865.01/2222: Telegram
The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
Algiers, March
19, 1944—8 p.m.
[Received March 20—5:33 a.m.]
[Received March 20—5:33 a.m.]
905. From Reber and Reinhardt.
- 1.
- During past few days we have had an opportunity to review Italian political situation with Macmillan and MacFarlane. Although it is still too early to determine effect of recent Soviet move on opposition parties, particularly Communist Party, recent events have again underlined desirability of reaching an agreed Allied policy.
- 2.
- All that is necessary are certain general principles within framework of which we can encourage contending Italian factions to work toward common agreement. This would avoid disadvantages inherent in our supporting either the Junta’s memo or the De Nicola plan as the basis for negotiation and would provide more latitude for compromise. It is clear that King’s presence is principal stumbling block to any agreement and that the longer such agreement is delayed the greater will be strength given to radical parties to impose their own solutions which is likely to endanger the two basic principles of United States policy, namely: that Italian people shall be free to choose own government at end of war and that a broad based representative government be formed not later than liberation of Rome. The extent of powers to be retained or delegated by Victor Emmanuel’s successor does not now in our opinion offer an insurmountable obstacle.
- 3.
- If the United States and British Governments can agree upon some such general framework of principles and authorize their representatives so to inform both the King and the opposition, negotiations can promptly be encouraged in Italy thus making possible a solution before Rome and eliminating danger of either freezing the position as it now is under the King or of permitting the more radical elements to get out of control.
- 4.
- We understand that Macmillan in general agrees with foregoing estimate and plans to make recommendations to London accordingly. His telegrams will, however, no doubt reflect the particular importance which British Government attaches to preservation of a stable Italy in the Mediterranean. [Reber and Reinhardt.]
Chapin