893.00/9–644
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 22.]
Subject: Kuomintang–Communist Negotiations: Transmission of Recent Pertinent Documents Relating Thereto.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch no. 2840, August 7, 194464 and to previous telegrams and despatches (including [Page 557] the 3rd paragraph of our telegram 1158, July 4, 1 p.m.65) on the subject of the Kuomintang–Communist negotiations, and to submit herewith translations of the following documents66 prepared in the Embassy which were obtained from Chinese Communist sources relating to those negotiations:
- (1)
- “Minutes” of conversations in Sian between Lin Tsu-han, the representative of the Communists, and General Chang Chih-chung and Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, representatives of the Kuomintang;
- (2)
- “First Proposals” of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, June 4 [May 22?] 1944;
- (3)
- “Second (Revised) Proposals” of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, June 4, 1944; and
- (4)
- “Proposals of the National Government for the Solution by Political Means of the Problem of the Chinese Communists” (presented on June 5, 1944).
Summaries of the Documents. (1) The “minutes” of the Sian conversations prescribe four armies totaling 12 divisions as the minimal limit of the reorganized Communist troops; they contemplate changing the name of the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Area to the North Shensi Administrative District, to be under the direct control of the Executive Yuan; with the present organizational structure of the Border Area for the time being not to be changed. Concerning the party issue, the minutes note that the Communist Party should be given legal status, there should be freedom of speech, and political prisoners should be released.
(2) The second document sets forth three main desiderata: Establishment of democracy, repeal of the prohibition on parties, and the putting into effect of local self-government. It lists seventeen outstanding issues between the Communists and the Kuomintang, suggesting that at the very least the Communist troops should be reorganized into five armies totaling sixteen divisions; that the Government should recognize the Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Area and other popularly elected governments; that the Communists should receive their share of the aid from abroad; that the military and economic blockades around the Border Area should be lifted; that political prisoners should be released; and that certain anti-Communist acts should cease.
(3) The third document repeats the essence of these desiderata, but reduces them to twelve points instead of twenty, dropping certain less important ones, and employing phraseology intended to be more acceptable to the Kuomintang.
(4) The fourth document is a statement of the proposals of the National Government. They would reduce the “Border Area” to a special administrative district in north Shensi whose chairman could be appointed and removed by the Central Government; would place other governing bodies set up by the Chinese Communists under provincial governments in the areas where they are located; would provide for [Page 558] the reorganization of the Chinese Communist armies into four armies totaling ten divisions, and require the concentration of those armies; and would place education in Communist areas under the control of the Kuomintang. End of Summaries.
An analysis of the enclosed proposals and counterproposals reveals that, in essence, the National Government and the Chinese Communists are as far apart as ever from a solution of their political, administrative and military problems. On the one hand, the proposals of the National Government are obviously designed to preserve party supremacy and national administrative and military sovereignty, while, on the other, the Communists request the implementation of democracy, recognition of the legal status of political parties other than the Kuomintang, and recognition of local autonomy and of the bases established by the Communists in north China. The National Government has made minor concessions, notably in agreeing to raise the number of Communist divisions from three to ten, in consenting to recognize the existing border lines of the “Shensi–Kansu–Ninghsia Border Area”, and in permitting the local appointment of subordinate officials. But even these concessions offer very little comfort to the Communists when considered in relation to the whole list of National Government terms.
The Communist requests for democracy and equality of party status are brushed aside with the suggestion that they abide by the Principles of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction and a reference to the resolution adopted by the Government to convene a National Congress (after the war), to establish a constitution, and to implement constitutional Government, at which time the Chinese Communists and other political parties will enjoy equality of treatment. The Government proposals, moreover, ignore Communist requests for the lifting of the economic and military blockade, the cessation of alleged military attacks against Communist units in central and south China, the release of political prisoners, and the establishment of Communist Party branches and newspapers throughout China.
No progress appears to have been made in the current Kuomintang–Communist negotiations since the exchange of proposals enclosed with this despatch. The National Government obviously is neither willing to grant Communist demands for democracy and equal party status nor those impairing national sovereignty. Nor will the Government make concessions which imply that it has pursued a mistaken and wrongful policy toward the Chinese Communists. For their part, the Communists are not likely to make concessions which would condemn their Party, their military units and their administrative organizations to the domination and control of or liquidation by the National Government. Neither side is likely to make concessions of a [Page 559] fundamental nature and there is little reason to believe that the impasse of the past five years is likely to be broken in the near future.
Respectfully yours,