Subject: Conversation with President Chiang Kai-shek; the
Communist Problem in China; the General Situation.
As regards the question of Kuomintang–Communist relations, it is apparent
from the Generalissimo’s remarks that he is as adamant as, if not more
adamant than, before in his attitude which is one that no compromise is
possible and that the only acceptable solution would be capitulation by the
Chinese Communists to the demands and wishes of the Government, i. e. of
himself and the present leaders of the national
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party. That the Generalissimo has come to realize the
need of improving Sino-Soviet relations would seem to be evident from the
National Government’s recent action to replace General Sheng Shihtsai as Tupan of Sinkiang Province—steps which, according to
the press, are meeting with success. It is doubtful, however, whether this
action will be sufficient to imbue the Soviet Government with a desire to be
again actively friendly toward the Chinese Government and it may be that the
Generalissimo does not yet realize that the fundamental problem between
China and the Soviet Union, which has become aggravated by Chinese official
propaganda against the Soviets, is the solution on a reasonable and fair
basis of the difficulties between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang.
Nor does President Chiang appear to realize that time is on the side of the
Chinese Communists; that as time goes on the Kuomintang Government’s
influence and control in free China is deteriorating if not yet
disintegrating; and that if the Soviet Union should come to make war upon
the Japanese and undertake hostilities in north China with the cooperation
of the Chinese Communist forces and in Manchuria, defeat of the Japanese
continental armies would probably leave the Communist forces and their
regime in a strong political and military position in those areas, thus
greatly extending their control and influence and placing them in the
category of a de facto regime for a very large
section of this country having Soviet approval and probably Soviet
support.
As mentioned in the reference telegram, I suggested to General Chiang that a
solution of China’s fundamental political and military difficulties might be
found in some measure to bring together the leaders and competent
representatives of other groups and parties into a war council in which they
would jointly share responsibility for carrying out hostilities against the
Japanese—a suggestion which was the subject in part of the Embassy’s 1159,
July 4, 2 p.m.57
and subsequent correspondence. While saying that it might at least be worth
study, the Generalissimo did not appear more than politely responsive to the
suggestion, and it is of interest in this connection that during a recent
conversation between the Counselor of Embassy and Madame Sun Yat-sen, the
latter gave her opinion that it was not yet too late for the Generalissimo
to take some such step and expressed strong belief that if he did not
endeavor to do something of the sort, the time was coming when he would “be
finished” and China would be lost as well as himself.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in
China (Gauss)
[Chungking,] August 31, 1944.
President Chiang having invited me, through Dr. Wu,58 to come to see him
yesterday afternoon at his summer residence in Hwangshan, I made the
journey by motor car with Dr. Wu, arriving at 4:15 P.M.
President Chiang as usual greeted me cordially, said he had not seen me
for some time, wanted to have a talk with me; we were served tea, and in
characteristic fashion he began his interrogations:—
- 1.
- What news had I on the Polish question? Did I believe that a
solution would be found?
- I commented that I had little official news on this subject; I
had noted the visit of the Polish Premier to Moscow and his
later return to confer with his colleagues in London and,
apparently, to consult the Polish underground movement in
Poland; my reading of the reports did not discourage my belief
that some compromise solution would be found.
- 2.
- What did I know of Mr. Nelson’s59 purpose in
visiting China?
- I commented that the exchanges on this subject had not passed
through the Embassy and perhaps President Chiang himself had
more detailed information on the plans. I knew that Mr. Nelson’s
visit had to do with economic problems. Mr. Nelson is a
prominent and important official of the Government in the war
effort—the War Production Board—and was formerly the head of a
very large American manufacturing company. I did not know Mr.
Nelson personally; but I understood him to be a man of great
ability and it is fortunate that he has been chosen to come to
China.
General Chiang then embarked on what was plainly the object of his
invitation to me—an exposition of his side of the Chinese Communist
problem and, indirectly through me, criticism of the American Government
attitude.
He asked me what was the attitude of the American Government on this
problem.
I replied that I understood that Vice President Wallace had expressed the
President’s view on this problem—one of concern that differences in
China should be impeding the war effort—the war against the Japanese—and
the hope that China could find an early, peaceful solution.
The Generalissimo then asked whether I agreed with Mr. Wallace’s views on
the Communist problem. I replied that I was certain that
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Mr. Wallace had expressed the American
Government views, and I was certainly in accord with the view that an
early solution of the problem by peaceful means is important to China
and to the successful and early termination of the war in the
Pacific.
The Generalissimo then said that “Washington” does not understand the
Communist problem in China, and it is my duty—the duty of the Embassy—to
see that Washington is fully informed on it and understands it
thoroughly.
