740.0011 P.W./11–2344
The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
Washington, November 23,
1944.
My Dear Ed: I send you herewith an Aide-Mémoire concerning proposals for the use
of the French in pre-operational activities in Indo-China.
This is a matter which Mountbatten and all of us have very much at
heart. Until we have the all-clear from your side he cannot
effectively carry out sabotage etc. activities which he is satisfied
should contribute very considerably to his task.
You will see that the matter is urgent and I would be grateful if you
could let us have a very early reply.
V. sin[cerely,]
[Annex]
The British Embassy
to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
- 1.
- In August last His Majesty’s Government invited the
concurrence of the United States Government in the following
proposals:
- (1)
- The establishment of a French military mission
with the South East Asia Command. This would
facilitate the work of the Secret Operations
Executive and of the Office of Strategic Services
and would serve as the nucleus of the operational
headquarters which may be required later. The
function of the mission would be primarily to deal
with matters concerning French Indo China and it
would not participate in questions of general
strategy. It would, therefore, be much on the same
basis as the Dutch and Chinese missions attached to
the South East Asia Command.
- (2)
- The establishment in India of a “Corps Léger
d’Intervention” composed at the start of 500 men and
designed to operate exclusively in Indo China on
Japanese lines of communication. The activities of
[Page 782]
this
body would correspond to those of the American and
British Secret Operational organizations and its
establishment could be without prejudice to the
wider question of from what sources French forces
participating in the Far East should be
equipped.
- (3)
- French participation in the planning of political
warfare in the Far East. This would be a matter for
arrangement between the South East Asia Command and
the French Military Mission.
- 2.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff, from a military point
of view concurred with these proposals except that they
believe that French participation in the planning of
political warfare should be restricted to the area of the
South East Asia Command. No further action could be taken by
them in this matter as it was understood that the President
had expressed the desire first to discuss the question of
French Indo China orally with the Prime Minister.
- 3.
- The United States Chiefs of Staff took occasion to point
out that in their view, French Indo China was part, not of
South East Asia Command, but of the China Theatre and was an
American sphere of strategic responsibility. They recognised
that an oral understanding had been come to between Admiral
Mountbatten and the Generalissimo by which both Commanders
would be free to attack Thailand and French Indo China, and
boundaries between the two Theatres would be decided at an
appropriate time in the light of progress made by the two
forces.
- 4.
- This agreement was recognised by the Generalissimo after
Sextant57
as applying to preoperational activities. It has however
never been formally confirmed by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
- 5.
- No further steps could be taken in obtaining the necessary
approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the proposals
outlined in paragraph 1 of this aide-mémoire until the President and the Prime
Minister had had an opportunity to discuss them. It was
anticipated that this discussion would take place at the
Quebec Conference, but in fact the subject was never raised.
Consequently no further progress has been made in this
matter which is becoming increasingly urgent.
- 6.
- Admiral Mountbatten is strongly of the opinion that useful
and important work on irregular lines could immediately be
done in French Indo China. The French Army and Civil Service
are unquestionably anxious to take part in the liberation of
the country from the Japanese and constitute virtually a
well-organised and ready-made Maquis.58 The
secret organisations operating from South East Asia Command
have made contact with these elements
[Page 783]
and are now in regular
communication with them. All that is necessary to exploit
the situation is the presence in South East Asia Command of
the necessary French personnel from whom alone the French in
French Indo China will take the direction necessary to
produce the action required.
- 7.
- Admiral Mountbatten has pointed out that French Indo China
constitutes an area of vital importance to the operation of
his Command since it lies on the Japanese land and air
reinforcement route to Burma and Malaya. Irregular
activities therefore on the lines envisaged in the proposals
which are the subject of this aide-mémoire are for him a matter of
urgency.
- 8.
- His Majesty’s Government, therefore, earnestly hope that
the United States Government will concur as to the
desirability and urgency of pushing on with the irregular
operations outlined above and will take such action as will
make possible the issue of a directive by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff (a) confirming the
oral understanding already existing between the
Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten, and (b) approving the program set out in
the opening paragraph of this aide-mémoire. Such action would in no way
prejudice the question of the ultimate settlement of the
boundary between the China Theatre and the South East Asia
Command, which, by the agreement between Admiral Mountbatten
and the Generalissimo, is at present left open, nor the
wider question of the participation of regular French armed
forces in the Far Eastern War.
Washington,
22
November, 1944.