740.00119 EW/8–2544: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 26—3:55 a.m.]
6928. Department’s No. 6717, August 23, 4 p.m.24 Your helpful telegram received August 24, concerning Mushanov approach at [Page 368] Ankara. On the same day Eden25 expressed his keen interest in taking advantage of this approach (which by them seemed much more serious than was at first assumed), to hasten Bulgaria’s exit from the war. An emergency meeting of the EAC was arranged for that evening. Prior to the meeting my staff met with Foreign Office experts to draw up a list of topics for inclusion in a Bulgarian armistice, taking our EAC–21 and the British EAC–22 as the basis. At the meeting the three delegates found themselves in close agreement except for three questions, which were held over for further discussion, and it was agreed to draft armistice terms on the basis of the list of topics approved at that meeting.
Today my staff drafted an armistice instrument, stating the basic requirements in rather full and exact language, and based on the materials furnished by the Department. This draft was circulated to the British and Soviet delegations at noon. A briefer British draft covering exactly the same points was likewise circulated. Then my staff and the British experts worked through the two drafts, bringing the British draft closer to American thinking but keeping the briefer form of the British statement. This third draft was discussed tonight in detail in the EAC. The new draft was explained thoroughly to Gousev and a number of clarifications were made in the wording. In its present form the armistice terms would seem to satisfy all our essential requirements and provide a firm basis for dealing with Bulgaria.
The text of the draft armistice follows:
“Armistice Terms for Bulgaria
The following conditions have been accepted by the Bulgarian Government:
- 1.
- Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and the United Nations at . . . . .
- 2.
- Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.
- 3.
- Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw forthwith from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.
- 4.
- The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice.
- 5.
- Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.
- 6.
- Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.
- 7.
- Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.
- 8.
- Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.
- 9.
- Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.
- 10.
- Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage.
- 11.
- Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.
- 12.
- Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security.”
At the close of the meeting Strang informed us that he approved the draft document on behalf of his Government. Eden is telegraphing the draft terms to Moyne in Cairo for his information. He has been selected by the Prime Minister to negotiate for the British. Moyne will be instructed not to act on these terms pending instructions from Washington to our representative. Gousev seems personally satisfied with the terms and hopes to inform us tomorrow of his Government’s attitude. I recommend this instrument for approval by our authorities in Washington. If it is approved I hope that suitable instructions can be sent to Cairo so that the opportunity for speedy action will be seized.
In view of our Government’s emphasis on assuring Bulgaria of its future independence as a means of easing its exit from the war, I suggested to my colleagues that some such statement be made orally or in writing to the Bulgarian delegate at the time of signing the armistice. Accordingly, it was recommended in the EAC that the representatives of the Allied Governments in Cairo be given authority at their discretion “to reaffirm the recognition by their Governments of the independence of Bulgaria”. It was our feeling that such a statement might hasten the acceptance of the armistice and encourage more willing execution of its terms.
At Thursday’s meeting Strang expressed a desire to have Greece and Yugoslavia associated as signatories of the armistice. The Foreign Office suggested that the British Dominions also join in signing if the other two Governments were included. After tonight’s meeting Strang explained that his people were hesitating between inviting the Greeks and Yugoslavs to sign and inviting them to assent to the terms without signing, with a slight preference for the second course. In accordance with the tenor of the papers furnished me by the Department, I urged that the Greeks and Yugoslavs be allowed to assent to the terms without participating as signatories. I believe the British will agree to this. Meanwhile the British are trying to hasten the arrival of the Bulgarian emissary in Cairo. Nothing has been said [Page 370] here about making release of Allied prisoners a prior condition for receiving the emissary. I heartily agree with the Department’s view in this matter.