811.34553B/7–1944: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)
2042. Your 2236 of July 19. The Department derives satisfaction from Salazar’s statement that we may properly consider Panair as camouflage and from his further statement that the inclusion of the long runways in his memorandum indicates his comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project. We take this to mean that he understands and approves the fact that the airfield will actually be built by the U.S. Government and will be used for transoceanic traffic in the prosecution of the war against Japan. If he understands these two things clearly, we consider that definite progress has been made.
With regard to that part of your message dealing with construction, we object first to his statement that construction can proceed only within the limits of his memorandum of June 14 to Mr. Long, and second to his statement that the order for construction can be given only after Panair converts its estimate into a “true tender stating the costs”.
As to the first objection, the idea of an “inter-island aerodrome” expressed in his memorandum to Mr. Long is inconsistent with Salazar’s stated “comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project”. Such an aerodrome (inter-island) has never before been remotely suggested by Salazar or anyone else. We must insist upon compliance with the President’s request that Salazar “authorize the sending immediately to Santa Maria of everything necessary for the construction of an airport as contemplated in the survey”. Additional material and personnel for a later enlargement of the airfield cannot be sent at a future date as it cannot be landed.
As to the second objection, there is no time within which to convert the estimate into a “true tender”, which we assume will involve the working out of a written agreement of some kind. For our present purposes Salazar may do one of two things: (1) consider the estimate contained in the survey report as a “true tender”, or (2) authorize immediate construction with the understanding that any ultimate [Page 56] “true tender” will be in figures that are subject to his approval. In either event, the authorization for construction must be immediate.
With reference to that part of your message which relates to use and control: We interpret Salazar’s “comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project” to mean that he understands that the United States intends to use the airfield in military operations against Japan. Since his understanding is the same as ours, we do not know that it is necessary that we be furnished a written commitment or even a more clearcut oral commitment. You may or may not consider it advisable to acquaint him with the construction we place upon his stated “comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project” and thus afford him an opportunity to correct us in the event we have misunderstood him. We note Salazar states that “in entering into commitments as to materials, men, and supplies we will have to take our chances”. If we enter upon such commitments and construct an airfield on Santa Maria, you will appreciate, of course, that it is upon the assumption that we will use and control it. Presumably Salazar himself realizes this.
Upon the arrival in Lisbon of Mr. Culbertson and the presentation of the President’s message to Dr. Salazar96 we are extremely hopeful that the air will be entirely cleared, and that we will receive a message that will enable us to advise the War Department that it may proceed forthwith with the shipment of all required equipment, material, and personnel to Santa Maria.