811.34553B/7–2044: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:30 p.m.]
2246. In further elaboration of my 2236, July 19, 9 p.m., the following observations may be of interest.
The first hour was spent in listening to Dr. Salazar read from some 30 pages of manuscript a history of the negotiations leading up to the present time. At the conclusion of this recital, I agreed that it appeared to me to be accurate as an account of facts and as to conclusions to be drawn therefrom with the exception of a single factor which was the element of time. For instance, he claimed that he had never led us to believe that he was prepared to consider anything excepting the first phase of the matter which was that of construction; that the question of use and control was always to have been considered as the second phase.
To this I replied that this would have been true had not the time element become a factor. His thesis may have held good last November, December, January, February; but that the conversations had now dragged on into the ninth month despite the fact that we had been very active in pressing the matter (to which he gave assent) and that the point had been reached where the first and the second phase could no longer be considered separately.
His rejoinder was that there were many factors involving Portugal’s neutrality and other interests which had to be taken into account.
Although the inter view opened in an atmosphere which can only be described as glacial, he gradually warmed to his subject and at one point the temperature was decidedly warm when we reached an exchange of views on the question of Portugal’s neutrality toward Japan, an attitude which appeared to me so difficult to understand as to leave me with a feeling of discouragement. He took refuge behind the qualification that it was a matter [of] “juridical” neutrality but I could see that he recognized the weakness of his position here.
Upon leaving I referred to his complaint that our insistence upon facing him with a request for an immediate decision was the wrong way to go about attaining our objective and asked what in his opinion would be the best way. He thought a moment and replied that, first, we should ask Panair to make him a true tender; second, that we should begin construction immediately after it had been approved; and third, that we should begin the staff conversations with the object of determining the manner and time of making available to the United States the use and control of the field. He added that he wished me to understand that in the event that all else failed and the staff talks did not lead to a solution favorable to United States, the use of the field [Page 55] could always as a last resort be brought under the Anglo-Portuguese agreement or for that matter this could be arranged now if desirable. I replied that [such?] a solution would not serve our purpose nor would it be given any consideration whatever.
I have just been informed that Colonel Serrano has been given orders to the Portuguese group now waiting at Santa Maria to prepare the emergency landing strip.