Mr. Service finds, after a canvass of the situation at Yenan, that the policy
of Chinese Communist political leaders (who, he asserts, appear to have
unquestioned control over Communist military leaders in matters of policy)
continues to be (1) adherence to the “United Front” (coalition of various
Chinese political and military groups to prosecute the war against Japan),
(2) full mobilization (of the people) to fight Japan, (3) abandonment
(voluntarily by the Communists) of any purely Communist program, and (4)
recognition of the Central Government and the leadership of the
Generalissimo. Mr. Service considers that these professed Communist aims
constitute a policy of self-limitation and he wonders why the Communists
adhere to such aims when they might well be pursuing a policy looking to the
overthrow of the Kuomintang and their own ascendance to power in China.
Mr. Service, after a brief examination of various phases of
Kuomintang–Communist developments, voices the view that the Communists
appear to be sincere in their policy of self-abnegation, and he advances two
alternative explanations in support thereof: first, from the theoretical
point of view, the Chinese Communists have renounced the policy of violent
revolution for one of a long and orderly program of democracy, socialism and
controlled economic development; and second, from the practical point of
view, the Chinese Communists by pursuance of their present policy are
enabled to create a powerful organization and obtain the sympathy and
support of the Chinese people and the foreign Powers with a view to eventual
assumption of
[Page 560]
power in China. Mr.
Service inclines toward acceptance of his first explanation of Chinese
Communist policy although he admits that elements of the second probably
enter into its formulation. Mr. Service submits that if his interpretation
of Chinese Communist policy is correct, it does not conflict with American
interests in China, and that the Chinese Communist Party accordingly merits
a sympathetic and friendly attitude on the part of the United States.
In the past decade there appears to have come about a considerable moderation
of Chinese Communist Party activities and policies. The revolutionary fervor
of Kiangsi days seems to have abated and the anti-foreign manifestations
(exclusive of the Soviet Union) discarded. Even the Communist policy of land
confiscation seems to have been abandoned for a more moderate program by
which the support of the landlords could be retained. This reorientation of
Chinese Communist policy appears to have had its inception in 1936 when the
fortunes of the Communists were at their lowest ebb and when Japanese
pressure on China was reaching its height. It was marked by the so-called
Sian incident of December 12, 1936 (when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was
seized and later released), the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July,
1937, and the Kuomintang–Communist agreement of September 22, 1937,67 when the Communists pledged to abandon
revolutionary policies and to unite with the National Government in waging
war against Japan. In the ensuing two years Kuomintang–Communist
cooperation, although marred by minor rifts, was, on the whole, constant and
well maintained. But by the beginning of 1940 relations had begun to
deteriorate and were marked by the cessation of Government support to the
Communists and the imposition of a cordon blockading the Communist base in
north Shensi. Relations were further strained when in 1941 units of the
Communist New Fourth Army were attacked and dispersed by Government troops
in south Anhwei Province. Since 1941 what might be termed an “uneasy truce”
has obtained between the Government and the Communists.
From 1937 onward the Chinese Communists, utilizing the Japanese occupied
areas of north and central China as their main spheres, have created strong
bases and established powerful political and military organizations which
are to all intents and purposes independent of the control of the National
Government. It is these developments—the growth of independent Communist
bases and organizations in north and central China—which seem to have been
decisive in altering the original spirit of cooperation and agreement and in
bringing about the existing Kuomintang–Communist impasse. The Communists
[Page 561]
have, for their part, admitted the
existence of powerful bases and military organizations in the enemy-occupied
areas of north and central China, but they have justified them on the basis
that they are necessary for the prosecution of the war.
The Embassy shares the view that the Communists have moderated their
policies, especially since 1937, whether for reasons of expediency or
otherwise. In all probability, self-preservation and the obvious need of
unity in the face of Japanese aggression impelled the shift to moderation in
Communist policy. It was only by following such a policy that the Communists
could hope to participate actively in the war in its early stages and
command support from the Chinese public.
