A summary of Mr. Service’s report will be found in the opening paragraph
thereof. The report constitutes a comprehensive and revealing account of
Communist political and administrative policies and measures and accordingly
seems to merit careful scrutiny.
In connection with this general question, it would seem only fair to observe
that a good many Chinese, whether Kuomintang officials or civilians, take
issue with the thesis that the Chinese Communist Party is democratic or that
genuine democracy is being practiced in the Communist-controlled area. A
recent example is to be found in the editorial columns of the influential
Ta Kung Pao which, in commenting on the scene at
Yenan, charged the Chinese Communist Party with possessing “almost carte
blanche powers over all Party, political and military affairs” (see
enclosure to the Embassy’s despatch 2856, August 9, 194415). For what is probably a
typical Kuomintang point of view of the “democracy” of the Chinese
Communists, reference is made to the enclosure to the Embassy’s despatch
2963, September 15, 1944.
[Enclosure]
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
No. 26
[Yenan,] September 10, 1944.
Subject: The Development of Communist Political Control
in the Guerrilla Bases.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF–CBI, APO 879
Summary: Communist influence predominates in
the guerrilla bases because the Communists took the lead in
establishing the governments, because there has been no important
organized political opposition within the areas, and because the
Communists have been supported by the peasants and liberals. The
Communists have used their influence in a democratic way and to
further democratic ends. End of Summary.
1. The Chinese Communist Party has overwhelming political influence in
the various guerrilla bases. In effect, this influence amounts to
control. Although the governments of these bases are nominally
independent of each other, their form of organization, and their
policies and administrative programs, are all similar. Furthermore these
policies are identical with those of the Communist Party.
It is sometimes suggested that this fact of Communist control is a
refutation of Communist claims of democracy. Considering the history,
political development and present situation of these bases, I do not
believe that this criticism is valid.
2. The political history of the guerrilla bases has been discussed at
length with a number of Communist leaders. These include:
| Liu Shao-ch’i |
Member of the Political Bureau, Communist Party. |
| Lin Pai-ch’u |
Chairman of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region
Government. |
| Nieh Jung-chen |
Commander of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Military Region
(General Nieh played a leading part in the establishment of
the government of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region,
which is identical in extent with the Military
District). |
| Ch’en Yi |
Acting Commander of the New Fourth Army. Political
Commissar of the Shantung Military District. |
| Yang Hsiu-feng |
Chairman of the Government of the
Shansi-Hopei-Honan-Shantung Border Regions. (At the outbreak
of the war Dr. Yang was a professor in the National Normal
University at Peiping and a member of the National
Salvationist Group. He was a leader of the first popular
resistance in Central Hopei. He joined the Community Party
in 1939.) |
[Page 624]
3. From these talks it appears that the political development in the
different bases has followed a generally similar pattern. I have
therefore attempted to give a generalized account of this development
which will fit all of the bases.
There have of course been minor differences from base to base. In
Shen-Kan-Ning there was a Soviet type government established several
years before the war; even after the government was reorganized in
accordance with the United Front agreement, the Kuomintang never made
any attempt to set up its Party organization. Shansi-Hopei-Chahar was
set up at a very stage of the war when there was still some degree of
Kuomintang–Communist cooperation; some Kuomintang Party organization was
maintained and there has been relatively greater Kuomintang
participation than in other bases. In Shantung and the areas under the
New Fourth Army, the Kuomintang attempted for a while to maintain its
own separate governments; the Kuomintang therefore regarded the
Communist governments as illegal and has never been willing to allow
participation as a Party.
4. The political development of the Communist bases has been, in general,
along the following lines.
[Here follows detailed report.]
The typical composition, then, is one-third Communists, plus a few
liberal Kuomintang (or ex-Kuomintang) members, plus a large number of
liberal-intellectuals, and finally a relatively small group of the
landlord-merchant group.
With this strong representation and a predominantly liberal and
sympathetic majority, it is not surprising that the Communists have been
the chief initiators of the policies followed by the base governments.
Furthermore, since the Communist Party holds the same dominant position
in each government, and since it is the one connecting link between
these separate governments, it has secured the adoption by all of them
of its program.
