Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III
740.00119 E.W./8–1544
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
The Secretary of State encloses herewith a document entitled “Proposed Terms of Surrender for Hungary” (WS–222) dated July 26, 1944. This document has passed through the Working Security Committee and has now been cleared both by the Department and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Accordingly, the Ambassador is requested to place the document before the European Advisory Commission as soon as possible. Such minor changes in drafting as may be required to bring it into a suitable form for presentation to the Commission are authorized.
Proposed Terms of Surrender for Hungary
CAC–263
I. The Problem
In view of the recent statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the desirability of the withdrawal of the Axis satellites from the war and of the favorable position of the United Nations developing from the continued military progress in the Eastern Mediterranean and Eastern European theaters of war, especially, serious consideration should be given to the means available for accelerating the surrender of Hungary.
Together with Rumania and Bulgaria, Hungary was warned by the Secretary of State on December 11, 1943,88 that since the Hungarian Government had recklessly continued its participation in the war, it would have to share the responsibility for and the consequences of the defeat to be inflicted on Nazi Germany by the United Nations. Following the occupation of Hungary by German troops in March 1944 and the establishment of a puppet government under the Horthy Regency, the United States Government warned the Hungarian People that only by firm resistance to the invaders could Hungary “hope to regain the respect and friendship of free nations and demonstrate its right to independence”. The declaration issued by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on May 12, 1944,88a advised Hungary, as one of the satellite states, (1) against contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine by its present attitudes and policies; and warned (2) that Hungary [Page 884] had it in its power, by withdrawing from the war and ceasing its collaboration with Germany to shorten the struggle, diminish its own sacrifices and contribute to the victory of the United Nations; (3) that the longer it continues in the war, the more disastrous will be the consequences to Hungary and the more rigorous will be the terms imposed on Hungary; (4) that Hungary must therefore decide, while there is yet time, whether to continue the policy of opposing the United Nations. The implication was that an early capitulation would be rewarded by less severe terms than those which would be imposed if Hungary did not surrender before the defeat of Germany.
The primary problem is to determine the degree to which this could be achieved without compromising the war aims of the United Nations. Over-generous terms to Hungary would not only tend to alienate members of the United Nations, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which have suffered from Hungary’s aggressions, but might also seem to justify within Hungary the policies of the reactionary and pro-Fascist groups which have dominated Hungary for more than two decades. On the other hand, unduly harsh terms would probably fail to win the support of any significant segment of Hungarian opinion and might actually strengthen the determination of the Hungarian Government to continue resistance to the United Nations.
II. Terms of Surrender
A. Obligations to be Imposed on Hungary
- 1.
- The Signatories.—The instrument providing for the termination of hostilities should be signed by the Allied Theater Commander, by the Chief of the High Command of the Hungarian Armed Forces or his representative and, if possible, by an authorized civilian official representing the Hungarian Government.
- 2.
- Evacuation of Occupied Territories.—Without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Hungarian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than territory held by Hungary on September 1, 1938, their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the occupation authorities. Hungarian officials in such areas, except those whose continued presence is desired by the occupation authorities, should likewise be withdrawn. Individuals or units in such areas may be designated to be held as prisoners of war.
- 3.
- Right of Occupation.—The Allied Governments signatory to the instrument of surrender should have the right to occupy with any forces they may designate and in any way they deem necessary, and to utilize in any way they deem appropriate, any or all parts of Hungarian territory heretofore acknowledged to be under Hungarian sovereignty or in dispute as to such sovereignty, and to exercise throughout the country the legal rights of an occupying power.
- 4.
- The Terms of Occupation.—In case the occupation of all or part of Hungary should be found necessary to the prosecution of the war, Hungary should place at the disposal of the occupation authorities such troops, materials of war, public and private archives, power and transportation facilities as the occupation authorities may demand. This assistance will be used by the Allied forces in their military operations against Germany. Hungary will not, however, be given the status of co-belligerency. The occupation authorities may determine according to the circumstances, the degree of Hungarian disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.
