Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

861.51/3019: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 7, 1944—4 p.m.
[Received January 8—10:56 a.m.]

56. Personal for Hopkins.¹⁸ On my return from Tehran¹⁹ I told Molotov²⁰ that the President regretted he had not had the time to discuss with Stalin the question of United States participation in the reconstruction of damage and dislocation caused by the war to the economic life of the Soviet Union, and that he had asked me to discuss the subject with Molotov at some convenient time.

In my subsequent talk with him on December 31, Molotov brought up the question on his own initiative and asked me what might be done. I outlined the approach I had discussed with the President and you at Tehran. I told him that the legal limitations on lendlease make it necessary to devise other methods of handling Soviet requests on the United States which could not be justified as needed for the direct prosecution of the war. I divide the subject into three categories:

(1) The possibility of the extension by an agency of the United States Government to the Soviet Government of a credit for the purchase in the United States of equipment and supplies for reconstruction;

(2) the desirability of the Soviet Government’s making known to us the specific type and quantity of equipment which were most urgently needed and over what period;

(3) the value of having American experts come to the Soviet Union to assist in planning and in obtaining information as to Soviet needs in the various branches of industry, transport, agriculture and housing, and possibly also the dispatch of Soviet experts to the United States.

I explained the difficulty of making available any large quantities promptly because of our war requirements. I indicated, on the other hand, the time that would be saved by making plans now even to the point of developing detailed designs so that, as the opportunity arose during the course of the war and after, there would be no loss of time in putting their requirements into production. Molotov showed the keenest interest and by his questions and comments indicated that he understood and approved the approach I had outlined. I explained to him that everything I said was tentative and that much of it was my personal analysis of what might be done.

In reply to his inquiry as to how I thought the matter could best be developed, I suggested that Mikoyan²¹ should be authorized to discuss the matter with me. He said he would arrange this and I expect to hear from Mikoyan shortly.

By this long talk with Molotov I believe that I can work out here the framework of a basic understanding for consideration in Washington.

I ask to be advised specifically:

1. Whether in principle the approach as described above is tentatively approved.

2. The size and general terms of a credit that might be considered at the present time and the agency which would extend it. I have in mind that the first credit might be relatively small, to be expanded at a later date if desirable, and that the specific projects under this credit would be approved in Washington item by item, with such recommendations from us here as may be required.

I am not suggesting that I be authorized to make a definite offer to the Soviet Government, but only to direct their thinking along lines that we would want and to develop a proposal for approval in Washington. Please bear in mind the difficulties we had 10 years ago over the meaning in Russian of “loan” versus “credit”.²² In order to avoid similar difficulties the term “credit” should always be used, as I understand the Russians consider a loan is granted without restriction as to use of the funds.

3. Whether it is approved in principle to send to Russia a few experts assigned to us here, if and when the Soviets want them, in fields where they can be of value. For example, Molotov showed interest in an American expert to assist in reconstruction of their Donbas coal mines, in prefabricated housing, railroads, etc. The work of these men might be of considerable value to the war, to the morale of the Russian people, and in getting our proper share of Soviet post-war business. In addition they could assist in determining whether Soviet requests should come under lend-lease terms or be applied against the proposed credit for reconstruction.

4. Whether it is agreed that the general negotiations should be carried on hi Moscow under my direction based on instructions from Washington and submitted for final approval in Washington. The actual placing of orders by the Soviets should be done in the United States with approval of the appropriate agency in Washington.

Until a general understanding is reached, I strongly recommend that no discussions be carried on between any Government agency in Washington and the Soviet representatives here [there].

It would be helpful if you could give me promptly a preliminary reaction to all or any part of the above for guidance in my discussions with Mikoyan.

From our standpoint, it seems clear that orders from the Soviet Government for reconstruction can be of considerable value in easing dislocations to our own employment problems if properly selected and timed for production when we are cutting back WTD [war] production during the course of the war and after. This will require the closest cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

Harriman

18. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt and Chairman of the President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. This Committee was established by President Roosevelt on October 30, 1942, with responsibility for the fulfillment and general coordination of the Soviet supply protocols. Maj. Gen. James H. Burns served initially as executive officer.
19. For the conference at Tehran between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People’s Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
20. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
21. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.
22. See Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 65 ff.