Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III
865.01/2704
The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: On behalf of the Soviet Government I am forwarding to you the enclosed memorandum.
The first part of the memorandum is being transmitted for the information of the Government of the United States in view of the importance of the questions touched upon in this part.
Sincerely yours,
The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State 97
Memorandum
In connection with the decision reached by the Soviet Government following the request of the Italian Government on the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, the Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. Kerr, in a conversation with Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs on March 13, 1944 stated, in passing, the following:
- 1)
- The British Government should like to stress, that the action of the Soviet Government, if it will be followed by other Allied Governments, [Page 1063] would inevitably undermine the whole foundation of the Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commission;
- 2)
- Besides, this would not be in full accord with the articles 37 and 42 of the terms of armistice with Italy.98
1. The Soviet Government considers that the stated above assertions are baseless and erroneous in essence.
It is impossible to agree with the statement that the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy, as well as between other Allied nations and Italy could in any way affect negatively the activities of the Advisory Council or the Control Commission. It is sufficient to recall the tasks and competence of the Advisory Council, as they were determined at the Moscow Conference, in the proper provision, in order to convince oneself that the Advisory Council contrary to the above-mentioned assertions is not an official instrument of the Allied Governments for contact with the Italian Government.
The same has to be said about the Control Commission. It is known that the articles 37 and 42 of complete terms of armistice with Italy have determined the authority of the Allied Control Commission as an instrument established with the purpose to carry out the regulation and execution of terms of armistice and only in these limits to maintain the necessary contact with the Italian authorities. The establishment of direct relations between the Allied countries and Italy is not in any discord with these provisions. The reference to these articles thus is groundless and, evidently, is a result of a misunderstanding.
As to the decision of the Soviet Government on the establishment of factual relations of the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, it is necessary to keep in mind that up to the present time the Soviet Government having no direct contact with the Italian Government was in an inequal position as compared to its Allies who had established from the very beginning a direct contact with the Government of Badoglio through their numerous institutions and numerous representatives on the territory of liberated Italy. The establishment of a direct contact between the Soviet Government and the Government of Italy to a certain extent eliminates the above-mentioned inequality and provides a possibility of direct contact between them, which already exists for a long time in the relations between Italy and the governments of Great Britain and the United States.
It is also necessary to keep in mind that the establishment of a direct contact between the U.S.S.R. and Italy is an establishment of relations with the Government of Badoglio de facto. The decision adopted on this question by the Soviet Government does not go beyond the limits [Page 1064] of factual relations between both governments and is just putting those factual relations into official form. In view of this a decision was made to establish not diplomatic relations between the two countries and exchange Ambassadors or Ministers but to establish only direct relations and exchange representatives between the governments.
2. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on the question regarding the political situation which has developed in Italy. This is the more necessary since up to the present moment the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America together have not yet considered the political situation in Italy and have not yet discussed together the question what kind of government should be in Italy in the period of armistice and what measures should be taken for its democratization.
It is impossible not to acknowledge that at the present time the situation in Italy is developing not in the direction of improvement in the desirable for the Allied countries direction, but on the contrary in the direction of deterioration. The affairs in Italy have come at the present time to a dead end, and the economic and political collapse of Italy is growing. On the territory of liberated Italy there exists, on one hand, the Government of Badoglio supported by certain groups of the population and expressing readiness to take part in the common struggle of democratic countries against the German-Fascist oppressors. Alongside with this on the territory of liberated Italy there exists a permanent executive Junta which is backed by anti-fascist parties and groups and striving to unite the Italian people for the fight against Hitlerite Germany and fascism and it is impossible not to see that on the side of the permanent executive Junta there is a considerably wide union of democratic elements expressing an inclination to active operations together with the Allied democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany and the fascist band of Mussolini. Thus, the Government of Badoglio as well as the permanent executive Junta are striving to take part on the side of the Allies in the struggle against the band of Hitler and Mussolini still controlling central and northern Italy, but in the course of all these months the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Junta not only were not united for combined actions against the common enemy but, on the contrary, were wasting strength fighting each other. Such a situation is, of course, only playing into the hands of the enemy of the Allies and is inevitably leading to the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of Italy. The experience of the recent months has shown to the full that the question regarding the uniting of democratic and anti-fascist forces in Italy for the speeding up of the destruction of Hitlerite bands of the fascist gang of Mussolini and, thus, the question of the establishment of such an Italian Government [Page 1065] which would unite these forces and would facilitate the carrying out of the task of the Allies in Italy is an immediate task. Meanwhile the establishment of such a Government, if one judges from the statements of the British and American representatives, is being postponed until the capture of Rome and until the conclusion of military operations connected with this aim, and the existing split of forces in the anti-fascist democratic camp of Italy is increasing more and more.
From the statements of the British and American governments it is known that at the present time it is not considered expedient to change the government of Badoglio and to support the demand regarding the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel. The Soviet Government is ready to agree with the mentioned point of view, even in spite of the fact that the government of Badoglio has not proved to the proper extent its ability to carry on the struggle against the fascist and pro-fascist elements. Besides, the Soviet Government has in view the fact that the question concerning one or another form of government in Italy will be solved later, when the Italian people itself will find it timely from the point of view of securing sufficient democratic conditions for the expression of its free will.
Since, thus at the present time, the governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union voice for the necessity to keep the government headed by Badoglio, in as much as the latter must secure the putting into practice the certain measures on uniting the democratic and anti-fascist forces of Italy in the interests of intensification of the struggle against our common enemy, and on the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that the present negative attitude of the political groups and trends, united by the permanent executive Junta, toward the government of Badoglio, cannot be overcome, if a certain reorganization and improvement of the Italian government will not be carried out in accordance with the wishes of the Junta.
Proceeding from the desirability and necessity of the speediest liquidation of the split in the camp of the political groups and trends inclined to cooperate with the Allied democratic countries, the Soviet Government proposes to the governments of Great Britain and the United States to take steps toward the possible union of all democratic and anti-fascist forces of liberated Italy on the basis of appropriate improvement of the Government of Badoglio. The Soviet Government is offering for the consideration of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States the above-mentioned proposals regarding the general situation of the affairs in liberated Italy, bearing in mind that this will assist the efforts of the Allies in the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini in Italy.