740.00112 European War 1939/8–644: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 6—2:50 p.m.]
6311. Personal for the Acting Secretary. Following up my 6266 of August 5,11 Mr. Eden’s reply was delayed because he was out in the country. It has just reached me and I am cabling it on to you: [Page 597]
“My Dear Ambassador: Many thanks for your letter of August 2 enclosing a message from the Department of State dated July 31.12 It seems to me that we are now agreed in almost all particulars on the form of approach to be made to the Swedish Government. It is only necessary for me to make a very few comments.
Since my letter to you of July 27,13 we have been informed that Monsieur Hägglöf is likely to leave Stockholm for London on August 5 ‘to discuss certain matters with Riefler and Foot’. Presumably he will be bringing some kind of reply to the suggestions made to him on July 5. You will remember that on that occasion Riefler and Foot suggested that the time had come when the Swedes should discontinue all trade with the Axis and that as a first step, they should force their ships to sail to Axis ports. It is probable therefore that we shall learn something more of the Swedish attitude within the next day or two. Meanwhile we are informing Mallet of the lines on which we are proposing to proceed. We think too that we should at once take the preliminary step of informing the Russians. I will send you shortly a copy of our instructions to our Ambassador in Moscow which will direct him to approach the Soviet Government as soon as Mr. Harriman has received similar instructions. We shall also communicate our instructions to Clark Kerr to the State Department through our Embassy in Washington.
As regards paragraph c in the Department’s message, we should be reluctant to cut off basic rations for Sweden since as I pointed out in my last letter to you, we are concerned not only with the preservation of the War Trade Agreement but also with certain other objectives in connection with which we are extremely dependent upon Swedish cooperation. This point can, however, be left aside for the present. Let us hope that it will never become actual.
I am quite willing that the communication from Mr. Hull and myself should take the form of a joint message rather than a letter.
With reference to part II, paragraph c, in the Department’s telegram, it did seem to us that in present circumstances, the despatch of a delegation to Stockholm might cause some perplexity to the Germans who might well suppose that the discussions were not confined merely to economic questions. If, however, your Government feels that the matter would be better handled through the regular diplomatic channels, we will not press the point.
We entirely agree that the Swedes should if possible be persuaded to withdraw their tonnage from enemy service and to discontinue their trade with the enemy of their own accord and not as part of a bargain struck with the Allies. Nevertheless, the Swedes are quite certain to raise the question of compensating supplies and if the success or failure of the negotiations were to turn upon it, it might be worth-while to give them certain assurances. This is a matter which we have under urgent consideration and I will let you know if we wish to go farther than the formula which the State Department suggests.
We are most grateful to the State Department for agreeing to the text of the proposed joint message. We on our side agree that when [Page 598] they present the message, Mallet and Johnson should speak as proposed in the Department’s paragraph b of part IV [V].
Yours sincerely, Anthony Eden.”