5. Related to this development of predominant Communist influence in the
guerrilla bases are a number of other factors which should be mentioned,
even though detailed study of some will be left for following
reports.
- (a)
- The Communists have kept their program moderate and within the
limits that the liberal-Kuomintang and liberal-intellectual groups
affiliated with it would continue to support. This has promoted
unity. It has also increased and held support. It might also be said
that it has robbed any important potential opposition of any
issues.
- (b)
- The Communist program has introduced democracy and improved the
economic condition of the great majority of the population. This is
the first experience the people have had of these benefits, and
their political experience has not had a chance yet to go beyond the
stage of being grateful. Nobody opposes Santa Claus.
- (c)
- The Communists at times have played a balancing role. In areas
where the landlords were too successful in gaining control over
local governments, either through the old awe in which they were
held by the peasants or their power over their tenants, the
Communists have stepped up their assistance to the people through
indoctrination in democracy and active support of the people’s
organizations. On the other hand, in areas where the peasants “felt
their oats” and used their new political powers to monopolize the
local governments, the Party used its influence to obtain the
election of landlord representatives. Wherever used this policy
makes grateful friends. And the Communists admit that when they use
their influence to aid the election of a landlord, it is a
progressive landlord—in other words another supporter of their
policies.
- (d)
- The Communists have accepted and incorporated into their own
program some proposals put forth by other groups. An example was the
policy to “refine the Army and reduce the Government” (generally
translated as “rationalization”), which was originally introduced
into the Shen-Kan-Ning Peoples Political Council by a landlord
representative. The Communists make much of this willingness to
accept suggestions from others as an indication of their democracy.
And they explain incorporation into their own program as the most
expeditious and sure means, since they are the only party to all
governments, of having these improvements universally put into
effect. There is a great deal of merit in these arguments. But it
must be recognized that the Communist Party, in a very smart and
hard-headed political way, gets the credit for these improvements
because the original introducer is not widely known and soon
forgotten and it becomes known as another item of the Party
program.
- (e)
- The Communist control of propaganda has already been mentioned.
This propaganda, except in special instances, does not attack the
Kuomintang or other groups. But it does tend to put these other
groups in a bad light. And it invariably works to promote the
Communist Party.
- (f)
- Finally, the Army is the army of the Communists. This is important
because the political effect of the 8th Route and New 4th Armies is
tremendous. This effectiveness comes in several ways. The Political
Department, which is used in indoctrination of the people,
especially of newly occupied areas, is highly organized and
experienced, and under wholly Communist leadership (contrary to the
rest of the Army). But even greater than this direct effect is the
example of the behavior and attitude of the army toward the people,
its volunteer character, its completely different attitude of unity
with the people, its high morale, and the fact that it
fights.
6. I have attempted to show that the political control of the Communist
Party in the guerrilla bases has developed from its leadership in
establishing and holding these bases, the absence of strong opposition,
the adoption of moderate, democratic policies which have benefited the
great majority of the population, and political astuteness combined with
control of propaganda and the influence of the Army. The policies of the
Communist Party have been democratic and there
[Page 626]
is little which under the circumstances can be
called undemocratic in its methods.
The question may be asked whether the Communists would have been so
democratic in method if they had been faced with stronger opposition.
The question is hard to answer because there has never been a strong
opposition willing to cooperate on a democratic basis. In the one area
where the Kuomintang has an organization, it has been allowed its own
newspaper and other democratic freedoms. But this opposition was weak.
In areas where the Kuomintang came in with military force to oust the
Communists, the Communists won out because they had the democratic
support of the people. The Kuomintang did not have this support and was
unable to obtain it. This fact, together with difficulties connected
with the war, forced the Kuomintang to withdraw.
The next question is logically the future. I believe that the Communist
influence with the people in the guerrilla bases is now so great, and
rests on such a strong democratic basis, that the Communists will be
willing to contest their political control there with any other party on
a democratic basis; and that they will accordingly content themselves
with democratic methods—including freedom of propaganda—provided that
the other party or parties do the same.
Approved for Transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
