865.01/2399: Telegram
The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 7—1 a.m.]
17. [From Kirk.] The question of the Allied status of Italy discussed in my 13, May 3, 10 p.m. was further developed in conversations which I had yesterday with various foreign officials. Agreement was frequently found as to the desirability of making some gesture destined to inject a vitalizing element into the present state of dejection of Italian people, not from any unnatural or misguided sympathy for population of a country which chose to fight with the Axis, but from practical consideration of facilitating task of Allies in their operations in an area which is not being treated strictly as an enemy-occupied territory, but has been accorded the equivocal favor of cobelligerency. Furthermore, it is being admitted that question of Allied status is an important factor in maintenance of present broad-based Government or in constitution of any succeeding government when changes may occur.
Chief objection to alteration of so-called cobelligerency status of Italy seems to be that it is obviously impossible to turn over to the Italians full administration of liberated territory owing to fact that it is either a military base or an operational theater and as every consideration in this theater must be ultimately subordinated to the priority of military operations, it is impossible to guarantee the conditions requisite for these operations unless a considerable degree of control is maintained by the Allies. Another objection offered is the unfavorable impression which a change in status of Italians might [Page 1109] create among certain peoples such as the Greeks and Yugoslavs who have suffered more directly at the hands of Italians. As regards first objection, however, I submit that a concession to Italy on matter of its juridical status should be accompanied not only by the safeguards of control essential to maintenance of the tranquility and effectiveness of this war theater but also by clear indications of the grievous consequences to the country of any failure to preserve that tranquility or develop that effectiveness. As for second objection, it may be argued that the struggle against the enemy which Greeks and Yugoslavs are pressing is prompted more by a natural patriotism than by a spirit of Allied solidarity and that anyway, for the moment at least, the priority in Mediterranean area which Italian theater holds would warrant risk of disturbing equanimity of certain other countries whose exiled governments have been of problematic assistance to Allies.
On basis of foregoing objection to which other might be added in argument, suggestions have been offered that instead of acceding to Italian aspiration for Allied status, alleviating concessions should be made to the Government in such matters as prisoners of war or elimination of terms of armistice which may have become obsolete and a more accurate application of these provisions which you [may] have been incorrectly implemented in practice. To such suggestion, however, it can be countered that palliative measures would neither alter the undetermined status which bears the title “cobelligerency” and which has produced so many contradictions and misconceptions nor mark a step in revival of the Italian people which at present stage is claimed to be only alternative to worse confusion.
In evaluating factors involved in the problem under consideration the question naturally arises as to determination of time best suited to effect a change in status of Italy if such a decision should be reached and in that regard as in many others references are regularly made to entrance into Rome as decisive moment.
Certain acts of internal political importance are scheduled as contingent on that event for execution and from the military standpoint it is essential that those acts be accomplished with speed and in a state of order and tranquility. If therefore statements made in my telegram of yesterday40 are to be credited even in part, a further advance in status from cobelligerency to Allied status would tend to assure that order and tranquility and in addition it would seem that an insistence on safeguards essential to Allied control in occupied Italy would be more readily obtained at present time when newly constituted government is seeking reinforcement and changes which may develop after entrance into Rome have not yet developed.
[Page 1110]I have learned that Badoglio has made same exposé to British representative [on] Advisory Council as he made to me and it is expected that he will see Soviet representative for same purpose. Accordingly it is probable that matter will come before Council and it is possible that one of interested Governments may singly take question under active advisement. I inquire therefore if you would take the initiative in presenting problem of Italy’s status to interested Governments on basis of statements and observations contained in this and my telegram under reference. [Kirk.]
- No applicable telegram has been found in Department files.↩