The Embassy concurs in the view that the Communists seem to be utilizing a
policy of “self-limitation” to the extent that they do not seem to be
adopting active measures to encompass the overthrow of the Kuomintang at
this time. Communist adoption of such a policy would probably result in
civil war and alienate the Chinese masses. But the Chinese Communists are
establishing themselves more and more securely in north and central China—in
some of the richest and best developed portions of China. The Communists
appear to insist on retention of established bases in these areas and
Government recognition of local autonomy; there is little likelihood of
reversal of this attitude on the termination of the war against Japan. This
aspect of Chinese Communist policy, therefore, does not appear to be one of
self-limitation but one of expansion and development independent of the
desires of the National Government.
The Embassy considers that Chinese Communist policy is perhaps not so much
one of self-limitation as it is one of seeking additional time for the
strengthening of the Communist political and military position vis-à-vis the
Kuomintang and the selection of a more propitious period in which to assume
the mantle of power. Irrespective of what the professed policies of Chinese
Communist leaders may be, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
Communists eventually aim to gain political and military control of China
and that use will be made of their bases of power in north and central China
to accomplish this object.
The attitude of the foreign Powers, and especially of the United States, the
Soviet Union and Great Britain, is likely to contribute materially to the
evolution of Kuomintang–Communist relations in China; indeed it may prove
decisive. For this reason, the position of the foreign powers is obviously
one of great responsibility in dealing with this problem. A decision, for
example, of one or more of the great Powers to arm the Communists to assist
in the conflict against Japan might in the end produce far-reaching internal
repercussions;
[Page 562]
indeed, it is
almost certain to do so. Independent or unilateral foreign support of the
Chinese Communists under present conditions would in all probability be a
serious blow to the Kuomintang and the National Government and might even
bring about their early collapse.
[Enclosure]
Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in
China (Service)
No. 5
[Yenan,] August 3, 1944.
Subject: The Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech., USAF–CBI, APO
879.
While there are a large number of political subjects of great importance
to be observed in the Communist areas (such as the form of their
governments, their political program, and their political indoctrination
of the people), the problem of greatest immediate urgency, and the only
one which I have had as yet even a slight opportunity of studying, is
the attitude of the Communist Party toward its differences with the
Kuomintang.
In comment on a conversation with General Lin Piao, a memorandum of which
was attached to my report no. 3 of July 30,68 I
noted the outspoken and apparently irreconcilable bitterness of the
Communist military leaders toward the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang
as contrasting with the more moderate and reserved attitude of the
civilian political leaders.
The policy of these political leaders, who appear to have unquestioned
control over the military leaders in policy matters, continues to be:
adherence to the United Front; full mobilization to fight Japan;
abandonment of any purely Communist program; and recognition of the
Central Government and the leadership of the Generalissimo. This
attitude has been clearly expressed by Mao Tse-tung in recent interviews
and by Chou En-lai in his talk with me on July 27, memoranda of which
were also transmitted with my report no. 3.
This professed policy of the Communist Party presents a number of
anomalies. It is generally assumed, for instance, that the driving power
of any political party is the struggle for political power. This should
be even more true of a Communist party which, theoretically at least, is
revolutionary in nature. Why then, at a time when it is apparently
growing in strength, and in the face of the obvious and serious
deterioration in China and the growingly questionable capacity for
leadership of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo,
[Page 563]
should the Communist Party insist on a
policy of self-limitation? Certainly the Kuomintang has given ample
provocation for it to give up its adherence to the United Front. And it
would seem that conditions in Kuomintang China had reached such a stage
that further effective resistance against Japan is doubtful under its
leadership and the Party might reasonably be justified in playing its
own hand. Instead of holding mass meetings and offering to send troops
to defend Sian (as was done during the critical period in the middle of
June), would it not be more logical for the Communists to hope for, or
even work for, the defeat and collapse of the Kuomintang?
The question therefore presents itself: are the Communists sincere in
this policy?
