740.00112 European War 1939/7–2744: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 27—1 p.m.]
5942. (Section I) Reurtels 5490 July 13, 4 p.m. and 5491 July 13, 5 p.m. Following has just been received from Mr. Eden together with the draft of a proposed immediate joint personal letter to M. Günther, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, referred to therein:
“Thank you for your letter of the 14th July regarding elimination of Swedish trade with the enemy.
As the Prime Minister has already informed the President we entirely agree regarding the desirability of such elimination. Indeed as you are probably aware this matter was informally raised with M. Hägglöf on the 5th July before his return to Sweden. It was suggested that the time had come when the Swedish Government of their own accord should suspend all trade with the Axis and that as a first stage they should prohibit all Swedish vessels from sailing to Axis ports. M. Hägglöf promised to consult with his Government but unfortunately owing to weather conditions his return was delayed for a week. We may assume however that the Swedes are now aware of what is in our minds.
[Page 588]The form and timing of the proposed approach to the Swedish Government need, we think, to be carefully considered. It would in our opinion be a mistake to lead off with a formal demand that Sweden should at once cease all trade with Axis countries—even more so if the demand were made public. As we and you know well, the Swedes are an extremely stubborn people and judging from past experience anything in the nature of an utlimatum would merely evoke a refusal. We should then either have to retract, which would be distasteful, or apply some form of sanctions. The latter course would presumably involve cutting off Swedish basic rations. The Swedes would then be under no obligation to observe and police last year’s War Trade Agreement with the result that the enemy might well obtain more and not less economic assistance. Moreover we might jeopardize our other objectives in Sweden. These include (a):
(Section II) Certain plans in which the Combined Chiefs of Staff are interested, the collection of intelligence and underground connections with Central Europe and Denmark. I may say that, in our opinion, the intelligence which has reached us from Sweden in recent months has been of the highest value. The Chiefs of Staff are communicating with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the aspects of the matter that chiefly interest them.
On the other hand the Swedes have shown during the past year a disposition to meet our wishes provided that they do not appear to be yielding to pressure, and publicity is avoided during the discussions. For example, you may remember that last year their economic delegation which visited London entered into a draft agreement to terminate the transit of German troops and war materials on Swedish railways, to include oil in the category of war materials, and to put a ceiling on the carriage of non-war materials on German account. The Swedish Government refused to ratify the agreement but put all these measures into force as an act of unilateral sovereignty. In this case, if they were to accede to our demands they would obviously wish it to appear that they had cut off trade with the Axis of their own accord and not because a pistol had been put to their heads by the Allies.
We think that the first step might be that Mr. Hull and I should send an immediate personal letter to M. Günther, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
I enclose a draft for Mr. Hull’s consideration. We suggest that the Swedes should be asked simultaneously to receive in the very near future a small delegation which would visit Stockholm secretly and there discuss this matter with the Swedish Foreign Office in consultation with the British and American Ministers. If your Government agrees, this delegation might perhaps consist of Mr. Riefler and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, since they are both (Section III) familiar with Swedish commercial questions and, if the news of their visit leaked out, it could be said that they had come to attend meetings of the Stockholm Joint Standing Commission. They should be accompanied by a representative or representatives of the services so that the Germans, if they hear of the visit, may be left in some doubt as to its purpose.
In our view and that of the British Chiefs of Staff, the prohibition of all Swedish vessels from sailing to Axis ports is far the most important concession which we want from the Swedes in the immediate [Page 589] future and far the most urgent. The German shipping position in the Baltic and northern waters is already most precarious and is likely to become more so. At the present time there are 1,100,000 g.r.t.8 of shipping operating in the Baltic on enemy account. This total includes 860,000 g.r.t. of Swedish vessels. If this Swedish tonnage were withdrawn the effect on the enemy shipping position would be disastrous, particularly if he was finding it necessary at the same time to evacuate his forces from the Baltic States by sea. If, therefore, there was a prospect of obtaining this quickly, we should not wish to lose time by pressing for the immediate cessation of all trade with the Axis.
Whatever course we may decide to adopt it will be necessary to consult the Russians and obtain their support. As you know, they have already shown considerable interest in ball-bearing supplies from Sweden and there is some reason to think that they are anxious to stimulate Russian-Swedish trade at the earliest opportunity. The opening of direct traffic between Sweden and Russia might, therefore, make the Russians less, rather than more, anxious to use violent tactics with the Swedish Government.
As on former occasions the Swedes are likely to react to a suggestion of the kind (Section IV) proposed by asking what supplies we are prepared to make available. We know that they are seriously alarmed about their coal imports after the European armistice. Although they have stocks for some months ahead they still feel it necessary to import from Germany in case supplies are not forthcoming after the armistice. They are afraid that at that time they may be left without any coal at all. They are also, we believe, anxious to know whether the basic rations which they now obtain under the War Trade Agreement will continue to be available after the armistice. If the Swedish Government replies to our proposal by asking what we will do to replace the loss of supplies from Germany, I think we should be ready with some kind of answer. We should be grateful if your Government would consider this.
A point of minor importance which should not be overlooked is that there are certain exports to Norway and Denmark of little importance from the point of view of economic warfare, which your Government and ours might wish to continue, e.g. I do not suppose your authorities would wish to cut off the present relief exports from Sweden to Norway. There are also the humanitarian projects which we are urging or may urge on the Swedish Government, notably the schemes for the evacuation to Sweden of a large number of Norwegian and Jewish children. Finally, it seems to us quite essential for the reasons suggested above that this matter should be handled with the greatest secrecy. If any hint of what we have in mind were to appear in the press the chances of a successful outcome would, as I am sure you will agree, be greatly diminished.”
(Proposed immediate joint personal letter to M. Günther). (Section V)
[Here follows in substance text of message presented to the Swedish Government on August 24, printed on page 626.]
- Gross registered tons.↩