865.01/2399: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)
77. For Kirk and Murphy. The Department has read with much interest your telegrams Nos. 13 of May 3 and 17 of May 5 suggesting that Allied status be considered for Italy at this time and inquiring if the Department would take the initiative in presenting the problem, and also your telegram No. 18 of May 6 and Murphy’s 1483 of May 741 proposing that as an alternative, a concrete gesture be made by the Allied governments in the form of alleviating concessions which would serve to strengthen the new government by winning for it popular support.
The Department is fully sympathetic towards the present plight of Italy and concurs in the desirability of this Government taking its part in Allied steps which may be feasible in strengthening the new government and assuring its position until Rome is reached. However, the Department after careful study considers that to raise now the question of Allied status for Italy is premature and that it had best remain in abeyance for the time being, not only because of the unfavorable impact which this move would likely have on the French, the Greeks, and the Yugoslavs, all of whom suffered the consequences of Italian aggression, but also because of its far reaching consequences in tending toward the disintegration of the whole machinery of the Allied Control Commission and the terms of the armistice, far in advance of the date when Italy, as a defeated power, shall inevitably become a signatory to a peace treaty with the three Allied nations.
The Department, however, is fully in accord with the desirability of a favorable concrete gesture at this time on the part of the Allied Governments, and in this connection views with particular approval the proposals advanced in Kirk’s 17 of May 5 as alternatives to Italian aspirations for Allied status. Of these, the prisoners of war [Page 1111] question is one on which the Department would welcome a solution, and thus an end to the contradictory situation of Italian cobelligerency on the one hand, and on the other, continuance by the Allies of the prisoner of war status for those Italians who are already contributing or about to contribute to the Allied cause (Murphy’s airgram No. 127 of April 2842). Badoglio would no doubt also welcome this move. The Department also approves an examination of the terms of the Armistice which may have become obsolete with a view to their modification or elimination, and also concurs that terms of the armistice which may have been incorrectly carried out in practice should be promptly adjusted; a brief report from you as to the specific examples of both categories would be useful for further study. In connection with the foregoing the Department understands that the British also have under consideration certain proposals destined to soften the terms of the Italian surrender, and would appreciate a report from you on their plans.
In general line with the foregoing, the Department believes that it would not be best at this time to encourage the Italian Government to accomplish its desire to make formal acknowledgement of its adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, (Kirk’s 26 of May 842) and if the matter should again be raised by the Italian Government, you should tactfully suggest that it be held in abeyance for the time being. The Department has communicated its views in this connection to the British, with specific reference to the personal call of the British Ambassador on the Secretary on March 3143 when he sought concurrence of this Government towards that end.