861.51/3022: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State

67. For Secretary and Under Secretary23: Copy to Hopkins. Reference my No. 56, January 7 to Hopkins: While at Tehran I had the opportunity of discussing with the President and Mr. Hopkins the methods by which the United States could supply equipment and material to the Soviet Union for reconstruction. I am sure you agree that this matter should be initiated on a carefully considered basis, bearing in mind all of its ramifications. As the Soviet Government places the utmost importance on our cooperation in this field, it is a factor which should be integrated into the fabric of our overall relations rather than dealt with independently in its purely commercial and economic aspects.

The Soviet Government seems anxious to come to understanding promptly and I believe this is of importance to us also, not only as a factor in cementing our relations with the Soviet Union but also as an outlet for American manufactured goods at the time our factories and labor are released from war production both during and after the war.

In addition, there is an aspect to lend-lease which is causing me considerable concern. There is no doubt that the supplies we have shipped up to the present time under lend-lease in almost all categories are badly needed for the Russian war effort, but we have already found in the few items we have been allowed to check here that the Soviets have over ordered and will probably not be able to use during the war all of what has been or is scheduled to be shipped. Also as the war approaches its conclusion there will probably have been accumulated in Russia a large quantity of equipment and material received under lend-lease which cannot be used for the war and which will be available for other uses. I recognize that because of length of time required to plan, produce and ship material to Russia and because no one can safely predict the end of the war, the condition I have described above is to a considerable extent unavoidable. On the other hand, I believe the time has now come when we should know more about the real need for some of the Soviet requests that are being presented and unless they [Page 1036] can be reasonably justified for the war, they should not be granted under lend-lease terms but against a credit for reconstruction.

Thus if a credit is now opened for reconstruction a method will be provided by which Soviet requests, which we are willing to fulfill but which they are not reasonable to justify as required for the war, can properly be met.

As explained in my telegram to Hopkins,24 I saw Molotov at the President’s request and discussed with him the general procedure which might be followed. I hope that action can be taken promptly to crystallize a program that I can be authorized to discuss at least in preliminary with Molotov, Mikoyan and other commissars involved. It seems clear that a better deal from our standpoint can be developed here in Moscow, negotiating with senior officials of the Soviet Government, that [than] by attempting to negotiate in Washington through Soviet representatives who have no authority.

May I suggest this question be discussed with Mr. Hopkins who is familiar with the talks at Tehran and preliminary instructions at least be cabled me at earliest possible date.

Harriman
  1. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
  2. Supra.