745C.9315/5
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose13 (a) copy of a map of the Burma front issued by the (Party) Ministry of Information and (b) copy of a memorandum of March 18, 1944, prepared by Second Secretary John S. Service, on detail to General Stilwell’s staff, in regard to Chinese territorial claims in north Burma.
Summary. A map recently issued by the Ministry of Information shows as Chinese territory the Hukawng Valley region in north Burma occupied by Chinese troops during operations against the Japanese. The Government spokesman at the press conference on March 15 said that the question of the Sino-Burmese boundary would be settled after the war. Chinese claims to this territory will likely increase British suspicion of Chinese military operations in north Burma and may give further ground for alleged British reluctance fully to support the campaign in north Burma. Chinese claims to this region may be expected to be used as a bargaining point in any postwar settlement of disputed territorial questions between China and Great Britain. End of Summary.
The map, recently issued by the (Party) Ministry of Information and published in the Chinese press on March 6 as a map of the Burma front, indicates that the Hukawng Valley area is Chinese territory, the Sino-Burmese border being shown just north of Myitkyina and the line of demarcation placing Taro, Taipha Ga, Maingkwan (points recently occupied by the Chinese troops) and Fort Hertz in China.
At the Government press conference on March 15, a foreign newspaper correspondent asked whether the Hukawng Valley was in China or in Burma. Dr. K. C. Wu, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs acting as one of the Government spokesmen, stated that a joint Anglo-Chinese Commission had been established in 1935 for the purpose of working on the Sino-Burmese border demarcation problem; that the demarcation of the southern section of the border was completed in 1941 but that the outbreak of the Pacific war prevented completion of the work. Dr. Wu further said that a settlement of the border question would be reached without difficulty once peace was restored and the question at present was of little importance, the prime objective now being to defeat the Japanese. When informed by a [Page 45] correspondent that Chinese official maps showed the Hukawng Valley to be in China, Dr. Wu repeated his previous statement that the question must be settled after the war.
The issuance by the (Kuomintang) Ministry of Information of a map showing the Hukawng Valley as Chinese territory at a time when Chinese troops have occupied the area during the course of military operations against the Japanese can scarcely have been coincidental. We do not know when the map in question was prepared but its release at this time must have been effected for a definite purpose. China may expect to need bargaining points at the peace conference and in the postwar period. There are several important territorial questions which are of mutual concern to China and Great Britain, such as Tibet, Burma, and Hong Kong. Present possession and claim of the Hukawng Valley as Chinese territory (so far as we know, China has not heretofore extended the Sino-Burmese border at this point so far south) allows for bargaining in connection with other Sino-British territorial claims and China’s willingness and ability to make concessions should be enhanced by the possession of this territory.
As a result of this Chinese action, the British may be expected to view with even more suspicion than in the past any Chinese military activities outside recognized Chinese territory and the British authorities are hardly likely to be convinced that it is in the best interests of Great Britain to give considerable aid to a Chinese campaign to recapture northern Burma—a campaign with the following possible results: Chinese possession of further “Burmese territory” and the opening of a route for supplying a Chinese army which might then be in a position, with American and Chinese air support, to recapture Hong Kong before British forces under Admiral Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Command could successfully conclude operations in the Southwest Pacific leading to the reoccupation of Hong Kong. There have been rumors that the British were not giving wholehearted support to General Stilwell’s campaign in north Burma to extend the Ledo Road. British suspicion of Chinese intentions in Burma, which has been perhaps one of the chief reasons for the alleged British failure to give full support to General Stilwell’s operations, may now be strengthened by this evidence of Chinese aims in that area. On the other hand, the British may be forced to give at least token aid to the Chinese forces in northern Burma in order to ensure the presence of British troops in this area as a means of precluding complete Chinese control and as a propaganda measure to offset Chinese criticism of the lack of British effort to reopen the Burma Road. An officer of the British Embassy at Chungking states that the British authorities are aware of the possibilities of the situation but are not greatly concerned, as British forces are now operating [Page 46] in the Fort Hertz area east of the Hukawng Valley, and that there will be enough British troops in north Burma to take care of British interests.
In connection with the question of the Ministry of Information’s map, it has been noted that the map of China contained in the first edition (March, 1943) of Chiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny gave the usual marked boundary between China and Burma. The revised edition published on January 1, 1944, however, showed the northern boundary between Burma and China at a point considerably further south than in the first edition and, according to the legend on the map, it is an “unfixed boundary.”
Respectfully yours,
- Enclosures not printed.↩