893.00/10–244
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service)60
Subject: General Impression of the Chinese Communist Leaders.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech., USAF–CBI, APO 879.
A general impression of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, as a group, may be of some interest because of the growing importance of the party they represent, and the certainty that the United States must take it into account in its future dealings with the China situation. Reference is made in this connection to my report no. 20, September 3, 1944,61 on the subject: “The Need for an American Policy [Page 552] Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party”.
Such a group character study should be based on long acquaintance and careful study. This I cannot claim, having been in Yenan only six weeks.
However, I have had unusual opportunities during that short time to meet and talk to the unprecedentedly large number of the important Communist leaders who are now assembled in Yenan for conferences. A partial list of these leaders, some of whom have not been able to meet in one place for more than ten years, is included in my report no. 15 of August 27, 1944.62
Biographical and individual “Who’s Who” data on these and other Communist leaders is being assembled and will be forwarded at a later date. I merely attempt here a general description of the first impressions given by the Communist leaders as a group. This is perhaps easier to do with the leaders of the Communists than with the leaders of most other political parties—certainly than of the Kuomintang. There is among them a certain lack of striking individuality; and they seem to show a number of common characteristics. It should be understood, of course, that the picture drawn does not pretend to fit every case.
A general knowledge of the history of the Chinese Communist Party is important to a study of its leaders. The Party’s twenty-three years of almost continuous struggle and war has not only affected the attitudes and character of its leaders, it has also helped to determine the type of men who could survive and rise to leadership. It is difficult to understand these men without this background.
A first impression is that of youth. Almost all are in the middle forties; a few in the upper thirties. They were college students or young military cadets in the early 1920’s, a period of great political ferment in both China and Europe.
With this youth there is physical vigor. As a group, they are active and fit; none seem soft, flabby or indolent. The half-starved, anaemic Chinese intellectual is missing: so is the over-fed official and bureaucrat. These men have never had a chance to lead an easy life. They worked in the “underground”, or lived through the civil war and the “Long March”. All have fought—in the most strenuous kind of warfare, guerrilla operations—and a surprising number carry wounds.
This vitality is not only physical: it is also intellectual. The proportion of men with an academic background is very large. Many became Communists while doing post-graduate study in Europe. They arrived at their views logically, they have been schooled in years of debate and discussion, and they have spent their lives in convincing [Page 553] others of the rightness of their unpopular cause. Communism, especially in China it seems to me, is chiefly an intellectual cause. And in its development in China it has passed through many stages without being completely dominated by a single man or dogma—like Sun Yatsen and his San Min Chu I.
The knowledge, interests and experience of these men are well rounded. Politics, economics, education, propaganda, and culture are to them inseparable parts of a single whole. To these they have been forced to add military science in order to survive. There is among them no one who is merely a military man, or an expert in one field such as economics. Every Communist is required to have military training. Many high commanders commenced as political commissars, and vice versa. Most of them have faced successfully the problems of organizing independent and self-sufficient governments under the most difficult and chaotic conditions.
All are men of unmistakeably strong conviction. The weaker ones have long ago left them. Those remaining are sure that they are fighting for something worthwhile: their sincerity, loyalty and determination are patent.
This strong conviction seems to give them an assurance, a certain pride, and a strong self-confidence. They are not troubled with doubts about themselves or their general policies. They neither apologize for the past, nor obsequiously seek your favor in the present. They are cordial and friendly—but not demonstratively anxious to make a good impression. They seem to know that they have been through hard times and accomplished creditable things: and they are confident—in a quiet but definite way—that they are now on the winning tide.
Related to all these characteristics is what, for lack of a better word, can be described as toughness. One realizes that they have patience (they have had a long, hard schooling in that); that they will compromise, if it is decided to be for the best long-term interest of the Party; that they will fight, when the need arises; and that they can be hard and ruthless, if that becomes necessary. One feels that fear or personal interest do not enter into consideration. Their personal courage cannot be questioned.
A rather unexpected, and yet strong impression that grows with acquaintance, is their realism and practicality. Far behind are the days when they may have engaged in heated youthful debates on alien and impractical theories. The pure visionaries have left their ranks or been submerged: those who stayed had to be doers. Firmly and universally held is the belief that the test of everything is whether it works—in China. It is difficult to get them to engage in what they regard as “useless” discussions of pure theory. The reaction is: “We cross our bridges when we come to them.”
[Page 554]A part of this realism is constant self-examination and self-criticism. This is not of the general objectives and policies, but of the specific measures and policies being carried out to advance toward those goals—of the reasons why they failed in the past or are not working out as intended now. This critical examination is of policies, not of personalities. It is carried on by very free discussion by all the higher cadres of the Party. But there is also a willingness to accept suggestions from outside the Party—several of the present basic policies have, in fact, such an origin.
