893.51/7759: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:43 p.m.]
518. There have recently been indications that the chiefs of the Chinese Government are planning some new démarche connected with China’s foreign relations: possibly in the economic field such as renewed seeking of American (and possibly British) financial “assistance”; possibly in the field of diplomatic propaganda to justify China’s lack of affirmative war effort both military and financial in cooperation with our forces in China and lack of military cooperation with Allied forces in Burma; perhaps in the military field [Page 42] looking to justifying an intensification of military pressure upon the Chinese Communists.
Included among the indications which have come to our notice are: (1) Chinese Government’s continued unwillingness to enter into realistic, reasonable and equitable arrangement for financing our rapidly mounting military expenditures in this country; (2) unmistakable tendency on part of Minister of Finance and others to blame recent sharp increase in prices and spiraling of exchange rate principally if not entirely upon our use of U. S. currency in open market and upon dislocation of prices and agricultural labor resulting from our military projects; (3) refusal to employ in Burma campaign his troops now in Yunnan; and (4) information that Chiang very recently sent a message to the President3 (through what he would assume to be politically uninformed channels) putting forth the theses that Soviets have understanding with Chinese Communists contrary to China’s interests and also understanding with Japs;4 that Chinese Reds are concentrating in Northern Shensi for a drive on Sian and Japs are preparing for new drive in Honan with troops released from Manchuria, implication being that Chungking and National Government may be threatened as result of Soviet-Chinese Communist-Jap understandings.
As regards (4), it is assumed that Chiang used as his springboard reported attacks by Soviet planes on Sinkiang forces on March 11–13.5 We have not heard whether he has sent similar message to Mr. Churchill.
It is believed that our recent telegrams will throw light upon questions reportedly raised by Chiang (our 479, March 17;6 485, March 18;7 487–8, March 19;8 491, March 20;7 496–7–9 and 501, March 21).9 Consul Clubb10 from Tihwa, now assigned to Department, will be able to analyze Sinkiang situation for Department.
The affair in Sinkiang in our opinion is nothing more than a border incident in which Mongolian or Soviet border authorities with or without knowledge of Moscow have taken type of action which Governor of Sinkiang11 best understands in support of non-Chinese element [Page 43] in Province related to people of neighboring Kazak Republic. We have reported unsettled political situation in Sinkiang involving Kazaks and other non-Chinese elements of population; also Soviet-Chinese friction.
It does not seem to us credible that Soviet would now undertake any serious military démarche in or against China. But their border authorities may find occasion from time to time by show of force to remind Sinkiang authorities of their interest in that Province and in non-Chinese elements of its population.
Aside from sowing continued distrust of Soviet, most plausible explanation of thesis is that Chiang desires to justify continued blockade of Chinese Communists in view of recent persistent foreign interest in that subject. Foreign press correspondents have been asking questions regarding blockade and urging that they be permitted to visit Communist areas. Publication of Mme. Sun Yat-sen’s criticism of blockade against Communists12 and critical press and magazine comment in U. S. such as March 13 New Republic have irritated Kuomintang. It is of course not beyond range of possibility that Chiang is also preparing to justify an attack on Chinese Communists although this does not seem probable at this time. It has long been contention of anti-Communist “War Party” among the Kuomintang that opportunity for liquidating Communist situation lies only in period while the war is on and will disappear at the end of war or before if Soviet should become involved in hostilities with Japs and give support to Chinese Communists. The [This is?] thesis Mr. Yalsabe [sic] used to justify failure of Chiang to move his armies in Yunnan into Burma campaign, implying that there is serious threat to China in other directions.
Military information tends to confirm statement that Japan is preparing for new drive in Honan but we have no information] indicating that this is to be undertaken with forces from Manchuria and as we have reported Chief of Chinese Intelligence states that Jap troops have not been moved into China proper from Manchuria and that in recent months five divisions of Jap troops have been withdrawn from China without replacement.
Concentration of enlarged Red forces in northeastern Shensi followed up on increase in Chinese Government forces blockading Communists who were suspected of planning to extend their area of occupation closer to Soviet territory.
While we have instructed Consul at Tihwa to report further in regard to incident of March 11–13, we have not suggested that he proceed to Chenghwa to investigate or to make formal inquiries which [Page 44] might be misconstrued by Soviet authorities. We believe it unwise from all standpoints to become involved in the matter.
- War Department’s message No. 15672, April 4, 1944, not found in Department files.↩
- Soviet-Japanese agreements on March 30, 1944, on the liquidation of the Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin and the prolongation of the 1928 fisheries convention (861B.6363/174).↩
- See pp. 758 ff.↩
- Post, p. 761.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Post, pp. 382 and 761, respectively.↩
- Not printed.↩
- For Nos. 496 and 499, see p. 762; Nos. 497 and 501, not printed.↩
- O. Edmund Clubb.↩
- Gen. Sheng Shih-tsai.↩
- See despatch No. 2217, February 23, from the Ambassador in China, p. 351.↩