The indications are that they are sincere. Except for the months from
July to September, 1943, when they seriously thought they were in danger
of attack by the Kuomintang, they have not talked of violent opposition
to the Kuomintang. Impartial observers have never been convinced of
Communist attacks on Government forces. But there have been instances of
Kuomintang attacks. And the Kuomintang’s record of its relations with
the puppets and even the Japanese in those guerrilla areas does not bear
close examination. The Communists steadfastly stick to the line that
civil war would be a tragedy which must be avoided at any cost—although
some observers believe that it would be difficult if not impossible for
the Kuomintang to defeat them. They will not permit any suggestion that
China should be divided or that they should hold one section of it, such
as North China, more or less independently. Propaganda wall slogans in
Yenan (long ante-dating our arrival) call for both parties to unite to
resist Japan. There are reports that military leaders too outspoken in
their criticism of the Central Government have been required to temper
their statements—similarly some party members have been disciplined for
becoming “left deviationists” by going beyond the Party line in
advocating such reforms as collective farms. Finally and very
significantly, even the Kuomintang has not made more than weak and
unconvincing efforts to claim that the Communists have attempted to
foment or capitalize on the agrarian unrest in Kuomintang China, or that
there is any large scale Communist activity outside of the areas of
their military operations in North and East China.
What then is the explanation of this Communist policy? And what is their
expectation of their place in China during the fairly near future—say
the next few decades?
I suggest that there may be two explanations of Communist policy. The
first, based on theoretical grounds, is the one given by the Party
leaders (though never, as far as I know, completely to any one foreign
observer). The second, arising out of practical political
considerations,
[Page 564]
may be too
cynical and would certainly be rejected by those leaders. Both, I think,
make some sense. And both would seem to show that the party is under
far-sighted, careful leadership and strong discipline.
Theoretical Explanation of Communist Policy
The Chinese Communist Party claims that it is Marxist. By this the
Communists mean that their ideology, their philosophical approach, and
their dialectical method are based on Marxist materialism. Marxism thus
becomes to them chiefly an attitude and approach to problems. It is a
long-term view of political and economic development to which all
short-term considerations of temporary advantage or premature power are
ruthlessly subordinated.
This interpretation of Marxist materialism means to them a certain
logical development of economic society. It also means that this natural
sequence cannot be shortcircuited. To try to do so would be disastrous
and a violation of their basic principles of strategy.
Thus socialism, in their view, cannot be evolved at one jump from the
present primitive agrarian society of China. It can come only after
considerable development of the Chinese economy and after it has passed
through a stage of at least modified capitalism.
Their Communism, therefore, does not mean the immediate overthrow of
private capital—because there is still almost no capitalism in China. It
does not mean the dictatorship of the proletariat—because there is as
yet no proletariat. It does not mean the collectivization of
farms—because the political education of the peasants has not yet
overcome their primitive individualistic desire to till their own
land.
Furthermore, the Communists see the existence of their politically
advanced party in an economically backward country a unique opportunity
to so lead and direct economic development that the abuses of capitalism
which lead to violent revolution can be avoided. The problem is to have
the economic revolution catch up to and keep pace with the more rapid
political revolution. By democracy, they hope to prevent the
exploitation of the working and peasant classes and the need for class
revolution. By orderly and progressive solution of China’s basic land
question, they seek to remove the possibility of a land revolution. By
the encouragement of such institutions as cooperatives, they can assist
productive development in a way suitable to a country lacking in
capital, modern industry and communications, and at the same time
educate the people toward socialism. By encouragement of private
capital, they can increase national wealth and raise the standard of
living; but at the same time, by democratic controls, avoid the abuses
of powerful private monopolies that have created problems in purely
capitalistic states.
[Page 565]
All facets of present Communist policies seem to fit into this framework.
For instance: the substitution of rent reduction for the former policy
of confiscation not only helps to keep the support of the landlord
interests and to unify all groups in support of the war; it also serves
to make industrial investment more attractive to the landlord-capitalist
class by restricting their profits from land investment. The policy is
already having this effect in the North Shensi Border Region.
So although the Chinese Communist Party aims at eventual socialism, it
hopes to arrive at this, not through a violent revolution, but through a
long and orderly process of democracy and controlled economic
development. This democracy will be of a progressive—or what would
generally be called radical—type. The economic development will be
partly socialistic, partly private. The first is essential to the
second: the desired economic development can come about only under
democracy.
