740.00112 European War 1939/8–544: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 6—1:50 p.m.]
2965. For the Acting Secretary. I saw Mr. Boheman this morning at his request. He said that he wished to acquaint me with certain developments which have taken place since I left the informal memorandum regarding Swedish trade with Germany referred to in my 2931 August 3, 6 p.m. He said that the Government has during the last few days given the most intensive consideration to possibilities of diminishing and even eliminating entirely its trade with Germany. Situation, however, is a very complicated one, which he desired to go into in some detail by way of background. First he explained the factual situation regarding shipping. There are 400,000 tons of Swedish shipping composed of ships of more than 1,000 tons each engaged in direct trade between this country and Germany. In addition there are a number of small craft with a total tonnage of about 65,000 tons.
This 465,000 tons represents the carriage of approximately 65% of the Swedish-German trade. In practice about one-half of the total is at all times tied up in German ports. Congestion in German ports due to Allied bombing and other conditions has the result that loading and unloading in German harbors takes place much more slowly than the corresponding operations in Swedish ports which is the basic reason why at any given moment so many ships are tied up in German harbors. Boheman says that is while [that if] the Government suddenly announces that there will be no more dispatch of goods and material from Sweden to Germany, there is no question but that German [Page 595] Government will seize all of the Swedish ships then in its possession. Close to 250,000 tons of shipping will thus be lost to Sweden and would represent a calamity which this country cannot face. Boheman said that it must appear obvious moreover that such a result would not be in the Allied interest nor desired by the Allies. It is therefore essential that Swedish decisions to stop the shipping be taken by degrees and appear to be motivated entirely by practical necessities which even the Germans in their present situation will have to accept.
The Government has already stopped the departure of further Swedish flag ships to Stettin and other principal German ports because of the critical danger to the traffic. An opportunity may be given at any moment to put a stoppage to all the traffic and Boheman mentioned as a personal suggestion in this connection that the conclusion of an armistice or peace between Russia and the Mannerheim10 Government in Finland might offer such an opportunity. The legal basis for this action is afforded by the provision in the shipping agreement with Germany that the Swedish Assurance Association may at any time when the situation in the Baltic so warrants, refuse to give any insurance to Swedish ship owners who engage in the Baltic traffic and to withdraw any insurance already issued. Boheman says that when the Assurance Association in any given case takes such action, no Swedish ship owner will venture his ships into the traffic. Other German ports will be added to this list as rapidly as feasible so that eventually there will be no Swedish shipping to German ports thereby in practice cutting off the Swedish-German trade. He said that this decision, of course, is one taken in entire independence by the Swedish Government and has not been the result of my informal representations.
He said however that he felt that we must realize that as a result of this decision we would be getting in effect everything that we wanted and he emphasized that there should be no publicity as it would greatly complicate the situation with Germany and raise serious difficulties for the Swedish Government. Mr. Boheman also made it clear that from the political point of view it is of real importance that this decision is taken by the Swedish Government in furtherance of the interests of Sweden and that it is not the result of pressure from us. I am convinced that Boheman and the Foreign Office in general as well as certain other elements in the Government are strenuously urging that the Swedish Government should now meet our desires. The going has not been easy in the face of contrary views among reluctant and timid members of the Government. It is Boheman’s opinion that we will cut the ground right from under the feet of our friends in the Government by endeavoring to achieve our ends through methods of [Page 596] pressure on Sweden at this time. I expressed to Mr. Boheman my gratification at the information he had given me and said that I thought it was a great step forwards.
Regarding the German-controlled shipping in the Swedish-German trade which represents about 35% of the total, Boheman gave me the interesting information that there are strong indications that the Germans have already withdrawn part of it and that they may be compelled to draw out even more. The Germans are suffering from an acute shortage of shipping. With the Russian advances they will be compelled to divert ships now engaged in the Swedish-Baltic traffic to provisioning and evacuation of their troops in the Baltic. Some of these ships will likewise have to be diverted to the provisioning of the German forces in northern Finland which may succeed in getting into Norway. This circumstance therefore he thinks may result in the German-carried trade between Sweden and Germany reaching the vanishing point. This serious shortage of shipping in Germany and the imperative necessity for ships to provision and evacuate the troops in Esthonia and in northern Finland would constitute, Boheman says, an additional temptation to the Germans to seize the Swedish ships in their possession if the Swedes by precipitate and ill-considered action should afford them such an excuse.
I regard the information which Boheman has given me of this decision as of very great importance and I consider that we must take the view that the Swedish Government intends to implement it to its fullest extent and as rapidly as practicable. We have powerful friends in Sweden who are working toward our ends and I think it is in our deepest interest to allow this new development to take a natural course without any action on our part which may indicate suspicion of Swedish good intentions or which would play into the hands of the stubborn group who deeply resent any form of foreign pressure.
My 839, August 5, 10 p.m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador and Riefler and my 14, August 5, 10 p.m. repeats this to Moscow for the Ambassador.
- Karl Gustav, Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim, President of Finland since August 4, 1944.↩