I replied that the Embassy is fully aware of its responsibility to inform
the American Government accurately and promptly on this and other
current problems in China; that we have been and are continuing to do
so; that we endeavor to be objective in our approach to all these
matters; we sift out propaganda and endeavor to get the cold facts. I
felt that Washington was being kept fully and carefully informed on all
phases of this problem. It would certainly be my responsibility to
continue to see that this was done.
President Chiang then embarked upon an extended exposition of the
Communist problem, condemning the Communists and their treachery, etc.
on a pattern all too familiar over the years.
He then went on to say that China is disposed to follow the United States
lead on world problems of today, and it is not unfriendly for us to
suggest to China that steps should be taken to improve Chinese relations
with Soviet Russia; but on the domestic problem of Chinese Communists,
China should have the full support and sympathy of the United States,
and our attitude on this subject may have very serious consequences for
China. That the attitude of our Government in urging China to resolve
the differences with the Communists serves only to strengthen the latter
in their recalcitrance. To ask China to meet the Communist demands is
equivalent to asking her to submit to unconditional surrender to a party
known to be under the influence of “a foreign Power”. He declared that
since the arrival of our Army observer group in Yenan the Communists are
becoming arrogant and refuse to continue their negotiations. The
American Government should tell the Communists to settle their
differences with, and submit to the National Government.
I managed at this point to say that I fully appreciated the difficulty
presented to China by the Communist problem; that there is no
disposition on the part of the American Government to say how or on what
terms China should solve the difficulties with the Communists; we are
not injecting ourselves into a Chinese internal problem, but we are
concerned that a Chinese internal problem exists which is seriously
affecting China’s contribution to the war effort for the defeat of
Japan; we see a situation where substantial armed forces in
China—Chinese forces—are facing each other rather than facing and
fighting
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the Japanese; we are
seriously concerned over this matter and on that basis we call it, in
the most friendly manner, to the consideration of our Chinese friends
urging them to endeavor to seek an early peaceful solution of the
problem—for the benefit of China, and for the benefit of all in the
early and successful termination of the war. We have not asked the
National Government to “surrrender unconditionally” to the Communists;
so far as I know we have made no suggestion of any basis for a solution;
and so far as I know we are not prepared to make any suggestion. It is a
Chinese problem, an internal problem of China; we believe the Chinese
must solve it for themselves.
As to the statement that since the arrival of the U. S. Army observer
group at Yenan the Communists have become arrogant and are refusing to
continue negotiations, it was, I said, my recollection that even before
the Army group had been sanctioned and organized, we knew that the
Communists had declared that they were unable to reach any agreement
with the Kuomintang representatives, that the negotiations had broken
down and that the Communist representative had expressed a desire to
return to Yenan. In fact I was certain that my reports to Washington
would so show. I could not accept the suggestion that with the arrival
of our U. S. Army observer group at Yenan there had been any change in
the Communist attitude on the subject. I did not know whether or not the
Communists were taking an arrogant stand; but I was confident in the
statement that the presence of our observer group at Yenan had nothing
to do with their attitude. That group, I said, were in Yenan for
military intelligence purposes; they had no political mission. I had
talked with Colonel Barrett, heading the group, before he left
Chungking, and I was certain that Col. Barrett and his whole group were
concentrating on military intelligence matters and had in no way
influenced any Communist attitude toward the National Government or the
Kuomintang.
I added that we have no official contact with the Communists; we have not
been consulted by them; and we are not in a position to give them advice
or to influence them.
President Chiang said that the observer group could very well tell the
Communists to settle their differences with and submit to the
Government; and we of the Embassy, when we have any contact with the
Communist representative, could do likewise.
He then went on to repeat what he had said before, and in reply to my
remark that the Communist problem has resulted in Chinese armed forces
facing each other rather than facing and fighting the Japanese,
commented that the expansionist program of the Communists is what had
necessitated the assignment of Chinese forces to neighboring areas to
prevent such expansion. President Chiang remarked that our observer
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group at Yenan would also be
well advised to check up on the strength of the Communist forces. He
also remarked that the introduction of a foreign commander of Chinese
armies would not solve the problem of Communist cooperation, adding that
there are those in Washington who apparently believe that it is only a
matter of “issuing orders” to have them obeyed. He has ordered the
Communists to attack the Japanese but they have not obeyed.
He stated that the Government’s demands on the Communists are quite
simple—that they submit to the National Government and that their forces
submit to his unified command.
President Chiang then asserted that the Communists are well known to have
relations with and to be under the influence of a “foreign Power”; but
that neither the Communists nor that foreign Power would be willing so
to admit, for if they did so the people of China would roundly condemn
the communists as traitors to China.
