Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

740.0011 P.W./11–2344

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

Washington, November 23, 1944.

My Dear Ed: I send you herewith an Aide-Mémoire concerning proposals for the use of the French in pre-operational activities in Indo-China.

This is a matter which Mountbatten and all of us have very much at heart. Until we have the all-clear from your side he cannot effectively carry out sabotage etc. activities which he is satisfied should contribute very considerably to his task.

You will see that the matter is urgent and I would be grateful if you could let us have a very early reply.

V. sin[cerely,]

Halifax

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

1. In August last His Majesty’s Government invited the concurrence of the United States Government in the following proposals:

(1) The establishment of a French military mission with the South East Asia Command. This would facilitate the work of the Secret Operations Executive and of the Office of Strategic Services and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. The function of the mission would be primarily to deal with matters concerning French Indo China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would, therefore, be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese missions attached to the South East Asia Command.

(2) The establishment in India of a “Corps Léger d’Intervention” composed at the start of 500 men and designed to operate exclusively in Indo China on Japanese lines of communication. The activities of this body would correspond to those of the American and British Secret Operational organizations and its establishment could be without prejudice to the wider question of from what sources French forces participating in the Far East should be equipped.

(3) French participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East. This would be a matter for arrangement between the South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view concurred with these proposals except that they believe that French participation in the planning of political warfare should be restricted to the area of the South East Asia Command. No further action could be taken by them in this matter as it was understood that the President had expressed the desire first to discuss the question of French Indo China orally with the Prime Minister.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff took occasion to point out that in their view, French Indo China was part, not of South East Asia Command, but of the China Theatre and was an American sphere of strategic responsibility. They recognised that an oral understanding had been come to between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo by which both Commanders would be free to attack Thailand and French Indo China, and boundaries between the two Theatres would be decided at an appropriate time in the light of progress made by the two forces.

4. This agreement was recognised by the Generalissimo after Sextant⁵⁷ as applying to preoperational activities. It has however never been formally confirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. No further steps could be taken in obtaining the necessary approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the proposals outlined in paragraph 1 of this aide-mémoire until the President and the Prime Minister had had an opportunity to discuss them. It was anticipated that this discussion would take place at the Quebec Conference, but in fact the subject was never raised. Consequently no further progress has been made in this matter which is becoming increasingly urgent.

6. Admiral Mountbatten is strongly of the opinion that useful and important work on irregular lines could immediately be done in French Indo China. The French Army and Civil Service are unquestionably anxious to take part in the liberation of the country from the Japanese and constitute virtually a well-organised and ready-made Maquis.⁵⁸ The secret organisations operating from South East Asia Command have made contact with these elements and are now in regular communication with them. All that is necessary to exploit the situation is the presence in South East Asia Command of the necessary French personnel from whom alone the French in French Indo China will take the direction necessary to produce the action required.

7. Admiral Mountbatten has pointed out that French Indo China constitutes an area of vital importance to the operation of his Command since it lies on the Japanese land and air reinforcement route to Burma and Malaya. Irregular activities therefore on the lines envisaged in the proposals which are the subject of this aide-mémoire are for him a matter of urgency.

8. His Majesty’s Government, therefore, earnestly hope that the United States Government will concur as to the desirability and urgency of pushing on with the irregular operations outlined above and will take such action as will make possible the issue of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (a) confirming the oral understanding already existing between the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten, and (b) approving the program set out in the opening paragraph of this aide-mémoire. Such action would in no way prejudice the question of the ultimate settlement of the boundary between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Command, which, by the agreement between Admiral Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, is at present left open, nor the wider question of the participation of regular French armed forces in the Far Eastern War.

Washington, 22 November, 1944.

57. Code word for the Cairo Conference of December, 1943; for correspondence on this Conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
58. French underground force.