740.00112 European War 1939/8–344: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 4—6:55 a.m.]
2931. Department’s 1520, July 31, 5 p.m.9 During past 3 weeks I have talked with Boheman and Sohlman, and Ravndal has talked with Sohlman and Ståhle along lines of following which is substance of an informal and unofficial memorandum I left with Boheman on his return from vacation, July 24.
Rapid change in military situation has made obvious United Nations will soon win war. Thoughtful persons are speculating as to what Sweden’s lot in early postwar period will be. What Sweden has to offer in way of transportation and production facilities it is hoped by some will be so much in demand that Sweden necessarily will receive treatment equal to that accorded to United Nations. [Page 593] Other persons are not so sanguine. They anticipate that agencies of Allied Governments will control distribution of all-important fuel, food and raw materials. They realize that if Sweden should be cut off from its present European sources of supply, which they perceive may occur even before end of war, and if Allied supply agencies should fail when making allocations to make provision for Swedish requirements the economy of Sweden would face a painful deterioration which conceivably might be prolonged for a considerable time after the war.
Sweden has in recent past given evidence of its wish to cooperate with Allied Governments. The assistance has been materially reduced which our enemies have been able to derive from Sweden since 1943. Nevertheless, since war is now rapidly approaching end and Sweden can without apprehension contemplate action it had previously felt it could not for reasons of national security consider and since, furthermore, any and every possible step to hasten end of war which in lives and material is costing so much would be to common interest, there is strong feeling among Allies that Sweden should now give maximum assistance to Allies and entirely eliminate aid to their enemies.
Time has come when Sweden should recognize that while for contractual obligations we have greatest respect, in principle these contractual obligations when placed in scales with war’s cost in treasure and blood become of little importance to people who are responsible for war’s conduct. While a spontaneous demonstration at this time on Sweden’s part that it desires fully to cooperate in shortening war would be understood and greatly appreciated by Allies, it is also thought that war is developing so rapidly that positive Swedish action may soon be too late to have significance desired.
If Sweden’s action now does not induce us to take important needs of Sweden sympathetically into account when allocating raw materials, food and fuel, it can hardly be expected by Swedish Government that those agencies in immediate postwar period will be inclined to give much consideration to needs of Sweden.
In allocating goods in short supply Allied agencies have had long experience and in view of many advantages from this type of control to both producers and consumers it is not likely that immediately after war this administrative machinery will be discontinued. It is anticipated, indeed, in view of desirability of obviating in so far as practicable postwar economic disturbances Allies will as they enlarge their area of control retain machinery for planned international trade. A system of priorities apparently will have to be used and it is almost inevitable that as a practical matter a country’s action during the war will be taken into account when that country’s claim to materials in short supply is considered.
That Swedish Government wishes to assist Allies in shortening war is considered certain. Therefore, Sweden should now in interest of humanity as well as in its own interest reorient its trade. From spontaneously stating now its willingness to make this change Sweden has much to gain.
Sacrifices and risk Sweden has entailed from practical demonstrations it heretofore has given of its desire to cooperate with Allies. Time has now come when by eliminating entirely its assistance to [Page 594] our enemies Sweden can go much farther. Sacrifices can be only of short duration, and almost non-existent would be the risk. Rewards for Sweden both economically and politically would be great on other hand. End of substance of statement.
It has been our impression from reactions of Foreign Office officials named that they are doing all in their power to convince the Government that Sweden should now and can now entirely stop its trade with Germany and enemy-controlled Europe. They are hopeful it will be possible within very near future to persuade the Government to use arrival of Russian troops on shores of Baltic as an excuse to withdraw Swedish ships from trade with Germany without violating terms of Swedish-German Trade Agreement.
My 817 repeats this to London.