This consideration of policies is based on an objective and scientific attitude. Most of these leaders have a foundation of Western social science. Their outlook impresses one as modern. Their understanding of economics, for instance, is very similar to ours. There is no mysticism in their make-up, no vague mouthings of the beauties of ancient Chinese culture, and no rigid adherence to a hardened dogma. In fact, one hears very little about the San Min Chu I—or any other Chu I.63 As for the ideas that China is “different”, that the fundamental economic laws do not apply here, or that “foreigners cannot understand China”—they laugh at them.
Once a specific measure or policy has been found unsuccessful or unsuited to conditions, and after discussion has produced what seems to be a better substitute, there is no hesitation in admitting failure by making a change. This adaptability and willingness to change has been apparent in every field—military strategy, taxation, land policy, education, mass organization, the promotion of the modern drama and dance, the attempt to romanize the Chinese written language. When it was found that the measures being taken were not suitable to the actual conditions in China, and hence not successful, they were dropped or changed.
Another important characteristic is a systematic orderliness. This is both mental and physical. Thinking is logical. There is a strong sense of organization. Speeches are direct and easy to follow. It is taken for granted that you take notes during an important conversation. People you call on like to know beforehand what you want to discuss so that they can be prepared. Decisions reached are put into writing and confirmed so that there can be no misunderstanding. There is a general businesslike atmosphere and apparent efficiency. For every task some particular person is made responsible. Things seem to get done with less fuss and talk than one is accustomed to in China.
In meeting and dealing with these men, one is struck by their being straightforward and frank. There is no “beating about the bush”. [Page 555] If they do not know something, they say so. If they promise something, you feel sure that it can and will be done.
Among these men there seems to be a strong group feeling and firm unity. They have had to stick together. Evidences of personal criticism, jealous rivalries, or cliquism are totally lacking. Personal ambition, if present, is subdued. None give the impression of being “politicians”. They have reached the top in a struggle where success depended not on the creation of a political machine, scheming maneuvers, or the cultivation of advantageous personal relationships, but on practical achievements.
In their relations with each other and with outsiders their attitude is democratic. Rank is of no importance: the Party relationship of comrade seems to be genuine. Toward the higher leaders, there seems to be respect and admiration but no subservience. Living, dress, and actions are simple; there is no pretentiousness.
One does not think to question the integrity and honesty of these men: their incorruptibility is obvious. Riches could be of no use to them—and could not be concealed in these surroundings. If they had been interested in such things, they would have turned in other directions long ago.
These might all be called positive characteristics. There are also a number of what might be termed negative traits.
One gets a feeling of voluntary effacement of individuality. Most refuse to talk about themselves and it is rare to hear a man refer to his own experiences. There is no boastfulness. Most of them are quiet and tend to be reserved. This is to be expected—their lives have been devoted, not to the satisfaction of personal ambition, but to the progress of an impersonal cause.
In their thinking and expressions, there is a noticeable uniformity. This may be a result of training in Communist thought and of Party discipline. But it must also, partly at least, be due to the fact that the Communist Party has not had to be a catch-all like the Kuomintang. Those who dissented have been free to leave them. In some cases they have been expelled. Those who are left do seem to really think alike.
It may also be noted that there seems to be a lack of humor—and what humor there is tends to be grim. The prevailing mood is sober and serious. Again, this is something to be expected. Their whole working life has been a struggle: it is not surprising that they do not find it easy to relax. It is obvious that the Communists themselves seem to recognize this: social amusements such as bridge and dancing are now encouraged.
A surprising absence of what might have been expected in the light of their history is an apparent lack of vengefulness. It is true that [Page 556] they are deeply cynical regarding the Kuomintang. But this is apparently not put on a personal plane. Their private and personal grievances are rarely mentioned. It is a common experience, for instance, to ask a man about his family and have him reply in a quiet and matter-of-fact way that he has been unable to hear from them for fifteen years, or that his wife, children, parents and brothers were killed by the Kuomintang. This suppression of personal feelings may be partly because of Party policy, which now calls for cooperation with the Kuomintang and a United Front. It is also partly due to disgust and weariness with the long years of bitter civil war: vengefulness has given way to a deep-seated desire for peace and a chance to work out their program (one gets the strong impression that these men will not start a civil war). Finally, it is a reflection of that toughness of character mentioned above: personal interests are to be submerged—”what is past, is past”.
Conclusion:
The general impression one gets of the Chinese Communist leaders is that they are a unified group of vigorous, mature and practical men, unselfishly devoted to high principles, and having great ability and strong qualities of leadership. This impression—and, I suggest, their record—places them above any other contemporary group in China. It is not surprising that they have favorably impressed most or all of the Americans who have met them during the last seven years: their manners, habits of thought, and direct handling of problems seem more American than oriental.
Distribution:
It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF–CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.