- 5.
- Maintenance of Order.—In case Hungary should not be occupied, or in such parts of Hungary as may not be occupied, the maintenance of order will be the responsibility of such Hungarian Government as may be established with the approval of the Allied signatory governments. In addition to its ordinary responsibilities, the Hungarian Government will be required to hold and to deliver as directed by the Allied signatory Governments all Axis nationals and persons designated as war criminals who may be found on Hungarian soil.
- 6.
- Prisoners of War.—Hungary should be obligated to release, as directed by the occupation authorities and to protect in their persons and property, pending release, all prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, all other nationals of those countries, who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be similarly confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of Hungarian or Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, creed, color, or political belief.
- 7.
- Reparation and Restitution.—Hungary should be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the United Nations may require. Hungary should also be required to take all necessary measures to safeguard all property removed from United Nations territory which has been under Hungarian occupation or control, and all property in Hungary belonging to the governments or nationals of the United Nations.
- 8.
- Economic Reconstruction.—Hungary should be required to assist and cooperate with the United Nations in such measures for relief, rehabilitation, and economic reconstruction as the United Nations may decide to undertake.
B. Eventual Advantages for Hungary
In case the military and political situation prevailing at the time of the negotiations for surrender of Hungary should warrant it, the United Nations should be prepared to offer positive inducements to Hungary in return for its withdrawal from the Axis. The full terms suggested below should be regarded as the maximum concessions to be made in case Hungary should resist the German armed forces [Page 886] within its territory and deliver them with their equipment to the forces of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, Hungary should delay surrender until the defeat of Germany is imminent, the United Nations should make no concessions to Hungary except with respect to the ultimate restoration of its independence.
- 1.
- Independence and International Status.—One of the primary fears of the Hungarian people appears to be that Hungary is to be deprived of its independence and that the country will be subjected to the Soviet Union. The independence of Hungary after the war and its territorial integrity within its 1938 frontiers could be assured. The assurance that the independence of Hungary is to be restored, with political and economic foundations enabling Hungary to play a constructive role, together with its neighbors, in the Danubian region, and that the Hungarian people will have the right ultimately to determine their own form of government, would facilitate the withdrawal of Hungary from the Axis. Hungary might also be assured of participation in such general international and regional arrangements as may be established after the war, as soon as it gives convincing proof that it has embraced loyally the basic principles of peaceful processes in international relations.
- 2.
- Occupation.—Hungary might be assured that neither Czechoslovak nor Yugoslav troops will participate in the occupation of the country, since participation of troops from these countries might result in widespread disorders and lasting resentment. It might also be stated that if the Hungarian people resist the Germans and establish a more democratic government friendly toward the United Nations, military occupation and military government might not be necessary. Nevertheless, if military government is not established, the United Nations will have to determine whether a commission or other agency should be established to control such matters as disarmament, reparation and the punishment of war criminals.
- 3.
- Territorial Settlement.—In the past two decades Hungary has had territorial claims against all its neighbors. The 1937 Hungarian frontiers with Czechoslovakia and the 1940 frontiers of Hungary with Yugoslavia should be restored, subject to any rectifications which these two countries might agree to make as a part of a general settlement of the issues in dispute between them and Hungary. The existing Austro-Hungarian frontier should also be preserved. Although Hungary should not be permitted to retain the territory acquired in Transylvania from Rumania in 1940, Hungary might be assured that an attempt will be made to establish a more just ethnic boundary between Hungary and Rumania, the territory in dispute to be controlled by the United Nations pending the final territorial settlement.
- 4.
- Economic Settlement.—In assessing Hungary’s reparation obligations, it will not be the intention of the United Nations to impose such [Page 887] an economic burden on the country as to reduce disastrously its standard of living or to endanger permanently its economic independence.