841D.01/244: Telegram
The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 22—6:50 a.m.]
28. At 3:30 p.m. today I called upon Mr. de Valera and pursuant to your instructions delivered note no. 410 dated February 21, 1944. It seemed to me desirable to obtain his reaction to the note and not merely to hand it to him and take my leave. I therefore opened the conversation by observing that in my opinion the Cardinal’s pastoral printed in the morning papers and expressing the view that the United Nations should be grateful that Eire was not now fighting on the side of the Axis in view of the wrong of partition was not helpful nor conducive to that conciliation between Northern and Southern Ireland which Americans of good will hoped might prevail. Mr. de Valera said that he could understand my viewpoint but that I must also try to understand the Cardinal’s and those of 80% of the Irish Nationalists who suffered under this injustice. I said that I tried to understand that point of view but from a practical viewpoint could not see that it was helpful. I then said “It is certainly not going to make it easier for you to make the response which I hope you can make to this note.” I thereupon handed him the note in question and watched him closely while he read it. I am under the impression that Brown Code in which the note was transmitted to us had not been broken for he read and reread certain passages [Page 222] slowly, obviously seeing them for the first time. He betrayed no anger as he often had done when confronted with an unacceptable proposal, but looked very sour and grim. When he reached the next to the last page the purport of the note became clear, he paused and said “Of course our answer will be no; as long as I am here it will be no.” He read a few lines further and paused again asking me “Is this an ultimatum?” I replied “I have no reason to believe that it is more than a request to a friendly state; as far as I can see there is no ‘or else’ implication in this communication.” He then finished the note and repeated “As long as I am here Eire will not grant this request; we have done everything to prevent Axis espionage, going beyond what we might reasonably be expected to do and I am satisfied that there are no leaks from this country; for a year and a half you have been advertising the invasion of Europe and what has got out about it has not been from Eire; the German Minister, I am satisfied, has behaved very correctly and decently and as a neutral we will not send him away.” I said that I had consistently reported to my Government my belief in the good faith of the Irish Government as far as preventing espionage was concerned but that naturally I had no means of ascertaining whether espionage did exist; I could only assume that it did exist in view of what had taken place in other neutral countries where Axis representatives were present. I said that in view of the known facts my Government could not take the responsibility of not making the request in question.
I then asked him if he intended to make a formal reply through me or through his Minister in Washington. He said he would have to consider that but would make his formal reply shortly. I then took my leave.
Immediately went to the office of the British representative and advised him of the conversation which I have above reported. He asked me whether I thought he should see Mr. de Valera as soon as possible or should allow an interval to occur. I told him that in my judgment it would be advisable to wait on Mr. de Valera as soon as possible; that I saw nothing to be gained from delay. He told me that this was his view also in the light of what I recounted to him. He said he intended at once to telegraph his Government and ask for instructions to see Mr. de Valera at his earliest convenience. We agreed that the question of publicizing this matter should be very carefully considered by our Governments with reference to de Valera’s formal reply.
Repeated to London.