landing anywhere in South China—or even if Hankow is
attacked.
- (b)
- The Communist forces are capable and experienced in mobile and
guerrilla warfare and have the morale and determination to carry out
such operations.
- (c)
- They have the popular support of the people in the areas concerned
which is necessary to the conduct of such operations on a wide scale
and over a protracted period. This popular support gives them great
manpower reserves of a useful, because voluntary and already
partially trained, type.
- (d)
- Their matériel requirements are simple and moderate. With them a
little will go a long way. They fully realize that they are unable,
and the conditions of their terrain and operations prevent them from
using heavy and complicated modern equipment.
- (e)
- The furnishing to the Communists of moderate quantities of
supplies will not only improve their effectiveness (making it
possible, for instance, for them to take isolated blockhouses or to
hold a bridge long enough to carry out proper destruction), it will
also enable them to add to their supplies, as they have done in the
past, by the capture of quantities of Japanese equipment. Their
position inside the areas of Japanese occupation and the tactics
they employ facilitate this self-supply.
- (f)
- The tonnage of supplies given to the Communist forces, even though
not large, will be much more effective in disrupting communications,
sabotaging industries and supplies, and killing Japanese than the
same tonnage put into the supply of the air forces for similar
purposes. Air bombing is not only wasteful and often ineffective; it
will also require, with the distance of targets in North China from
our useful bases, great expenditures of gasoline, maintenance
supplies and other equipment. A much better job could be done in
destroying and keeping out of use a Japanese railway, for instance,
by numerous coordinated guerrilla attacks along an extended stretch
of line. Japanese garrisons not only on the railway itself but all
through the occupied territory would have to be increased if the
Communist forces had sufficient supplies to make them effective.
Japanese losses and expenditures in equipment in these operations
would be much greater than suffered from isolated bombings.
- (g)
- The use of the Communist forces for this guerrilla warfare and the
demolition of communications in the far rear of the Japanese would
permit concentration of the air force on other important tasks. For
instance, before a coastal landing the Communists over a
considerable period could be given sufficient supplies and trained
in their use. When the landing is about to be, and after it has been
made, the air force can devote itself to direct support because the
already equipped and prepared Communist forces will be able to
relieve it of the responsibility of attacking and disrupting the
communications from Manchuria to the Yangtze.
[Page 622]
Conclusion:
Consideration of all these political and military factors, I propose,
warrants the extension of American military aid to the Chinese Communist
armies.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
