Office of the Historian

740.00119 E.W./8–2044

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

The Counsellor of His Majesty’s Embassy in Ankara was approached in the train from Istanbul on August 14th by M. Stoicho Moshanoff former president of the Sobranje and said that though out of office, he had been charged with a mission to see Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen.10 The Counsellor remarked that His Majesty’s Government’s attitude towards Bulgarian approaches had been defined; M. Moshanoff said he knew this but that this was an entirely new and official approach and that he was charged to present an official memorandum defining it direct to Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen. The Counsellor replied that he must seek instructions.

2.
The British Ambassador in Ankara was authorised by the Foreign Office to receive M. Moshanoff but was instructed not to go further than listening to what he had to say and promising to report it to the Foreign Office. At the same time he was instructed to make it clear that any communication which M. Moshanoff might make would be communicated as a matter of course by His Majesty’s Government to the United States and Soviet Governments.
3.
Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen received M. Moshanoff on August 16th and began the interview by speaking in the sense of the Foreign Office instructions as given in the preceding paragraph. M. Moshanoff of course agreed.
4.
As regards informing the Soviet Government he stated that he would prefer it if the Bulgarian Government could be the first to do so. The position as regards Russia, he said, was different as the Russians were not at war with Bulgaria. Later he expressed considerable satisfaction that all three Allied Governments would be dealing jointly with the matter.
5.
He brought an official message from the Bulgarian Government that they desired to get out of the war and asked to be informed what conditions would be satisfactory to the Allies.
6.
He mentioned two points which might affect the timing: (1) it was necessary to get in as much of the harvest as possible. The harvest, though very good, is late this year. (2) the need of securing unity in Bulgaria. He said that this could be achieved by the end of the month. Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen understood that these points related to the fear of German reaction. The reservists are not with the colours but are working at the harvest. M. Moshanoff said that Bulgaria could not cope with German reprisals.
7.
Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen deprecated delay. M. Moshanoff entirely agreed and said that since his arrival in Turkey he realized that things were going much faster than he had previously supposed. As regards the harvest, M. Moshanoff thought it could not be in till after September 14th but in view of the need for haste he finally said that enough could be brought in during the early days of September.
8.
M. Moshanoff will remain in Istanbul until a reply is received. He has authority, if necessary, to proceed to Cairo.
9.
As the State Department will have learned through the United States Embassy in London in connexion with the latter’s communication to the Foreign Office on July 28th, 1944 regarding Bulgarian peace feelers through the intermediary of the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, the British Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with American views that the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war would be of distinct military value to the Allies and that the Bulgarian Government should be invited to send a fully empowered representative to Cairo. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the sincerity of Bulgarian intentions should be tested and unnecessary delays avoided by improving the preliminary conditions. It is considered, however, that it would be impracticable to ask that Bulgaria should break off relations with Germany and withdraw troops from Serbia and Greece at this stage, and the proposed conditions are therefore:
(a)
that the Bulgarian Government should release Allied prisoners now in Bulgaria before their emissary is received in Cairo and (b) that a date not later than the end of August should be fixed by which the Bulgarian emissary should arrive in Cairo and condition (a) should have been fulfilled.
10.
Although there are some obviously unsatisfactory points about M. Moshanoff’s approach his statements reported in paragraphs 5 and 8 above seem hopeful and His Majesty’s Government consider that provided Sir H. Knatchbull Hugessen is satisfied with M. Moshanoff’s credentials he might go to Cairo as Bulgarian emissary.
11.
In informing the United States Government of M. Moshanoff’s approach His Majesty’s Ambassador is instructed to ask them urgently to agree that the conditions proposed in paragraph 9 above should be communicated as soon as possible to M. Moshanoff for immediate [Page 360] transmission to the Bulgarian Government. The next move would then be with the latter.
12.
If the United States Government agree His Majesty’s Government would propose to go ahead on this basis and inform the Soviet Government of what is being done. The latter could be invited to join in discussions in Cairo if so desired but as the U.S.S.R. is not at war with Bulgaria the Soviet Government could hardly sign armistice terms.
Washington , August 20, 1944.
  1. British Ambassador in Turkey.↩