840.48 Refugees/6257: Telegram
The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 11—2:40 a.m.]
1937. For War Refugee Board from Murphy. Your 1669, May 27, 10 p.m. was received while I was in Italy. In the interval I have had opportunity to discuss this problem with the Supreme Allied Commander, Heathcote-Smith,59 Ackermann and other competent American and British officers.
I should like to make it quite clear that there has been no intention on part of AFHQ60 to discourage escape of refugees from Balkan countries. Whatever reservations may have existed in the past on this subject have related only to concern over refugees’ welfare once they are rescued.
It does not seem to me that crux of this matter is the finding of suitable places of removal for these refugees as stated in your telegram under reference, but rather that the primary difficulty lies in their rescue from enemy-occupied territory. Post-rescue treatment, as important as it is, should be far simpler of solution. There seem to be actually three main divisions of the problem: (1) The rescue work; (2) transportation, feeding and clothing; and (3) places of refuge or havens.
In the actual rescue of these unfortunates it seems to me that we leave very much to chance and to individual efforts of refugees themselves. Obviously under prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia only the hale, hearty and courageous are able to make the physical effort and run the great risk incidental to escape. It seems to me that results [Page 1063] of greater consequence can only be achieved through military and/or paramilitary instrumentality. No schemes neglecting this basic fact can result in more than an odd refugee here and there being brought out. The present rate of arrivals in Italy from Yugoslavia is considerably lower than figure of 1800 per week mentioned in your telegram under reference. This average figure represents a period when through favorable circumstances considerable batches of refugees were successful in leaving. Present difficult circumstances in Yugoslavia have decreased this figure. According to Allied Control Commission’s recent statistics from May 1 to 31, 3540 Yugoslavs were brought across Adriatic to Italy. I am informed by Heathcote-Smith that there were no Hungarian Jews brought out during that month.
Fortunately, according to our information from that area, enemy authorities are generally so preoccupied with pressure of military events that their attention momentarily is distracted from racial question.
As you will be also aware recent happenings which have affected Marshal Tito make it extremely dubious that, temporarily at least, his cooperation will be very productive.
AFHQ has been active in a study of problem of arranging accommodation and maintenance of refugees ex-Yugoslavia over and above the total of 40,000 agreed for acceptance by Mid-east. Temporarily this quota is reduced to 30,000 pending procurement of additional medical personnel, about which Ackermann is keeping you informed. It is also studying question of preparation on a larger scale to accommodate and maintain refugees from other European countries received in Italy and elsewhere in Mediterranean theater during the next 6 to 9 months. Study has also been given to question of helping such refugees in Italy, removing them to North Africa, or possibly to such places as Sicily, Sardinia or Cyprus. (Your M 61, June 3, midnight61). I personally feel that mainland at [of] Italy can accommodate a larger number of refugees than it now is handling. However, serious arguments are advanced against holding ex-Yugoslavia refugees on Italian mainland because: (a) Battle conditions require use of all facilities for military operations; and (b) supply problem concerned in their feeding and care might be dealt with more readily in North Africa.
Preliminary results of AFHQ study reveal that camp equipment in Philippeville and Bone areas (Algeria) is of prime interest. In Philippeville area accommodation sites for approximately 40,000 refugees, including some buildings suitable for hospital, are available. Location of sites would permit organization of camps for 10,000 which [Page 1064] I considered most economical size for administration. Certain construction work would be necessary, requiring at least six weeks’ notice before first camp or accommodation of 10,000 could be ready.
In Bone area there is a camp site with capacity of 10,000. This location is near Italian prisoner-of-war Yugoslav military camps.
It is anticipated, in the light of our negotiations with the French regarding the use of the camp site at Fedhala for refugees from Spain, that French authorities may resist our efforts to employ other camp sites in French North Africa for temporary lodging and care of non-French European refugees. It is believed best to treat this subject as a military matter, therefore, and accordingly it is proposed that Chief-of-Staff Allied Force Headquarters will inform French Chief-of-Staff that we propose to use whatever camp sites might be required for this purpose. After this has been done it might be desirable for the British and American diplomatic representatives here to make a joint démarche on the subject. We believe that should the French prove intransigent on this question public opinion could be rallied in support of it.
It also appears that equipment, stores and blankets on a summer basis are available for approximately 36,000 in French North Africa.
On the subject of personnel for administration of camps and hospitals the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff have been asked as a matter of urgency to provide UNRRA administrative and medical personnel ATM as military personnel is not available. AFHQ consider that acceptance of refugees in French North Africa is practicable only if UNRRA or other civilian personnel, particularly medical, is available. Could you supply any information regarding UNRRA plans and possible practical support in this connection?
With respect to feeding and care of these refugees, whether in Italy or elsewhere, question arises at what point UNRRA will be willing and able to assume this responsibility. Undoubtedly you do not consider that either the military authorities engaged in operations or the Allied Control Commission in Italy should perform this function over an indefinite period of time. [Murphy.]