He then asked me whether I believe the Chinese people favor Communism. I
replied in the negative, but commented that the Communist party is
reported now not to claim to be preaching or practising Communism, but
to have come to realize that Communism cannot be introduced into this
country at this time; and they claim to be following and supporting the
Kuomintang principles of democracy and to be seeking the improvement of
the condition of the masses—“democracy and the people’s livelihood”
principles of the San Min Chu Yi. I said that, speaking very frankly, we
have come to know that there are substantial elements in China, both in
and out of the Kuomintang, who believe that in recent years these
Kuomintang principles—”democracy and the people’s livelihood”—have not
been kept first and foremost in mind; that we have observed increasing
criticism of the Government; and that we have been much concerned by
information that at this time when all loyal Chinese should be facing
the enemy and not be quarreling amongst themselves, there is evidence of
disaffection amongst both military and civilian groups of some
importance in China. I said that General Chiang of course must know more
of these matters than we do. We are greatly concerned over this
political and military deterioration in China at this important
juncture.
President Chiang commented that the Communists alone are defying and
obstructing his government; and if there are suggestions or reports
reaching us of disaffection elsewhere, in any circles, this is but a
machination of the Communists, who, using stooges perhaps one, two or
three times removed from themselves, spread such false propaganda and
have it conveyed to us.
I remarked that, having spent many years in China as a close observer of
developments in this country, I had long ago learned not to believe all
I hear; I look always to the probable source of whatever
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may reach me; I am not inclined to accept
rumors or propaganda; and that I believed I should say to him that we
have definite information of disaffection in certain military and other
circles and this information distresses us. Our information does not
come directly or indirectly from Communist circles. But we learn of
these matters. In fact there is some apparent disposition to sound us
out on our attitude toward these movements; and I would tell him frankly
that we have had and will have no sympathy with any movement threatening
disunity in China at this critical period. It seemed to me that
everything possible should be done at this time in China to bring about
unity, to revive the spirit of resistance, and to work harmoniously
toward the one important immediate objective—the defeat of Japan.
General Chiang made no comment in reply.
He reverted to the question of the Communists, and repeated that they are
not to be trusted.
Asking, and receiving, his permission to make a personal
observation—prefacing my request with the statement that I had lived
long years in China, have great faith in China and the Chinese people,
am concerned over the problems now facing China, and have given much
thought to how it might seem to me China might find a solution of the
Communist problem—I stated that while President Chiang on his part says
that the Communists are not to be trusted, we have heard time and time
again the Communist complaint that the Kuomintang Government is not to
be trusted. It seemed to me that an effort should be made by those
sincerely desirous of seeking a solution of this important Chinese
internal problem to dissipate this mutual distrust—to find some course
where the good faith of the two sides could be put to the test and
demonstrated, to the end that mutual trust could be restored, whatever
political differences might remain. It was my personal opinion that a
solution might be found in some measure which would bring competent
representatives of other groups or parties to participation in the
government, to an understanding of the problems of the government, and
an understanding of the efforts being made by the government to meet
those problems; to sharing in the responsibilities of the government. I
said that I was of course aware of the Kuomintang contention that there
can now be one party government in China, only. I should like to see
that difficulty overcome; but even if it could not be overcome on a
broad basis to give some representation in the government to minor
parties, perhaps a limited solution might be found under which able
representation of parties or special groups might be provided for—that
such representation could be invited to come and share in some form of
responsible war council, planning and carrying out the plans to meet the
serious war crisis now facing China—sharing with the Government
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the responsibility in this
whole matter. Nothing could be more sobering to critics than to have
them called upon to assume responsibilities in connection with
activities which they criticise. The Government would certainly be
entitled to call upon all Chinese who claim to be patriotic Chinese to
shelve their political differences for the moment and to cooperate in
the major war problem of facing and defeating China’s enemies. In such
sharing of responsibility perhaps there could be developed a situation
overcoming the present mistrust and criticism; and a disposition toward
cooperation for the unification of China. This was but my own personal,
modest thought; a thought springing from my intense interest in China
and my desire that, for the good of China, domestic quarrels should be
abandoned and the Chinese people should stand as a united people facing
the Japanese.
General Chiang listened attentively; paused for some moments after I had
ceased speaking; and then said that the suggestion might at least be
worth studying.
He then embarked again on a review of the points he had been making
repeatedly throughout our conversation.
General Chiang was most cordial and friendly throughout the whole of our
conversation; he said that he wanted to see me frequently; and he
invited me to come and stay with him in the hills whenever I found the
heat of Chungking too oppressive.
I made the usual polite inquiries regarding Madame Chiang, and the
Generalissimo’s health, commenting on the heavy burden of work he is
carrying, etc.
The interview terminated at 6:15 P.M.