This long-term approach therefore determines for the Communists their
present policy toward the Kuomintang. Since they believe in democracy,
they advocate multi-party participation in politics. They accordingly
seek compromise with the Kuomintang and hope that the progressive
elements within the Kuomintang will rise to the occasion to make such a
compromise possible. To this end, they refuse to exploit what seems to
be a present opportunity to seek the overthrow of the Kuomintang. And
for this reason they seek to avoid civil war: even if they win after a
long struggle, the country’s development will be set back by loss of
time and destruction of resources.
At the same time, the Communists take the view that this desirable
compromise with the Kuomintang will be wasted if they are forced to give
up the progress that they have already made toward these democratic
goals. Therefore, while they accept provocation and abuse, they will
make no concessions of principle, because to make such concessions would
be a violation of their long-term policy and a turning back in the
pursuit of their ultimate objectives.
By this view the Communist Party becomes a party seeking orderly
democratic growth toward socialism—as it is being attained, for
instance, in a country like England—rather than a party fomenting an
immediate and violent revolution. It becomes a party which is not
seeking an early monopoly of political power but pursuing what it
considers the long-term interests of China. It bases this seemingly
“idealistic” policy on a rigid interpretation of materialism, which
holds it to be a violation of those materialistic principles to attempt
to force the country into socialism before the natural development of
the country’s economy makes socialism possible.
[Page 566]
Practical Explanation of Communist Policy
Almost everything that the Communist Party is doing and advocating can
also be explained from a practical point of view. This starts from the
assumption that the Party is actually seeking power and that this aim
provides the motivation for its policies. In very brief and exaggerated
form this interpretation might be as follows.
The Communists actively support the war because this gives them an
opportunity to mobilize, organize and indoctrinate the people, and to
create and train an efficient army.
They operate by preference in the areas behind the Japanese lines because
there they are relatively free from Kuomintang interference.
Such policies as the abandonment of land confiscation are useful
temporary expedients to help them carry on the war and to win unified
popular support in the areas of their operations. It also has strong
propaganda appeal in other areas.
Their espousal of democracy appeals to the great majority of the people
of China and is a good club for beating the Kuomintang. They realize
that popular support must be their principal weapon against the superior
arms of the Kuomintang in any contest of strength.
Their democratic claims, their engagement in guerrilla warfare behind the
enemy lines, and their proclamation of liberal economic policies based
on private property are also useful in appealing to foreign sympathy and
in winning the foreign support which they realize will be necessary, at
least for a time, in the economic rehabilitation and development of
China following the war.
At present, time is working in favor of the Communists. As conditions in
the rest of China worsen and the Kuomintang becomes weaker, the
Communists, both relatively and absolutely, are growing stronger. It is
unnecessary, therefore, for them to take active steps to capitalize on
this situation in Kuomintang China. They can afford to sit back and
wait. If things continue as they are now going, time will bring the
collapse of the Kuomintang, leaving the Communists the strongest force
in China. They will then be free, immediately or gradually as
circumstances seem to dictate, to revert to their program of
Communism.
Comment
It is difficult to make a clear-cut choice between these two explanations
of Communist policy. It is probable that something of both enter into
the actual formulation of Communist strategy. The bellicoseness of the
Communist generals inclines one toward acceptance of the second
explanation. Even the almost over-adroitness of the Communists in the
field of public relations and propaganda inclines one at times to be
suspicious of them.
[Page 567]
But on the other hand, the apparently genuine attempts of the Communists
to avoid any civil war now or after the present war are hard to fit into
the second explanation. And the impressive personal qualities of the
Communist leaders, their seeming sincerity, and the coherence and
logical nature of their program leads me, at least, toward general
acceptance of the first explanation—that the Communists base their
policy toward the Kuomintang on a real desire for democracy in China
under which there can be orderly economic growth through a stage of
private enterprise to eventual socialism without the need of violent
social upheaval and revolution.
If this view is correct, it follows that the policies of the Chinese
Communist Party will not run counter to the interests of the United
States in China in the foreseeable future, and that the Party merits, so
far as possible, a sympathetic and friendly attitude on our part.
It is requested that the attached copies of this report be transmitted to
the American Ambassador at Chungking and to Headquarters, USAF–CBI, New
Delhi for the information of Mr. Davies.
Approved for transmission:
David D. Barrett, Colonel, G. S. C.
