811.34553B/7–1944: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 20—1:30 a.m.]
2236. I have just returned from a 3-hour talk with Dr. Salazar.
He said that he was very much put out at being faced with a request for replies to the two questions I posed in my letter94 and that I must take into account the unalterable fact of Portugal’s neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. With regard to construction he said that he was prepared to request Panair to proceed immediately but within the limits of his memorandum to Mr. Long of July 14.95 The order for construction could, however, be given only after Panair had converted their estimate into a true tender stating the costs. He said that, although he realized Panair would have to obtain men and materials from the United States Government and while I might properly consider Panair as “camouflage”, he must continue to deal only with Panair in order that he might justify his action to the Germans and Japanese on the grounds that he was merely entering into a commercial transaction with a private American company. He said that he had given orders to Colonel Serrano to prepare the emergency strip at Santa Maria and that this work could begin immediately without awaiting Panair’s statement of costs for the construction of the main airfield.
As to the question of eventual use and control, he said that he intended that this should be the main point of discussion in the forthcoming staff conversations. Although he realized that it was asking a great deal for the United States Government to enter into commitments as to materials, men, supplies, et cetera, we would have to take our chances in this respect relying upon the many indications which he had given me in previous talks to the effect that everything was pointing toward the possibility that the eventual use and control could be worked out to our satisfaction. In this connection he pointed to the inclusion of the long runways in the memorandum as an indication of his comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project. He said [Page 53] that while he was continuing by diplomatic means to induce the Japanese to return Timor to Portugal, he could not consistently give us now the favorable decision which we desired regarding the question of the use and control.
Although we went over the entire history of our conversations on this subject and although at one point I intimated that he had given us grounds for making certain assumptions which were proving in our conversation today to be not entirely warranted at the moment, I was unable to budge him from his position as to “juridical” neutrality vis-à-vis Japan.
He emphasized again in conclusion that he wished to begin construction at the earliest possible moment, and that during the staff talks the principal objective would be to determine how and when the Santa Maria facilities could be made available to the United States Government.
I informed Dr. Salazar that I was very doubtful if my Government would be willing, even in the light of the indications he had given me today of how his mind was working for the future, to gamble on an undertaking of this magnitude which involved the allocation of an impressive amount of materials, men, and shipping from other theaters where it was greatly needed merely in hope that matters would eventually work out to our satisfaction. I added that I would of course consult with my Government and he said he would receive me as soon as I had an indication of my Government’s attitude.
It is my belief that Salazar hopes that his dilemma will be solved by a defeat of Germany before question of use of field arises in which event he would then be in position, without any risk whatever, to make available to us all facilities we require.
Bearing in mind time element, we are preparing tonight a cost figure covering construction of project as outlined within limits of Salazar’s memo to Long, July 14. I propose tomorrow to present this figure to Salazar and inform him that if acceptable to him I will cable my recommendation that it be agreed to by my Government and Panair accordingly authorized. At same time I will ask him whether, if this figure is agreed to by Washington, he will request Panair to begin construction at once. Should his reply be affirmative it is my feeling as result of talk today that War Department may wish to consider advantages of instructing Panair to present formal tender to Portuguese Government at once on basis of the foregoing so as to start construction forthwith and thus gain a firm foothold on the Island.