Office of the Historian

740.00112 European War 1939/7–2744: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, July 31, 1944—2 p.m.

6018. 1. For convenience of reference in the future please telegraph Legation in Stockholm and Embassy in Moscow close paraphrase of Embassy’s 5942, July 27.

2. The British agreement in principle to this Government’s proposal with respect to the elimination of Swedish trade with the enemy is gratifying and the contents of Mr. Eden’s letter lead us to anticipate that there should be no difficulty in working out at a very early date a joint Anglo-American démarche supported by the Soviet Government.

3. Following are our observations on certain of the points made in your 5942; references are to sections of that telegram:

  • Section I:
    (a)
    We agree with the British suggestion that as a first step towards the attainment of our major objective, namely the elimination of all Swedish trade with the enemy, an attempt be made to induce the Swedish Government to withdraw Swedish tonnage from the service of the enemy.
    (b)
    Provided the Swedish Government does not procrastinate we are willing to give them an opportunity to take on their own initiative action responsive to our desires.
    (c)
    While we hope that our objectives can be promptly attained through the diplomatic channel and without the use of sanctions candor compels us to observe that this Government would be prepared in the final analysis to employ against Sweden any pressures or sanctions which might seem calculated to further our aims, including the cutting off of Swedish basic rations. While the consequences of cutting off Swedish basic rations are matters of opinion we are inclined to believe that in the light of the rapidly developing military situation in the Baltic, Swedish public opinion would not permit the Swedish Government to retaliate against a cutting off of basic rations by relaxing existing controls over Swedish trade with the enemy.
  • Section II:
    (a)
    We are fully aware of the various American and British military interests in Sweden and are in constant touch with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments with regard to these matters.
    (b)
    We agree to the dispatch to the Swedish Foreign Minister of a joint message (rather than a letter) from Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull.
    (c)
    The steps with respect to Sweden which we are about to take are regarded by this Government as of the highest political and military importance. Accordingly, we believe that it would be preferable to use the regular diplomatic channels, namely, the American and British Ministers in Stockholm, rather than to dispatch a special delegation to Stockholm.
  • Section III:
    (a)
    British remarks on importance to the enemy of Swedish tonnage have been commented upon above.
    (b)
    We entirely agree that the Russians must be consulted and kept fully informed of all developments. Our proposal is that after we and the British have agreed upon all necessary steps the Soviet Government be informed through the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow of our final plans and invited to throw Russian weight behind the joint Anglo-American démarche in Stockholm through appropriate representations by Madame Kollontay. The opening of direct traffic between Sweden and the Soviet Union might be assumed to offer an opportunity for direct negotiation between the Swedish and Soviet Governments with respect to trade between the two countries.
  • Section IV:
    (a)
    Undoubtedly the Swedish Government will raise the question of replacement by the American, British and Soviet Governments of supplies formerly furnished by Germany. If, however, we are to attempt to induce the Swedes to withdraw Swedish tonnage from enemy service and eliminate all Swedish trade with the enemy of their own accord and not publicly as under pressure from the Allies, we are at this time inclined to think that we should make no commitments to the Swedes with respect to future supplies except that we will do what may be possible as occasion arises in the light of our own needs. We believe that in our approach to the Swedes the emphasis should be on the necessity for the Swedes to stand up and be counted in this war rather than to permit them to bargain for our future assistance. That assistance would presumably follow should Sweden’s assertion of its policy vis-à-vis Germany be sufficiently forthright and unequivocal. In this connection we believe that the Swedes might appropriately be confronted with the thoughts set forth in paragraph numbered 1 of the Department’s 666, April 14, to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department’s 2980 [2988].
    (b)
    We agree that it may be necessary to permit humanitarian shipments to Norway and Denmark. We believe that these are details, however, which could be handled on an ad hoc basis by the Joint Standing Commissions.
    (c)
    We fully agree that secrecy is essential.
  • Section V:
    (a)
    Although we agree to the general approach taken in the proposed joint message to Günther we would have preferred a somewhat stronger tone. However, in order to expedite action we agree to the text of the message as drafted by the Foreign Office.
    (b)
    We believe that when Johnson and Mallet present the joint message they should orally outline to the Swedish Foreign Minister the situation, political and military, which leads the British and American Governments and presumably the Soviet Government if its agreement can be obtained, to propose that the Swedish Government seize firmly the present opportunity to bring about this radical change in Swedish policy towards Germany. These oral remarks would follow and be a development of the conversation which Johnson has already had with Günther (see Stockholm’s 2669, July 18, repeated to London as Stockholm’s 677 [709]). The remarks made by Johnson in the latter conversation, however, were purported to have been his own personal suggestions and the oral statements now suggested would therefore be an official confirmation of what Johnson has already intimated might be forthcoming from the American and British Governments.

4. Please present the foregoing to Mr. Eden immediately so that we may obtain British concurrence with our views and move forward with this important matter including consultation with Moscow.

Sent to London for action, repeated to Stockholm as no. 1520 and to Moscow as no. 1822 for information only.

Stettinius